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Using a very comprehensive Chinese firm-level data covering the period of 
2000 to 2005, this thesis empirically assesses the determinants and consequences 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China. In particular, the novelty of this 
research lies in our firm-level analysis which is based on a large sample of firms 
in 31 host provinces, allowing us to explore the question by distinguishing 
different modes of FDI inflows. 
We employ binary-choice models to estimate how institutional quality and 
pre-acquisition firm heterogeneity affect the probabilities of domestic firms being 
acquired by foreign investors. We find better institution quality encourages FDI 
and this effect is stronger in capital-intensive and R&D intensive industries. 
Moreover, in capital-intensive industries, better institutions reduce the 
probability of domestic firms being wholly acquired. We also find evidence of 
'cherry-picking' which is stronger in capital- and R&D- intensive industries. 
We then apply a combination of propensity-score matching and 
difference-in-difference estimation to assess the effect of foreign acquisition on 
acquired firms with a focus on export performance, productivity and financial 
indicators. We find significant FDI-induced export lift and finance improvement. 
However, FDI-induced productivity change is not significant.  
Finally, we investigate whether location determinants have different effects 
on attracting greenfield FDI as compared to acquisition FDI. We find the industry 
cluster pushes greenfield FDI away due to competition effect while attracting 
acquisition FDI, indicating that procurement opportunities have a strong impact 
on acquisition FDI. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1 Motivation 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants and 
consequences of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing countries using 
firm-level data from China. The determinants of FDI are key factors in 
explaining the motives of FDI inflows, while the consequences of FDI illustrate 
whether the host economy benefits from FDI inflows. In an effort to provide a 
thorough understanding of inward FDI, we further consider different entry modes 
of inward FDI, in particular, we focus on two ownership modes of FDI, namely 
partially foreign-owned affiliates and wholly foreign owned affiliates, and also 
two investment modes of FDI, namely greenfield foreign investment and 
acquisition FDI.   
Understanding the determinants and consequences of FDI in a developing 
economy is important for several reasons. First, the dramatic increase of FDI 
inflows into developing countries in recent years has attracted substantial 
interests from both academia and policy makers to study the main forces driving 
this new trend. In fact, the last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented 
surge in global FDI. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)'s database, FDI net inflows rose from 200 billion USD 
in 1999 to over 1.35 trillion USD in 2012. Its growth rate exceeds the growth of 
worldwide exports, domestic investment and gross domestic product (GDP). In 
recent years, a large share of FDI has flowed to developing economics and it 
continues to increase. In 2012, China, the largest developing economy, received 
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the lion's share of 121 billion USD (or 9 percent of the total) FDI inflows, 
followed by Brazil with 65 billion USD, Russia with 51 billion USD and India 
with 25 billion USD. Moreover, FDI has played an important role in emerging 
economies. For example, industrial output by foreign affiliates accounted for 
31.5 percent of China's national industrial output in 2006.1 Manufacturing FDI 
in India has also seen a five-fold increase over the period 2000 to 2009. In 2009, 
it accounted for 12 per cent of India's total exports.2 Therefore, the intrinsic 
importance of investigating FDI in emerging countries comes from its rapid 
growth rate and its growing importance in the host economies.  
Second, unlike developed economies, which have are well-developed 
market economies, most emerging economies are undergoing economic reforms 
across many aspects that may have an impact on the determinants and 
consequences of FDI in different ways. For instance, privatisation is recognised 
as an important factor in the surge of acquisition FDI in China (Huang, 2003) and 
Latin American countries (Calderón et al., 2004). Also, with regard to the 
consequences aspect, Bernard and Jensen (2004) observe that FDI boosts 
affiliates' exports but that this effect varies across countries. These concerns are 
particularly relevant for less developed countries given their institutional 
environments.          
Third, an investigation into inward FDI in a developing economy is 
interesting because of the controversy regarding the effects of FDI on developing 
countries. On one hand, it is a widely shared view that FDI contributes to the 
growth of under-developed economies by transferring technology, providing 
training for the local labour force, and facilitating access to the international 
                                                             
1
 Source: China Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises. 
2
 Source: FDI in India and its Growth Linkages, National Council of Applied Economic Research, India, 
2010.  
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market (Borensztein et al., 1998; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Greenway 
et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, there are increasing doubts from developing countries 
about the benefits of FDI. It concerns the possibility that FDI may not help the 
dynamics of developing economies if it is only capitalising on raw materials and 
cheap labour (Caves, 1996; UNCTAD, 2002). Particularly, pollution-intensive 
and energy-intensive industries tend to be relocated into less developed countries 
which normally have lighter environment regulation (Javorcik, 2003). 
Furthermore, two crowding-out effects of FDI in developing countries have been 
drawing increasing attention since the mid-2000s. From a financial constraint 
perspective, Huang (2003) suggests that foreign investment crowds out 
pre-maturity domestic private investors who are subject to under-developed local 
financial markets. From a technology point of view, it suggests that the most 
competitive FDI affiliates crowd out domestic firms in terms of accessing 
scientifically and technologically talented workers. The enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and high level of ownership control also help foreign 
investors to crowd out independent research and development (R&D) centres of 
domestic investors who have less control (Backer, 2003). 
Motivated by a substantial surge in FDI inflows into emerging countries and 
the controversy over effects of FDI in developing countries, in this thesis we 
investigate the determinants and consequences of FDI, with a focus on foreign 
affiliates in China. The main dataset used in this thesis is China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises (CASIE) collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBS) covering the period from 2000 to 2005. It provides comprehensive 
information about the characteristics of a large sample of firms across 31 regions 
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in China. Importantly, it allows us to identify two ownership modes (joint 
venture and wholly foreign owned) and two investment modes (greenfield 
investment and acquisition investment) of FDI inflows in China. One novelty of 
the current research is to provide firm-level analysis on the determinants of FDI 
with a focus on different modes of FDI inflows.   
We believe that ownership modes and investment modes are important in 
explaining why particular modes of foreign invested firms are clustered in certain 
industries and regions. Many studies, as we show below, explain the existence of 
different modes in regions and industries relating to firm heterogeneity and 
location characteristics. Therefore, without thorough investigation on modes of 
foreign investment, assessing the determinants of FDI in a host economy is not 
all-inclusive.  
Ownership modes indicate the level of control over local affiliates by 
foreign investors. In the literature, it can be explained by the transaction costs 
theory (Williamson, 1979; Crawford and Alchian, 1978) which predicts that a 
firm's ability to cover coordination costs subject to the host location's investment 
environment determines the ownership structure of FDI. Alternatively, it can also 
be explained by a contracting force on property rights (Feenstra and Hanson, 
2005), which suggests a firm's profitability and protection enforcement in the 
host location are the key factors in explaining the level of control.  
Greenfield and acquisition FDI are also commonly found as two investment 
modes in a host country. Existing theories also predict that firm-specific and 
host-location-specific characteristics determine the investment modes of FDI 
entry by setting up a new plant or acquiring an existing plant. Görg (2000) and 
Nocke and Yeaple (2008) show that firm characteristics (such as technology) and 
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a host country's investment environment (such as market size, institution quality) 
can explain why FDI operates in two different investment modes in host 
locations. 
The second novelty of our research is that we use firm-level data to assess 
the effects of acquisition FDI on target firms, while most empirical works have 
documented the consequences of FDI by investigating the inter-firm spillover 
effects. Since foreign acquirers are usually multinational firms with advanced 
technology, efficient managerial skills and a large market share, one would 
usually expect foreign acquisition to have positive effects on the performances of 
the target firms (such as export increase and productivity upgrading). However, 
the literature so far shows mixed results. For example, Kneller and Pisu (2007) 
and Greenaway (2004) find positive export spillover effects. Conversely, Barrios 
et al. (2003) find no evidence of export spillovers. A number of reasons, such as 
absorptive ability, have been discussed to explain the mixed results. By taking 
advantage of the comprehensive firm level data, this thesis takes a different 
approach investigating the consequences of FDI based on a comparison of 
acquired firms' dynamics with similar domestic firms in the post-acquisition 
period using a propensity score matching technique.  
 
2 The background of inward FDI in China and its policy context 
Why is China of special interest for this research? This section describes the 
basic patterns of inward FDI, and evaluates FDI policy in China during the 
period under examination of this thesis.    
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2 .1 Basic patterns of FDI in China 
The first wave of FDI inflows into China was the result of a policy of 
experimentation with joint ventures in the 1980s. By 1991, inward FDI in China 
reached 4.4 billion USD from almost zero before the adoption of openness and 
economic reform. The majority of FDI was relocated from Hong Kong's 
manufacturing sector to Southern China in the form of joint ventures. 3 The 
second stimulus of inward FDI was the formal announcement of the approach 
toward a market economic system in 1992. During the1990s, inward FDI 
increased ten-fold to more than 45 billion USD in 1998. The recent wave of FDI 
inflows into China was followed by China's accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001. During the 2000s, China received a higher amount 
of inward FDI than any other large developing FDI recipient did, as we can see 
in the comparison in Table 1-1.  
 
Table 1-1: Inward FDI in major Emerging Countries, 2000 to 2009 (USD billion) 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
China 41 47 53 54 61 72 
Russia 3 3 4 8 15 13 
Brazil 33 23 17 10 18 15 
India 4 6 6 4 6 8 
Source: UNCTAD's FDI database. 
 
During our sample period, manufacturing FDI dominated FDI inflows. In 
2001, 56 percent of the total amount of FDI in value terms flowed into the 
Chinese manufacturing sectors. In addition, 70 percent of FDI projects were 
                                                             
3
 Source: The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and the UNCTAD FDI database.  
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investing in manufacturing plants.4 Although we have observed an increase in 
the share of tertiary sector FDI, due to the opening up policy in the tertiary sector 
in recent years, manufacturing FDI remains the top performing of the sectors, 
accounting for 57 percent of total value in 2011.  
Manufacturing FDI varies in Chinese manufacturing industries. It can be 
seen that a majority of manufacturing FDI inflows in China is driven by its lower 
costs of production, which is consistent with comparative advantage norms. 
Indeed, the distribution of FDI across manufacturing sectors shows a bias in 
favour of labour intensive industries. Large clusters can be found in textiles and 
wearing apparel industries. 5  Although the electrical machinery and 
communication equipments sectors also attract a considerable amount of FDI, it 
is argued that many of them are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) which 
do not heavily feature R&D. For example, Foxconn, one of the largest 
multinational electronics OEMs in the world and which has recruited more than 
one million employees in China, produces parts for the iPhone, which was 
developed outside China.      
Manufacturing FDI in China also shows an uneven distribution across the 
regions. The biased regional distribution of FDI in China is associated with the 
uneven economic development of the regions. The eastern coastal regions, which 
have large ports, more regulatory provision and strong industrial development 
attract more foreign affiliates, especially Guangdong and Shanghai. Fewer 
foreign invested firms are found in under-developed central regions and western 
mountainous regions.   
Foreign invested manufacturing firms have also seen a change in modes of 
                                                             
4
 Source: The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and the UNCTAD FDI database. 
5
 For more details please refer to Table 2-3 in Chapter 2. 
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entries. Before the 2000s, FDI in China occurred mainly in the form of joint 
ventures (partially foreign owned) and greenfield firms. In 2001, contributing to 
joint venture experiments, the accumulated joint ventures accounted for 65 
percent of total FDI in China in dollars. Moreover, because there was no 
regulatory provision for the acquisition of state-owned enterprises and the 
undeveloped private sector in the early years, greenfield FDI dominated FDI 
inflows until the late 1990s. Because of China's WTO commitments to a phased 
opening up, China removed many restrictions on foreign investors. Since then, 
solely foreign-owned enterprises have become more popular than joint ventures 
as a form of FDI in China. Furthermore, complemented by the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises and a booming private sector, acquisition FDI dominated 
greenfield foreign investments and continued to grow strongly.     
Another important feature of FDI in China is that a majority of 
manufacturing FDI inflows are recognised as export-orientated. This is initially 
because of the small domestic market size of China in the early years of FDI 
boom. In addition, China's export promotion policies, such as processing trade 
tax exemption policies, played an important role in attracting export-orientated 
FDI. However, amid a slowing down of world demand and rising production 
costs in China, recent debate has focused on integrating FDI into domestic 
markets.   
 
2.2 The recent FDI policy context in China  
In recent years, there has been a switch of FDI policy in several aspects in 
China, which is common in many other large emerging countries as well. First, 
since the mid-2000s, the Chinese government appears to have taken a more 
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selective stance on its FDI policy by increasingly emphasising the quality rather 
than the quantity of inward FDI. High-tech foreign investments are invited to fill 
gaps in the Chinese economy. At the same time, China increasingly restricted 
FDI with high environmental-pollution and energy-consumption. This shift can 
be traced in the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment which 
shows industries that are 'encouraged' and 'permitted', or 'restricted' and 
'prohibited' to foreign investors. In the 2011 Catalogue, for example, new energy, 
new materials, high-end equipment, and energy-saving equipment were added to 
the 'encouraged' category. Indeed, the rapid economic growth of the last three 
decades has been at the cost of natural resources and environment pollution.6 
The Chinese government has realised such an economic growth model cannot 
last long. 
Second, by recognising a great regional disparity, efforts have been made to 
boost FDI in less-developed central and western regions of China. China has 
issued the Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in Central and 
Western Regions. In addition to having all the benefits that the Catalogue of 
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment offers, 'encouraged' industries are 
eligible for further favourable tax policies and land use policies.7 Meanwhile, 
because the developed coastal regions are seen as a rising investment (land) and 
production (labour) costs, low-cost interior regions such as the former industrial 
base, North-East China, is undertaking major infrastructure developments. The 
competitiveness of these regions in attracting FDI is increasing. 
Third, while keeping a light restriction on foreign investment, the Chinese 
                                                             
6
 Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment, published by the Ministry of Commerce, People's 
Republic of China, 2011. 
7
 Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in Central and Western Regions, published by the 
Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, 2011. 
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government has gradually removed its FDI preferential policies. As a part of this 
move, the government abolished fiscal incentives for foreign investment. In fact, 
after 30 years of fast economic growth, lack of capital is no longer a problem for 
the development of the Chinese economy. In addition, more domestic firms have 
developed to the stage where they are able to compete with foreign firms. Voices 
demanding a fair competitive market are increasing in number. 
To summarise, behind the FDI phenomenon in China is a skewed 
distribution in industries and regions, with changes in FDI composition in terms 
of modes of entry. These characteristics are evolving as China is also undergoing 
a switch in its FDI policy. Many of these attributes are commonly found in a 
number of other emerging countries. Therefore, this thesis is motivated by 
understanding the determinants and consequences of inward FDI in China as a 
reference for other developing countries.   
 
3 Organisation of this thesis 
This section sketches the outline for the whole thesis and summarises the 
specific motivations and key findings of each core chapter. This thesis is 
organised as follows: in Chapter 2, we first investigate the determinants of 
acquisition FDI, with a special focus on the role of local institutional quality and 
pre-acquisition firm heterogeneity. Chapter 3 examines the effects of foreign 
acquisition on exports, productivity and the financial status of foreign-acquired 
firms. In Chapter 4, we study whether location determinants of FDI have 
different effects on attracting greenfield FDI versus foreign acquisition. We 
conclude in Chapter 5.   
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3.1 Determinants of foreign acquisition: the role of institution and firm 
heterogeneity 
This chapter provides an understanding of why acquisition FDI inflows 
have a skewed regional and industrial distribution by examining the determinants 
of foreign acquisition with a variation of different ownership modes. Since the 
1990s, institution quality has been focused upon as a key factor explaining FDI 
flows across countries. It is widely accepted that countries with less corruption, 
greater political instability and fairer property right enforcement, attract more 
FDI inflows (Bénassy-Quéré, 2005, Asiedu, 2006). Based on the industrial 
organisation (IO) literature, multinational studies also recognise that institution 
quality is a determinant factor in the ownership modes of FDI. Transaction cost 
theory suggests that institutions that are more efficient encourage joint ventures, 
which is costly due to coordination (Williamson, 1979; Asiedu and Esfahani, 
2001). Property rights theory points out that wholly foreign-owned affiliates are 
preferred when there is an improvement in contracting forces since foreign 
investors are not willing to share the control of power and profits (Feenstra and 
Hanson, 2005; Javorcik and Wei, 2009).     
With the availability of firm-level data in recent years, firm-level 
characteristics prior to foreign investment are also found to determine FDI 
inflows. Girma et al. (2005) suggest that the more productive firms in the United 
Kingdom are more likely to be foreign acquired. Firm-level characteristics also 
have effects on the ownership mode of FDI. Many studies such as Raff et al. 
(2009) and Hebours and Ruf (2010) have found that efficiency is positively 
related to the level of control.  
Something in common across the literature is that most studies focus on 
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multinationals. Moreover, fewer studies have integrated this broader literature 
with an investigation into how institutional quality and firm heterogeneity affect 
the ownership structure of acquired firms. This chapter contributes to the 
literature by filling these gaps with a use of comprehensive Chinese firm-level 
data in the period 2000 to 2005. We employ binary choice logit models to 
estimate the probabilities of domestic firms being acquired by foreign 
multinationals. Furthermore, we explicitly distinguish different ownership modes 
of foreign acquisition in our discussion.   
Interesting results emerge. First, we find that the better institutions 
encourage foreign acquisitions in China. This effect is found to be strongest in 
capital- and R&D-intensive industries. second, we find better institutions 
discourage wholly foreign owned affiliates in more capital-intensive industries, 
which is consistent with transaction cost theory. Third, we confirm that foreign 
investors 'cherry-pick' domestic firms. Firms that are more productive are more 
likely to be acquired by foreign investors. Fourth, conditional on foreign 
acquisition norms, domestic firms that are smaller, younger, more capital- and 
export-intensive are more likely to be wholly foreign acquired.     
 
3.2 The consequences of acquisition FDI 
Having understood the key determinants of acquisition FDI at regional, 
industry and firm level, in Chapter 3, we examine the consequences of 
acquisition FDI on the acquired firm's export performance, productivity and 
financial status. As described earlier, one attribute of FDI in China is that the 
majority are export-orientated. In Chapter 2, we also find more export-intensive 
firms are more likely to be acquired. Other studies such as Zhang and Song 
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(2001) suggest a positive link between FDI and regional manufacturing export 
performance. However, does FDI lift an acquired firm's export performance after 
acquisition? Probably because of data limitations, little effort has been focused 
on FDI effects on export performance at an intra-firm level. We also contribute to 
the literature by investigating other FDI-induced consequences such as changes 
in productivity and financial constraint of the acquired firm.    
In order to control causality issues and unobserved time-invariant effects, 
we implement the combination of propensity matching and 
difference-in-difference (DiD) technique with using China's firm-level data. Our 
difference-in-difference estimators suggest that foreign acquisition significantly 
increases the export intensity of the acquired existing exporter. In addition, 
foreign investment increases the likelihood of export of acquired firms if they 
were non-exporters prior to the acquisition. Second, the increase in export 
performance is not due to FDI-induced productivity change since we do not 
observe any significant intra-firm productivity gain. Third, our results show a 
significant FDI-induced reduction in long-term debt. Fourth, we justify whether 
the increase in exports due to foreign acquisition is related to the reduction in 
debt. The effect of a reduction in debt on export increase is found to be 
quantitatively negligible.      
  
3.3 The location of manufacturing FDI in China: greenfield versus 
acquisition 
Although acquisition FDI has dominated FDI inflows into China since the 
late 1990s, we also observe a fair amount of increase in greenfield foreign 
investment. In this chapter, we extend our study with an understanding of the 
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regional and industrial disparity of foreign investment by splitting our sample 
into greenfield foreign investment and acquisition FDI.    
There is a limited economic literature explaining the existence of the two 
investment modes. Some studies from the multinationals' perspective suggest 
that more technologically advanced firms tend to set up a new plant in a host 
country rather than take over an existing one due to high adoption costs (Görg, 
2000; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). Evidence of the relationship between the two 
modes of investment and the location characteristics is even scarcer. According 
to some intrinsic differences between greenfield and acquisition investment, Neto 
et al. (2010) show risk measurements play an important role in the location 
decision of the two investment modes because greenfield investment is a more 
risky strategy compared to acquisition. Based on new economic geography 
theory, Roberto (2004) shows that a high concentration of local firms generates 
agglomeration externalities, which have a positive effect on attracting acquisition 
FDI, while this effect is not significant on greenfield foreign investments.  
This chapter provides an investigation into the agglomeration determinants 
and other location determinants of the two investment modes of FDI in China. In 
general, we first find that market potential has a positive effect on both modes of 
investments but this effect is marginally stronger in greenfield FDI projects. It is 
because acquisition FDI takes over the markets of the acquired firm, which is 
absent in the case of greenfield investment. Second, we find greenfield foreign 
investment is negatively related to the number of firms of an industry in the same 
region because of competition effects. However, acquisition FDI is encouraged 
with a higher number of local firms, implying a rapid growth of acquisition FDI 
in recent years can be explained by a strong procurement effect. Third, we also 
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find that higher stock of FDI of an industry in a region attracts more FDI in 
general, and this effect is larger for the greenfield FDI. This is because foreign 
investors have limited knowledge about the host location investing environment. 
The FDI stock is a signal to suggest whether the investing environment is 
foreign-friendly. Greenfield foreign investment is a riskier strategy and more 
dependent on this signal than acquisition FDI.  
Our research in this chapter is the first of its kind with its focus on location 
characteristics that affect the two FDI investment modes in China. It is an 
important step toward future studies as to how greenfield FDI has different 
consequences in developing economies compared to acquisition FDI.  
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CHAPTER 2: The Role of Institution and Firm 
Heterogeneity in Foreign Acquisition: Evidence from China 
 
1 Introduction 
The role of institution and firm heterogeneity in foreign acquisition has 
received increasing attention in the international economics literature in recent 
years. Two common views have been voiced. First, it is widely documented that 
FRXQWULHV ZLWK µEHWWHU TXDOLW\¶ LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH PRUH SRSXODU DV GHVWLQDWLRQV IRU
foreign acquisition. Secondly, the productivity of the target firm, along with a 
range of other firm performance variables, has been shown to have an impact on 
the probability of acquisition.  
Less studied within this broader literature have been the questions of how 
the same variables, institutional quality and firm heterogeneity affect the 
ownership structure of acquired firms. Are the types of firms acquired as wholly 
owned enterprises similar to those that are acquired as joint ventures, or different 
from them? How does regional institutional quality affect these choices? China 
serves as an appropriate setting for providing empirical evidence to the above 
two questions as China has been one of the largest recipients of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and the distribution of FDI between joint ventures and wholly 
owned enterprises there differs markedly across regions, industries and time. 1 In 
this chapter, we contribute to this literature by adding empirical evidence using a 
Chinese firm-level data set together with a new measure of regional institutional 
quality to investigate the determinants of acquisition activity.  
A remarkable fact is that the flow of FDI to China has surged recently, 
                                                             
1
 Source: Please refer to the UNCTAD survey, 2010. 
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increasing from $3.49 billion in 1990 to $69.47 billion in 2006 in realised value. 
In 2006, industrial output by firms with foreign investment became a major part 
RI&KLQD¶VQDWLRQDOLQGXVWULDORXWSXW, accounting for 31.5%, compared to 2.28% 
in 1990.2 )RUHLJQ DFTXLVLWLRQ SOD\HG DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ WKH VXUJH RI &KLQD¶V
FDI inflows during this period, as we observe that over 80 per cent of FDI 
inflows during 2000-2005 were through acquisitions, while greenfield firms with 
foreign investment accounted for less than 20 per cent only. However, these 
investments are geographically concentrated in a few regions; six Chinese 
provinces accounted for about 82% of the foreign acquisitions that took place 
during the period 2000-2005.3 Furthermore, we find that the acquisitions are 
clustered in a few industries; for example, 41% of the acquisitions during the 
period 2000-2005 have taken place in six industries. 4  Motivated by these 
stylised facts, one objective in this paper is to investigate whether variations of 
institutional quality across Chinese provinces help explain why foreign 
acquisitions are more likely to take place in some particular regions, and why 
acquisitions are more prevalent in some industries. With use of the firm-level 
dataset, we are also interested in whether acquired firms are different from other 
domestic firms before the acquisitions take place. 
On the other hand, apart from choosing the location of foreign acquisition 
and takeover activities, multinational firms also often need to decide the 
ownership mode of acquisition, that is, whether to establish a wholly owned 
affiliate (wholly owned enterprise) or to set up a partially owned affiliate (joint 
venture). We observe that the number of cases of these two modes were almost 
                                                             
2
 Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 
3
 The six provinces are Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Shandong.  
4
 The six industries are wearing apparel, chemicals, plastic products, general purpose machinery, and 
electrical machinery and communication equipment.   
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equal during the period 2000-2005.5 However, the distribution of the ownership 
modes of acquisition FDI varied across regions and industries. For example, we 
find that more firms were acquired as joint ventures than wholly owned 
enterprises in most of the regions except Shanghai, Fujian and Guangdong. 
Furthermore, in plastic and communication industries, wholly owned foreign 
affiliates were more prevalent, making up 60% of acquisition cases. These 
observations motivate the second objective of this paper, which is to probe 
deeper into the question of how the regional institutional and firm characteristics 
affect the ownership mode of acquisition. To be more precise, whether 
institutional impact on the mode of acquisition within a region in China varies 
across industries, and whether wholly acquired firms are different from joint 
ventures in pre-acquisition characteristics.  
Our ability to answer the above questions would be greatly enhanced by 
investigating a very comprehensive, firm-level, production and accounting 
dataset covering medium- and large- VL]H HQWHUSULVHV LQ &KLQD¶V PDQXIDFWXULQJ
sector, compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Its Annual Survey 
of Industrial Production (ASIP) dataset includes more than 456,000 individual 
Chinese firms during the period of 2000-2005, and provides detailed information 
RQDVSHFWVOLNHWKHILUPV¶WRWDOHPSOR\PHQWYDOXH-added, age, capital stock, and, 
most importantly, the equity shares held by domestic and foreign owners. This 
DOORZV XV WR LGHQWLI\ FKDQJHV LQ WKH ILUPV¶ RZQHUVKLS modes, including 
foreign-owned versus domestically-owned or wholly foreign-owned versus joint 
ventures. To examine the role of institutions, we combine the ASIP data with the 
Annual Report on Urban Competitiveness in China, which includes the index of 
                                                             
5
 There were 6,298 newly acquired wholly-owned enterprises and 5,906 newly acquired joint ventures 
during the period 1999 to 2005 in our sample. 
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property rights protection across 31 mainland provinces/municipalities in China 
during the period from 1997 to 2007. We use this as a proxy for the quality of 
institutions. Following the existing literature, we adopt the binary logit model to 
identify the key determinants of acquisition FDI in China, with a special focus on 
WKHUROHRIORFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\DQGWKHILUPV¶SUH-acquisition characteristics. 
A number of interesting patterns emerge. First, we find that better local 
institutional quality generally has a positive effect on foreign acquisition 
activities, which also crucially depends on the characteristics of the industries. 
More specifically, we find that the positive effect of the institutions is stronger in 
more capital-intensive or more R&D-intensive industries, indicating that these 
industries are more dependent on the quality of local institutions to attract 
acquisition FDI. One possible interpretation is that the protection of property 
rights plays a more important role in capital- or R&D-intensive industries, and 
further enhances the positive impact of good institutions on the multinational 
ILUPV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRDFTXLUHWKHP)XUWKHUPRUHLQWHUPVRIWKHRZQHUVKLSPRGH
of foreign acquisition, we find that, conditional on foreign acquisition norms, 
better institutions increase the probability of being partially foreign-owned, 
relative to wholly foreign-owned, only in highly capital-intensive industries. To 
the best of our knowledge, this finding is new, and has not been reported in 
previous studies, especially in the context of developing countries.  
In the existing literature, at the macro level, as argued by Asiedu and 
Esfahani (2001), country-level institutional quality has been identified as one 
explanation for the popularity of some countries as FDI destinations, and the 
inability of some other countries to attract FDI. However, perhaps due to the 
limitations of data availability, micro-level evidence using firm-level data 
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focusing on foreign acquisitions has been very scarce. Our study fills this void by 
taking advantage of the richness of the Chinese firm level data, and the large 
variation of institutional quality within China, both across provinces and over 
time. On the other hand, there exist only a very limited number of studies on the 
impact of country-level institutional quality on the mode of entry of the 
multinationals. ,QSDUWLFXODU$VLHGXDQG(VIDKDQL  ILQG WKDW WKHFRXQWU\¶V
institutional set-up affects the ownership structure of FDI. More recently, Kamal 
and Lovely (2010) have IRXQG UREXVW HYLGHQFH VKRZLQJ WKDW &KLQD¶V :72
accession has inflXHQFHG WKH PXOWLQDWLRQDO ILUPV¶ ownership choices using 
Chinese enterprises data. However, they do not examine how local institutional 
quality and industry characteristics have affected the mode of foreign 
acquisitions. Hence, one important contribution of this study to the existing 
literature is to reveal how local institutional quality may affect the incidence of 
acquisition FDI and the mode of foreign acquisition at the firm level in China, 
which has not yet been fully investigated in the existing literature.     
6HFRQGO\LQWHUPVRIWKHILUPV¶SUH-acquisition characteristics, we find that 
the acquired firms, in general, have had better performance indicators, such as 
productivity, firm size etc., compared to non-acquired firms, before acquisition 
takes place. Furthermore, in terms of the ownership mode of acquisitions, we 
find that the more productive and larger firms are less likely to be wholly 
foreign-acquired than partially acquired.  
In the existing literature, the efficiency of the firm has been acknowledged 
as an important factor that affects the incidence of acquisition and its ownership 
mode. It has been documented that the acquired firms are more productive than 
non-acquired firms are. MoGukin and Nguyen (1995) show that the 
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multinational firms 'cherry-pick' their targets, and accordingly choose the firms 
with the highest productivity. Girma (2005) and Girma et al. (2005) have also 
documented that firms in the U.K. are more likely to be acquired by foreign 
multinationals if they are more productive. It has yet a firm-level analysis that 
tests 'cherry-pick' hypothesis in China, our study contributes to the literature by 
first confirming the 'cherry-picking' story for China as found in other countries in 
the sense that multinational firms target the best performing domestic firms for 
the purpose of acquisition. 
In addition, there are also few empirical studies showing that multinationals 
that are more efficient prefer wholly owned affiliates to joint ventures, such as 
those of Hebours and Ruf (2010), Raff et al. (2009) and Mugele and Schnitzer 
(2008). However, these studies focus on the effect of productivity of the 
multinational firms, rather than those of targeted domestic firms being acquired. 
Therefore, different from their approach, we reveal the relationship between 
acquired ILUPV¶ SUH-acquisition productivity and their post-acquisition share of 
foreign ownership, which may be non-linear: whilst firms that are more 
productive are more likely to be acquired by multinationals, the most productive 
acquired firms are more likely to turn into joint ventures rather than 100 percent 
foreign-owned. Compared with the existing literature, our paper is perhaps the 
first study to examine various acquired firm's characteristics in determining the 
likelihood and the ownership mode of foreign acquisition. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature by providing a brief survey of recent studies on the prevalence of 
acquisition FDI and the mode of entry of multinational firms. In Section 3, we 
introduce our empirical methodology and our main specifications. In Section 4, 
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we describe our data, explain the construction of key variables, and provide a 
descriptive analysis on the data. We present our main results in Section 5 and 
conclude it in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Determinants of foreign acquisition  
Institutional climate has been identified as an important determinant in 
foreign acquisition. Blonigen (2005) suggests that it is especially important for 
developing countries. First, without good property right protection, high 
expropriation risk discourages foreign investment. Second, poor institution 
quality results in a less-functional market. Consequently, higher operational costs 
prevents FDI inflows. Last but not the least, poor institution quality provides 
inadequate public services and thus poor infrastructure which diminish inward 
FDI.     
Empirically, a large body of cross-country studies suggests that the inability 
of some countries to attract FDI is largely explained by poor institutions. Wei 
(2000) is one of most influential early studies on institution effects on FDI. 
Based on bilateral FDI from 12 source countries to 45 host countries, the paper 
shows that a variety of measures of corruption indices impede inward FDI. With 
the use of six governance indicators provided by Kaufman et al. (1999), 
Globeman and Shapiro (2002), it found quality institutions measured by better 
public governance infrastructure, free from corruption, and strict legal system 
enforcement encourage both a country's FDI inflows and outflows.  
More recently, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) uses the institutional profile 
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database which provides an estimate of institutional quality across 52 countries 
to examine institutional determinants of FDI using a gravity model. They point 
out that institutional environment, in a broad sense, is a major determinant of 
FDI inflows. Their institution measures include the tax system, ease of creating a 
company, lack of corruption, transparency, contract laws, security of property 
rights, efficiency of justice, and prudential standards. They conclude that 'good' 
institutions almost always increase the amount of FDI received. Daniele and 
Marani (2006) analyse the quality of institutions as a factor to attract FDI in the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries using the Kaufmann et al. 
(2005) governance indicators. They show that poor institutions are a relative 
weakness of MENA in attracting FDI. A relative study conducted by Asiedu 
(2006) also investigates how institutional and political instability affects FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, using a linear regression model. The institutional variables 
are measured by the indicators of corruption and effectiveness of the Rule of 
Law from World Bank surveys. It finds that corruption impedes FDI inflows, 
while effectiveness of the rule of law encourages it, focusing on property right 
protection.  
Most of these studies are cross-country investigations. Two criticisms have 
been raised by Blonigen (2005). First, Blonigen (2005) suggests that institutions 
are quite persistent and not likely to vary over time in many countries, specially 
developed countries. Second, it points out that most institution measurements in 
the existing studies are sourced from survey responses in different countries. 
Therefore, the comparability of institution indexes cross countries is questionable 
when survey responses are in different backgrounds. One reference is from a 
comment that Kaufmann et al. (1999) made on its aggregate governance 
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indicators. It suggests that aggregate governance indicators are informative but 
the standard errors associated with its estimation are relatively large. 
Investigating institutional impact in China can overcome the first criticism 
as there has been a significant improvement in institution quality since its 
reforms. There are also a number of studies that have identified that the overall 
improvement of institution in China over time has played an important role in 
attracting FDI, such as Fan et al. (2009). This paper regresses country-level FDI 
inflows on a number of institution quality measurements. The discussion on the 
case of China is based on China-specific dummies. The 'impulse response' of 
China's 1993 reforms shows that China's FDI inflows are stimulated by better 
governance. Its cross-country level institution measurement is adopted from the 
rule of law index from ICRG and International Country Risk Guide. The 
measurement errors associated with different backgrounds of survey responses is 
still not solved in this paper's empirical strategy.  
However, investigation on provincial-level institutional impact on FDI 
inflows in China addresses both criticisms. Apart from distinctive institution 
improvement in all provinces in China, the institution quality of each province 
varies largely. Furthermore, a survey based institution index is more reliable as 
the survey responders have the same country background. In the literature, little 
has been done to focus on intra-country institutional impact on the allocation of 
FDI, especially acquisition FDI, in China. Du et al. (2008) examine 6288 U.S. 
affiliates in different Chinese provinces over the period 1993 to 2001. It shows 
that U.S. affiliates prefer to locate in those provinces that have better intellectual 
property right enforcement, higher contract enforcement and lower levels of 
government corruption. In this paper, we complement the literature by examining 
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whether regional institutions have an impact on attracting acquisition FDI by 
using a dataset which records provincial institutional data over the period of 2000 
to 2004. Compared to the country-time level institutional indicators, this 
indicator offers an additional dimension of variation to isolate region-time 
specific factors that potentially correlate institutions with foreign acquisition, 
such as the regional labour quality, utility prices, etc.         
In addition to institutions, several other region-specific characteristics 
influencing foreign acquisition have been documented in several studies which 
examine the allocation of FDI. From a Chinese perspective, Cheng and Kwan 
(2000) estimate the effects of determinants of FDI in 29 Chinese regions from 
1985 to 1995. Using GMM estimation on the regional stock of the FDI, they 
conclude that a large regional market, good infrastructure and preferential policy 
have a positive effect on FDI, while wage costs have a negative effect. The 
policy variables in their paper include the number of Special Economic Zones, 
Open Coastal Cities, Economic and Technological Development Zones and Open 
Coastal Areas, rather than direct institutional measures. A more recent study by 
Amiti and Javorcik (2008) examines the determinants of foreign entries in 515 
Chinese industries at the provincial level, during 1998-2001, using non-linear 
least squares. They find that production costs measured by provincial wage and 
electricity prices, the availability of infrastructure and the openness measured by 
the agglomeration of foreign firms, play important roles in the number of foreign 
entries. According to these studies, we also include regional GDP per capita, 
average wages and foreign presence into our analysis. 
Recent literature has also frequently stressed firm characteristics as an 
important factor determining FDI. Girma et al. (2005) use the OneSource data set, 
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spanning the decade between 1988 and 1998, to investigate the impact of the 
ILUPV¶ H[SRUWLQJ LQWHQVLW\ RQ IRUHLJQ DFTXLVLWLRQV LQ WKH U.K. manufacturing 
industries with a consideration of a range of other firm characteristics. By using 
quasi-likelihood estimation, they found that the U.K. firms with a higher 
exporting intensity are more likely to be foreign takeover targets. They conclude 
that the evidence is consistent with the idea that the U.S. acquisition FDI in the 
U.K. is to establish a platform for serving the wider E.U. market. Furthermore, 
they find that productivity and firm size have positive impacts on the probability 
of being acquired by foreign firms. These results accord with the argument which 
is made in early industrial organisational literature. It asserts that the acquiring 
firm should 'cherry-pick' its targets and accordingly choose the firms with the 
KLJKHVW SURGXFWLYLW\ )RU H[DPSOH EDVHG RQ WKH 86 &HQVXV %XUHDX¶V
Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), McGuckin and Gguyen (1995) find that 
the acquired firms are generally associated with productivity above the average.   
Girma and Görg (2003) look into electronics and food sectors in the U.K. to 
hypothesize that firm level factors also influence the probability of being 
acquired by a foreign owner. They find that older firms in both electronics and 
food industries are more likely to be acquired by foreign firms. They also find 
that the productivity effect matters in electronics industry but has no impact in 
the food industry. The size of the firm, measured by the number of employees, 
has no impact on both the industries. 
In an investigation of how foreign acquisitions affects productivity in 
Swedish manufacturing firms by using a probit estimation, Karpaty (2005) also 
finds evidence that firm characteristics affect the probability of a domestic firm 
being the target of foreign multinationals. They find that more export intensive, 
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capital-intensive and R&D intensive firms are more likely to be acquired by 
foreign investors. However, in contrast to Girma and Görg (2003), they find that 
age is negatively related to acquisition. In fact, the age variable has different 
interpretations. On the one hand, younger firms may more easily be integrated 
into the multinationals, as they are more flexible and adaptive to the ownership 
transition. On the other hand, older firms have accumulated experience which 
should give them an advantage over the younger firms. Furthermore, compared 
to the results in the U.K., they find no evidence at all for the 'cherry picking' 
hypothesis as the profitability of the firm and productivity are statistically 
insignificant in the probit model.    
In line with the previous studies focusing on firm characteristics, we 
examine whether a range of firm level variables determines the probability of a 
domestic firm being acquired by foreign multinationals in China. In this paper, 
firm characteristics thought to influence the probability of foreign acquisition are 
labour productivity, export intensity, capital intensity, size and age of the firm. 
New to the literature, this paper offers the first evidence on the impact of 
domestic firm heterogeneities on foreign acquisition in China.     
 
2.2 Determinants of the mode of acquisition: whole acquisition versus 
partial acquisition 
Apart from their importance in acquisition decisions in general, institutions 
have also been regarded as one of the deciding factors in the choice of the mode 
of acquisition, namely full-acquisition or partial-acquisition. One strand of the 
literature, such as by Williamson (1979), Crawford and Alchian (1978) 
underlines that sharing the ownership (Joint Venture) is costly due to a number 
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of reasons such as coordination and transaction costs. If these transaction costs 
cannot be avoided by contracting due to weak institutions or insufficient market 
disciplinary forces, firms may tend to choose vertical integration (wholly-owned 
affiliate). Motivated by this idea, a few empirical studies have focused on the 
institutional impact on the choice of ownership mode of acquisition and found 
evidence to support the theoretical prediction. For example, Aseidu and Esfahani 
(2001) empirically examine the ownership decision and find that the high quality 
of law reduces the probability of choosing a wholly-owned affiliate based on 
2011 observations from 388 U.S. parent firms in 46 countries.  
Fan et al. (2009) examine the institutional determinants of vertical 
integration by looking at companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2001 to 2003. They measure provincial legal property rights 
protection using an index that is developed by Fan and Wang (2001, 2002, and 
2003) spanning the years from 2001 to 2003. It reflects the frequency of lawsuits 
and the efficiency of courts in each province or special district. Based on the 
results in OLS regressions and Heckman regressions, they conclude that firms 
are more vertically integrated in regions with weak legal property rights 
protection and poor quality government. However, their investigation does not 
have an FDI context as their sample firms are limited to the listed large 
companies in China and does not include foreign-owned enterprises.  
Another strand of the literature focuses on incentive issues which are 
addressed in property rights model. It argues that, with the improvement of 
contract enforcement, firms are less willing to leave the ownership to the 
co-owner. Hence, joint ownership is chosen if contracting enforcement is weak 
and wholly owned ownership is preferred if the institution becomes better. There 
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are also some pieces of empirical work which have found evidence to support 
this argument. For example, both Javorcik and Wei (2009) and Hebous and Ruf 
(2010) find that a high level of corruption in the host country induces more joint 
ventures. Kamal and Lovely (2010) take China's WTO accession as an 
opportunity to observH WKH PXOWLQDWLRQDO FRPSDQLHV¶ UHVSRQVH WR WKH
improvement in property rights protection in a developing country. Using an 
adaptation of Feenstra and Hanson¶V  SURSHUW\ ULJKWV PRGHO WKH\
especially examine whether a joint venture in China makes a transition to a 
domestically owned firm or a wholly foreign-owned firm, or remains unchanged. 
By applying multinomial logit tests of the property rights theory, they find robust 
evidence to show that the WTO accession has facilitated a more toward wholly 
foreign-owned firms. One problem here is that WTO accession is a questionable 
way to measure institutions, and hence contract enforcement. There are probably 
other factors which change over time and are also correlated to the ownership 
mode of acquisition. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by using a 
region-year level institutional measure to test whether intra-country institutional 
quality affects the ownership mode of acquisition.     
In addition to institutional quality, the efficiency of the acquiring firm is 
also frequently identified as an important factor determining the mode of 
acquisition. Existing literature has focused on how the productivity of the 
multinational companies has affected their choice of ownership modes, namely 
wholly-owned or partially-owned. Intuitively, more efficient multinationals 
prefer wholly-owned affiliates to jointly-owned ones, for efficiency gains 
considerations. Mugele and Schnitzer (2008) develop a model in which the 
multinational investors decide the ownership mode of their affiliates. With an 
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assumption that the investors face the costs of control that vary with sectors and 
with increase in distance, they find that the more efficient multinationals prefer 
wholly-owned affiliates to joint ventures as they are better in covering the costs. 
Empirically, by looking at German outbound FDI with a binary logit mode, 
Hebous and Ruf (2010) find that efficiency measured by the ratio of total 
revenue to total balance sheet, is negatively related to the probability of joint 
ownership of German multinationals. consistently, with a sample of 1,512 
observations of Japanese foreign investment in 22 countries from 1985 to 2001, 
Raff et al. (2009) suggests that the most productive multinationals will not 
choose joint ventures. To summarize the existing literature, little work has been 
GRQH WR HYDOXDWH KRZ WKH GRPHVWLF ILUPV¶ SUH-acquisition characteristics are 
related to the ownership mode of the acquisition. In this paper, we investigate 
how the productivity of the acquired firm, along with a range of other firm 
pre-acquisition performance variables, affects the ownership structure by using 
the Chinese firm-level data.     
To summarise, we contribute to the existing literature mainly in two ways. 
First of all, although country-level institutional quality has been documented as 
an important factor in determining the prevalence of acquisition FDI and the 
mode of foreign acquisition, more disaggregated regional level evidence using 
firm-level data has not yet been investigated, perhaps due to the limitation of data 
availability. Taking advantage of the richness of the Chinese firm level data, and 
the large variation of institutional quality within China both across provinces and 
over time, we fill this gap by revealing how local institutional quality may affect 
IRUHLJQ DFTXLVLWLRQ 6HFRQGO\ DOWKRXJK WKH PXOWLQDWLRQDO ILUPV¶ SUH-acquisition 
characteristics have been intensively examined in the literature, little has been 
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done to investigate how the domestic firms' pre-acquisition characteristics affect 
foreign acquisition. Our paper, as far as we are aware, studies for the first time 
what firm characteristics affect the likelihood and ownership mode of foreign 
acquisition of domestic firms in China.     
 
3 Empirical methodology  
 
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy and main econometric 
specifications.  
 
3.1 Econometric specifications 
Following the empirical literature on foreign acquisition, for example, 
Karpaty (2005) and Hebous and Ruf (2010), we estimate the determinants of 
foreign acquisition, as well as the mode of foreign acquisition, by using binary 
discrete choice models. For that purpose, we apply logit models to estimate the 
likelihood of acquisition. The baseline regression specifications are as follows: 
 




= ߙ + ߚ1൫ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݎ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ2൫ܨ݋݆ݎݎ ,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ3൫ܣݓ݆ܽ݃݁ ݎ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ4൫ܩܦ ܲݎ,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ5൫ܮܾܽ݌ݎ݋݀݅,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ6൫݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁݅,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ7൫ܧݔݏ݄ܽݎ݁݅,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ8൫ܥܽ݌݈ܽ ܾ݅ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ9ሺܣ݃݁݅ݐሻ
+ ߛ1ܦ݄݄݅݃ܥܽ݌݈ܾ݆ܽ + ߛ2ܦ݄݄ܴ݆݅݃ܦ
+ ߛ3ܻ݁ܽݎ_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏݐ + ߛ4ܲݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏݎ
+ ߛ5ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ݆ + ߳݅ݐ  
(Eq.2-1) 
 
where ݅  indexes firm, ݐ  indexes year, ݆  indexes industry, and ݎ  indexes 
region (province). 
 
3.2 Dependent variables 
We define the binary dependent variables indicating the probability of being 
acquired or not as: 
ODDSሺܦ݅ݐݓ݋݁ = 1ሻ
= ߙ + ߚ1൫ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݎ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ2൫ܨ݋݆ݎݎ ,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ3൫ܣݓ݆ܽ݃݁ ݎ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ4൫ܩܦ ܲݎ,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ5൫ܮܾܽ݌ݎ݋݀݅,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ6൫݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁݅,ݐെ1൯
+ ߚ7൫ܧݔݏ݄ܽݎ݁݅,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ8൫ܥܽ݌݈ܽ ܾ݅ ,ݐെ1൯ + ߚ9ሺܣ݃݁݅ݐሻ
+ ߛ1ܦ݄݄݅݃ܥܽ݌݈ܾ݆ܽ + ߛ2ܦ݄݄ܴ݆݅݃ܦ
+ ߛ3ܻ݁ܽݎ_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏݐ + ߛ4ܲݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏݎ
+ ߛ5ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ݆ + ߳݅ݐ  
 
(Eq.2-2) 
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 ܦ݅ܽݐܿݍ = ൜1, if the domestic firm ݅ is foreign acquired at ݐ;  6 0, if the domestic firm ݅ remains domestic at ݐ.        
 
In the same manner, we define a binary variable representing the mode of 
being acquired as: 
 ܦ݅ݐݓ݋݁ = ቊ 1, if the domestic firm ݅ is wholly foreign acquired at ݐ; 7    
0, if the domestic firm ݅ is partially foreign acquired at ݐ.        
The dependent variables are logarithms of the odds ratios to allow for linear 
estimations as in Eq. (2-1) and (2-2): 
 ܱܦܦܵ൫ܦ݅ܽݐܿݍ = 1൯ = log ൤ Pr൫ܦ݅ܽݐܿݍ =1൯1െPr༌(ܦ݅ܽݐܿݍ =1)൨  (Eq.2-3) 
 ܱܦܦܵሺܦ݅ݐݓ݋݁ = 1ሻ = log ൤ Pr൫ܦ݅ݐݓ݋݁ =1൯1െPr༌(ܦ݅ݐݓ݋݁ =1)൨  (Eq.2-4) 
 
3.3 Independent variables 
We specify the probability of acquisition, which takes place between two 
periods ݐ െ 1  and ݐ , as a function of two sets of variables measured in 
period ݐ െ 1: one reflecting regional institutional quality; and the other reflecting 
firm characteristics, such as labour productivity and total employment. The 
probability of being acquired as wholly foreign-owned firms versus partially 
                                                             
6
 As we will define in Section 4, foreign acquired firms are those firms that have seen an increase in foreign 
ownership from below 25% to above 25% between ݐ െ 1 and ݐ. In the appendix, we also present 
regression results with different thresholds (10% , 50% and 75%) to define foreign acquisition according 
literature. 
7
 As we will define in Section 4, wholly foreign acquired firms are those firms that have seen an increase in 
foreign ownership from below 25% to above 100% between ݐ െ 1 and ݐ.  
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foreign-owned firms is modelled in the same way. More specifically, 
Institur,tെ1is the logged quality of property rights protection in region r, at year 
t െ 1; Exsharei,tെ1 is the export share of firm i at year t െ 1; employeei,tെ1 is 
the logged number of employment of firm i one year before the acquisition; 
Labprodi,tെ1 and Caplabi,tെ1 are the logged labour productivity and capital 
intensity of the firm. Labour productivity is defined as the value added, weighted 
by the number of employees, while capital intensity is calculated by the fixed 
asset weighted by the number of employees.  Ageit  is the firm age; 
DhighCaplabj,tെ1 is a dummy that measures whether the firm is in 
capital-intensive sector or labour intensive sector. It takes on the value of one if 
the industry's capital intensity is above the median of all industry, and zero in 
other cases. Awagejr ,tെ1  and Forjr ,tെ1  are the logged average wages and 
logged foreign presence of industry j , in region  r , at time t െ 1 ; foreign 
presence is defined as the ratio of the sales of foreign firms to the total sales of an 
industry in a region. GDPr,tെ1 is the logged GDP per capita in region r, at time 
t; we assume that the acquisition decision is based on all the determinants at the 
pre-acquisition time. Therefore, we lag all time-variant independent variables by 
one year.   
We include regional foreign presence to provide control for the possibility 
of foreign firm agglomerations attracting foreign acquisitions. Regional 
LQGXVWU\¶V DYHUDJH ZDJHV DUH DGGHG LQ DV D SUR[\ IRU WKH DYHUDJH ODERXU FRVW
Regional GDP per capita is introduced to capture provincial economic 
development over time. Additionally, we include the industry capital intensity 
and R&D intensity dummies to account for the potential role of differences in the 
nature of capital intensity and R&D intensity across industries. These variables 
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are treated as a comprehensive set of control variables which is not correlated 
with the institution quality and firm heterogeneity. They help us to isolate the 
causal effect of the institutional quality and firm heterogeneity on the acquisition 
and modes of foreign ownership. Thus, the results are more likely to reflect true 
causal effects in our investigation.  
However, there may be some other unobserved factors across time, regions, 
or industries - such as favourable tax policy to foreign ownership in some regions, 
which affect the acquisition probability, and correlate with key explanatory 
variables of interest. To tackle this problem, dummies are included when 
appropriate to provide control for the above time-, region-, and industry- specific 
effects. Specifically, the year dummy captures the overall time trend of the 
probability of being acquired, which is common to all firms. For example, the 
increasing openness of national policies may enhance the attractiveness of 
Chinese firms to overseas investors. Region dummies are added to provide 
control for the unobserved province-specific factors that may be correlated with 
both the covariates (such as institutional quality) and the acquisition probability. 
For example, provincial government policies in special economic zones may 
significantly influence the prevalence of foreign acquisition and the mode of 
foreign ownership. The introduction of region dummy controls for these 
provinces corrects for this effect. Furthermore, two-digit industry dummies are 
used in order to correct the potential bias caused by the possibility that firms in 
some industries are more likely to be acquired anyway. In China, regulations and 
policies guiding the approval of foreign acquisitions vary from industry to 
industry,  so the associations between acquisition probability and firm 
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characteristics could be entirely industry specific. 8  Ԗit is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed error term 
with normal distribution and mean zero. Since a mixture of industry and regional 
variables are used in all of the empirical exercises of this chapter, clustered 
standard errors are applied to identify significance level. Having found that the 
majority variation of the institutional quality is explained by regional differences, 
the standard errors is clustered at region level to control for correlation of 
regression errors within provinces. Note that foreign acquisitions are assumed to 
be based on the consideration on performances of all determinants in the past. 
Thus all time-variant independent variables are lagged by one year to capture the 
characteristics of firms and regions prior to the acquisition.   
Moreover, to examine whether the effect of institutions varies across 
industry characteristics, we create interaction terms between industry 
characteristics and institutions, which are constructed as follows: 
 ܫ݊݀ܭܮ݅݊ݏݐ݆݅ ݎݐ = ܦ݄݄݅݃ܥܽ݌݈ܾ݆ܽ × ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݎݐ , (Eq. 2-5) 
 ܫܴ݊݀ܦ݅݊ݏݐ݆݅ ݎݐ = ܦ݄݄ܴ݆݅݃ܦ × ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݎݐ  ˄Eq.2-6˅ 
 
Where ܦ݄݄݅݃ܥܽ݌݈ܾ݆ܽ ݐ  is the dummy that equals one if the industry capital 
intensity is higher than the industry median, and zero in other cases. ܦ݄݄ܴ݆݅݃ܦ   is the dummy that equals one if the industry R&D intensity is higher 
than the industry median, and zero in other cases. We then include these two 
                                                             
8
 Foreign investors have no access, or only a limited access to ownership in nuclear power plants, aerospace, 
chemicals etc. 
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additional interaction terms into specification (1) and (2) with binary logit 
models.   
It has been explained in a large body of theoretical and empirical literature 
that the presence of foreign investment may vary substantially depending on the 
characteristics of the industrial sector in the host country. The literature on the 
determinants of FDI (e.g. Markusen, 1995) has stressed that profit maximising 
firms will successfully locate an affiliate in a foreign country only if they have 
some advantage with respect to local producers. Since China is a developing 
country, the most likely kind of advantage of foreign firms with respect to 
Chinese competitors is on capital and technological grounds. As a result, we use 
industry capital intensity and industry R&D intensity, in conjunction with 
institution variables, to investigate how the institutional effects on acquisition 
vary across sectors.  
More importantly, since the institution variable is region-year specific, the 
inclusion of region-year dummies will make institution impact unidentifiable. To 
overcome this problem, we allow institution variables to vary across industries 
within each region-year cell by allowing it to interact with industry 
characteristics, namely capital intensity and R&D intensity indicators. In other 
words, because of this additional dimension of variation created in new 
interaction terms, institutional effect is now identifiable even after providing 
controls for all region-year fixed effects. With a further assumption that industry 
differences do not vary across regions, our measure better reflects the true causal 
effects of institutional impact on acquisition probability. 
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4. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
4.1 Data sources and variables 
The main firm-level data we use is China Annual Survey of Industrial 
Enterprises maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). It 
contains deWDLOHG LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ ILUPV¶ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ FRGH SURGXFWLRQ DQG
accounting data, which is based on the annual accounting survey of all 
state-owned enterprises and those non-state-owned enterprises, which had an 
annual turnover of 5 million Chinese Yuan or more for the period 2000-2005. 
The information reported to the NBS should be quite reliable for two reasons. 
First, because the NBS has implemented standard procedures in the national 
income accounts since 1995 and has strict double checking procedures for firms 
that had an annual turnover of 5 million Chinese Yuan. Hence, it is much less 
subject to manipulation. Secondly, firms do not have clear incentives to 
misreport their information to the NBS, because such information cannot be used 
against them by other government agencies, such as the taxation authorities.  
On average, we have about 190,000 firms per year in our sample period, 
spanning 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. In addition to the 
detailed information about the characteristics of the firm, the dataset includes the 
firms' industry affiliation (at the GB/T code four-digit level), age (based on the 
reported opening year), size (including employment, sales, value-added sales and 
capital stock, etc.) and foreign equity share of the firm9. Furthermore, the NBS 
provides every firm in the dataset with a legal identification number and specifies 
its ownership mode. Firms are classified into one of the following six primary 
                                                             
9
 Foreign equity share excludes shares held by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan firms. It is because that 
many of investments from HMT are originally created in PRC, then flight into HMT but finally 
round-tripping back to PRC. 
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categories: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective firms, private firms, 
mixed-ownership firms, foreign firms, and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
firms.10 Firms with foreign investments are recoded into three ownership modes: 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, equity joint ventures and contractual joint 
ventures. 
Our institutional quality is measured as the quality of intellectual property 
rights protection for 31 Chinese provinces for the period 2000-2005, sourced 
from the NERI Index of Marketisation of China's Provinces (2009 report) from 
National Economic Research Institute, China Reform Foundation. We focus on 
protection of property rights since it is arguably the most important aspect of the 
institutional climate (North, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 
2009). NERI constructs the indicator of intellectual property rights protection 
from two sub-indices. 11  The first one is the number of applications for 
intellectual property rights protection weighted by the number of the technical 
staff. The second one is the number of approvals of intellectual property rights 
protection divided by the number of the technical staff. Although, the indicator 
cannot fully capture institutional quality, it substantially reflects the legal 
environment of property rights protection. Arguably, the higher the willingness of 
the technical staff to apply intellectual property rights protection in a province, 
the stricter the law for the intellectual property rights protection enforced in that 
region, and therefore, we may expect better institutional quality and contractual 
environment. In other words, the indicator is positively related to the contractual 
environment and hence institutional quality. Since our measure of institutional 
                                                             
10
 The NBS does not treat publicly listed companies in China separately, which are all grouped under the 
mixed-ownership category. By the end of 2005, there were about 1,300 publicly listed companies in China's 
two stock exchanges. Only slightly over 700 of them were manufacturing firms. 
11
 Please refer to Fan and Wang (various years) for the details of how these sub-indices are synthesised into 
a single indicator. 
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quality is measured from two sub-indexes with the principal components analysis, 
one limitation of the measure is that the weight of the sub-indexes is artificially 
defined. This raises a concern about the potential bias. Another limitation of the 
institutional measure is that the score of the institutional quality is ordinal. Thus 
it is meaningless in scale and hard to interpret the meaning of the unit change of 
the institutional quality. However, one noticeable advantage of this indicator is 
that it varies across both regions and over time, and is recorded from 1997 to 
2007, which covers our sample period. 
In the literature, rule of law is commonly used in studies such as Hebous 
and Ruf (2010). Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) use the indicator of enforceability of 
government contracts across countries. Kamal and Lovely (2010) use China 
WTO accession as an indicator of institutional improvement. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, direct measures of the institutional measures across 
Chinese provinces and time are not available. Regional openness is employed in 
Amiti and Javorcik (2008) as a proxy for the regulation environment in China, 
which varies across regions and over time. However, we believe that many other 
issues apart from institutional quality such as preferential policies may capture 
openness. To summarise, given the importance of institutional development over 
time during our sample period, one clear advantage of our measure of property 
rights is that our indicator measures institutional quality at both the regional and 
year levels 
Table 2-1 summarises the definitions and the sources of the variables 
employed in our study. The first two variables are independent variables which 
are to be included in the binary logit model. Four variables in the middle are 
explanatory variables referring to regional institutional quality and other regional 
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variables. The third block of variables consists of independent variables 
reflecting the basic firm characteristics. Finally, the remaining variables are other 
control variables. The way we construct these variables, as well as our empirical 
methodology, is described in detail below.  
Like Dollar and Wei (2007), we rely on information on the equity held by 
foreign firms, rather than firm registration type, to identify the ownership mode 
of foreign affiliates. In this paper, foreign acquisition is defined as if the foreign 
share increases from below 25 percent a year before to above or equal to 25 
percent. Furthermore, two ownership modes of foreign acquisition are crucial to 
our study, wholly foreign-owned acquisitions and equity joint venture 
acquisitions. They are defined as follows: 
 
x If 100% of the equity of a domestic firm is acquired by foreign investors, 
the acquired firm is defined as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise. 
x If more than 25% but less than 100% of the equity is bought by a foreign 
firm, the acquired affiliate is classified as an equity joint venture 
enterprise.   
 
The choice of 25% as the threshold for defining foreign affiliates is because 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China defines foreign affiliates as firms in 
which 25% or more equity shares are held by foreign multinationals. It is worth 
mentioning that the two modes of foreign ownership, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises and equity joint ventures, are regulated under different laws and 
regulations. A wholly owned enterprise is a limited liability entity solely owned 
and operated by the foreign investor. The foreign firm bears all of the costs and 
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risks of the venture and equally receives all after tax profits, while the equity 
joint venture is a limited liability company in which control is based on the 
proportion of equity shares held by the foreign company and the remaining 
parties. Noting that the proportion of equity shares held by the foreign company 
and the remaining parties indicates different level of the control of the acquired 
firm. In literature12, a threshold of the 50 percent is commonly used with focus 
on the majority level of the voting right. Our study takes 10 percent, 50 percent 
and 75 percent as the alternative thresholds for defining foreign acquisition as a 
robustness check of main empirical analysis. Regression results are shown in the 
appendix.  
At the firm level, production efficiency is frequently suggested as an 
important factor determining foreign acquisition and the ownership mode. In our 
study, productivity is captured by labour productivity. It is expressed as the 
logarithm of the total value added divided by total employment.13 As mentioned 
in Section 2, it is expected to have a positive impact on the prevalence of foreign 
acquisition. Moreover, since most current studies are investigating acquiring 
firms, how productivity of the acquired firms, prior to the acquisition, affects the 
choice of ownership mode is to be examined in our investigation.14   
With regard to other aspects of firm characteristics, export intensity is 
defined as the share of exports to the total sales. Firm size is measured by the 
logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. Firm capital intensity is the 
logarithm of the total fixed assets scaled by the total number of employees. 
)LQDOO\ ZH VXEWUDFW WKH \HDU RI WKH ILUP¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW IURP WKH \HDU RI
                                                             
12
 Such as Bandick, and Görg (2009); Du and Girma (2009); Karpaty (2005) 
13
 All values are normalised to 1999 price index. 
14
 Theoretical and empirical studies find efficiency of the acquiring firm to have a negative impact on 
partial acquisition and positive impact on full acquisition.  
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observation to refer the operating age of the firm. Referring to Section 2, we 
H[SHFW WKH ILUPV¶ H[SRUW LQWHQVLW\ VL]H DQG FDSLWDO LQWHQVLW\ WR KDYH D SRVLWLYH
impact in our study of foreign acquisition. Age effect is ambiguous in previous 
studies. We will investigate what impact it has on the prevalence of foreign 
acquisition in China. Furthermore, while little has been done in the previous 
studies to examine how these factors determine the mode of ownership structure, 
we explore the impact of these firm characteristics on the probability of being 
fully acquired versus jointly owned by foreign firms in the second part of our 
















                                                             
15
 Karmal and Lovely (2010) find no evidence that smaller firms are more likely to transit to WOE. Raff, 
Ryan and Stahler (2008) find no evidence that the affiliate age has an impact on the ownership. 
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Table: 2-1 Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable  Definition Variation Level Source ܦܽܿݍ  
 
Dummy that takes the 
value 1 if foreign share 
reaches 25% 
And 0 if foreign share 
remains less than 25% 




Dummy that takes the 
value 1 if foreign share 
reaches 100% 
And 0 if foreign share 
increase to more than 
25% but less than 
100% 







Region-Year The NERI Index of 
Marketisation of China's 
Province 
Foreign Presence Ratio of foreign sales 
to total sales of an 
industry in a region 
Region-Industry-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Average Wages Ratio of industrial real 
wages in a region to 
the number of 
employees in the 
industry and region 
Region-Industry-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Regional GDP per 
Capita 
Ratio of regional real 
GDP to population 
Region-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Firm Export Share Ratio of firm export to 
total sales 
Firm-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Firm Employment Number of firm 
employees 




Ratio of firm 
value-added to number 
of employees 
Firm-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Firm K/L Ratio Ratio of firm fixed 
assets to number of 
employees 
Firm-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Firm Age Length of firm 
operating years 




Dummy that takes the 
value 1 if capital 
intensity is higher than 
median and 0 
otherwise 
Industry-Year China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises 
Indu. R&D intensity 
dummy 
Dummy that takes the 
value 1 if R&D 
intensity is higher than 
median and 0 
otherwise 
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4.2 Descriptive analysis 
4.2.1 Foreign acquisition in China 
In all, there were 12,204 acquisitions by foreign-owned firms during the 
sample period (1.89% of all the firms) according to 25% threshold, and these 
were relatively evenly split between acquisitions as joint ventures (5,906 
acquisitions) and acquisitions as wholly owned firms (6,298 acquisitions). 
In Table 2-2, we show how the acquisition activity by foreign multinationals 
varies significantly across geographic dimensions in the data. Table 2-2 shows 
that, although acquisitions appear to occur in all the regions, they are 
concentrated in Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Shandong. 
These six regions together accounted for about 82% of the acquisitions that took 
place, with Shanghai and Guangdong accounting for around 25% each. The 
second and the third columns illustrate the number of firms which were acquired 
to become joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. The total number 
of each type of firms is almost evenly balanced, with 5,906 firms and 6,298 firms 
each. However, there were also some noticeable differences across regions. We 
observe that more firms were acquired as joint ventures rather than wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in most regions except Shanghai, Fujian and 
Guangdong.  
In the final column, we ensure that the second column adequately represents 
the geographical spread of industrial activity in China by presenting the number 
of acquisitions as a percentage of the number of firm-year observations within 
the dataset. The average proportion of acquisitions is 1.9% of the firm year 
observations. The greatest concentration of foreign entry was observed in 
Shanghai, which was 8.99%. The proportions for Guangdong and Fujian were 
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4.04 and 2.69, respectively. The differences across the other regions were much 
smaller. In general, acquisitions were more likely to take place in the coastal 
regions. The overall rates of acquisition in the central regions of China were, in 
contrast, far below the mean. 
In Table 2-3, we repeat the same exercise separately based on the broad 
industry in which the acquired and green-field affiliates operate. Results in Table 
2-3 show clear industry heterogeneity. In general, acquisitions took place across 
all of the broad industry groups, except in the manufacturing industry of tobacco, 
and were less concentrated industry-wise as compared to the pattern of regional 
differences. Measured in terms of the number of acquisitions and percentage of 
acquisitions in total firms, acquisitions took place most intensively in the 
industries of textiles, wearing apparel, tanning and dressing of leather, furniture, 
sports goods, chemicals, rubber, plastics, electrical machinery, as well as 
communications equipment and computers. In the second and third columns, we 
differentiate the acquisition mode in the results. We find less variation in 
industries than across regions. Focusing on those industries which have relatively 
a large number of acquisitions, we find that the two modes of acquisition are split 
almost evenly. Only the industries of furniture, tanning, plastics and 
communications were more likely to be acquired as wholly owned enterprises as 
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Table 2-2: Foreign Acquisition by Location 
 






Beijing 227 147 80 2.13 
Tianjin 322 165 157 2.92 
Hebei 176 151 25 1.05 
Shanxi 32 27 5 0.41 
Inner Mongolia 28 23 5 0.80 
Liaoning 325 268 57 1.85 
Jilin 72 50 22 1.21 
Heilongjiang 59 41 18 0.98 
Shanghai 2965 1102 1863 13.5 
Jiangsu 1337 860 477 2.28 
Zhejiang 804 657 147 1.37 
Anhui 82 58 24 0.90 
Fujian 783 291 492 4.63 
Jiangxi 83 41 42 0.97 
Shandong 771 499 272 1.86 
Henan 142 110 32 0.68 
Hebei 137 93 44 0.94 
Hunan 114 76 38 0.77 
Guangdong 3323 936 2387 6.22 
Guangxi 99 74 25 1.41 
Hainan 24 13 11 2.42 
Chongqing 39 34 5 0.83 
Sichuan 109 71 38 0.91 
Guizhou 20 14 6 0.49 
Yunnan 35 30 5 0.90 
Tibet 5 5 0 0.79 
Shaanxi 40 32 8 0.80 
Gansu 14 11 3 0.26 
Qinghai 4 3 1 0.44 
Ningxia 7 6 1 0.61 
Xinjiang 16 13 3 0.58 
 
Total 12,204 5,906 6,298 2.73 
Note. a Intensity of acquisition is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of 
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Table 2-3: Foreign Acquisition by Industry and Mode 
 
Industry Acquisitions 









70 54 16 0.27 
Processing of food 445 285 160 1.27 
Manufacture of 
food 
318 164 154 2.21 
Manufacture of 
beverages 
182 120 62 1.73 
Manufacture of 
tobacco products 
0 0 0 0 
Manufacture of 
textiles 
858 434 424 1.92 
Manufacture of 
wearing apparel 
1242 585 657 4.22 
Tanning & dressing 
of leather 
513 228 285 3.95 
Manufacture of 
wood  
201 110 91 1.84 
Manufacture of 
furniture 
212 79 142 3.57 
Manufacture of 
pulp paper 
240 113 127 1.38 
Publishing & 
printing 





toy and sta. 
357 130 227 4.81 
Manufacture of 
coke & refined 
petroleum 








231 153 78 1.80 
Manufacture of 
man-made fibres 
74 41 33 1.94 
Manufacture of 
rubber products 
160 74 86 2.59 
Note. b Intensity of acquisition is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of 
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Table 2-3: Foreign Acquisition by Industry and Mode (Continued) 
 
Industry Acquisitions 








763 276 487 2.77 
Manufacture of 
other non metallic 
minerals 
537 316 221 0.96 
Manufacture of 
basic metals 




128 83 45 1.22 
Manufacture of 
other metals 























882 300 582 5.04 
Manufacture of 
medical & optical 
instruments  
234 92 142 3.23 
Manufacture of 
crafts 
424 198 226 2.97 
Recycling  16 10 6 3.19 
Electricity, gas 
and water 
126 97 29 0.48 
 
 
Total 12,199 5,903 6,296 2.71 
Note. b Intensity of acquisition is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of 
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4.2.2 Regional institutions 
 
Table 2-4 shows that coastal regions such as Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Tianjin ranked at the top in the index of intellectual 
property rights protection throughout the sample period where acquisitions were 
more likely to take place. In general, coastal regions are among those have best 
institutions and western regions are those have poorest institutions. Ranked in the 
middle are those central regions. Furthermore, there were no big jumps for the 
most regions over the period. Therefore, over the period, coastal regions remain 
institutional advantages over central and western regions.   
In Figure 2-1, we examine how much the institutional climate varies 
between regions and across time. We have compared the intellectual property 
rights institutional environment in 1997 and in 2007. First, how far the province 
is from the origin at x-axis and y-axis indicates how good the regional 
institutional climate was in the year 2000 and 2007 respectively. Combined with 
the evidence from the firm-level data, we find that the regions that have more 
acquisitions also have better institutional quality. Secondly, we find that all the 
regions are above the 45-degree line, which indicates that the institutional 
improvements did take place in all the provinces. Finally, the distance from the 
45-degree line indicates how much the institutions improved in each region. 
Particularly, we observe that intellectual property rights institutional environment 
in the coastal regions such as Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and 
Tianjin improved much faster than the other inland or hilly regions.   
To summarise, the data shows that there are large regional differences in our 
measure of institutional quality. First, the level of the institutional quality has a 
significant regional dimension. Second, the institutional qualities of Chinese 
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provinces have also improved unevenly over time. The regional differences in 
institutional improvement share many similarities with the regional differences in 
acquisition, as shown in the firm-level data. It confirms the finding that the 
institutional quality varies widely across China (Du et al., 2008; UNCTAD, 
DQGWKDW&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWKDVEHHQFRQFHQWUDWHGLQFHUWDLQ
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Table 2-4: Provincial Ranking of Institutional Quality 
Ranking 1999 Ranking 2001 Ranking 2003 Ranking 2005 
Beijing 1 Shanghai 1 Shanghai 1 Shanghai 1 
Guangdong 2 Beijing 2 Guangdong 2 Guangdong 2 
Tianjin 3 Guangdong 3 Zhejiang 3 Zhejiang 3 
Shanghai 4 Zhejiang 4 Beijing 4 Tianjin 4 
Hainan 5 Tianjin 5 Tianjin 5 Jiangsu 5 
Fujian 6 Jiangsu 6 Jiangsu 6 Beijing 6 
Jiangsu 7 Fujian 7 Fujian 7 Fujian 7 
Zhejiang 8 Liaoning 8 Liaoning 8 Liaoning 8 
Jilin 9 Heilongjiang 9 Shandong 9 Shandong 9 
Shanxi 14 10 Hainan 10 Heilongjiang 10 Heilongjiang 10 
Liaoning 11 Shandong 11 Xinjiang 11 Hebei 11 
Shandong 12 Jilin 12 Sichuan 12 Sichuan 12 
Anhui 13 Sichuan 13 Jilin 13 Anhui 13 
Heilongjiang 14 
Inner 
Mongolia 14 Hubei 14 Chongqing 14 
Hebei 15 Xinjiang 15 Hainan 15 Hubei 15 
Ningxia 16 Hebei 16 
Inner 
Mongolia 16 Xinjiang 16 
Guangxi 17 Henan 17 Hebei 17 Jilin 17 
Hubei 18 Hubei 18 Chongqing 18 Henan 18 
Inner 
Mongolia 19 Guangxi 19 Guangxi 19 
Inner 
Mongolia 19 
Henan 20 Shanxi 14 20 Shanxi 14 20 Shanxi 14 20 
Jiangxi 21 Anhui 21 Hunan 21 Jiangxi 21 
Qinghai 22 Chongqing 22 Henan 22 Hunan 22 
Sichuan 23 Hunan 23 Jiangxi 23 Shanxi 61 23 
Guizhou 24 Jiangxi 24 Anhui 24 Yunnan 24 
Gansu 25 Yunnan 25 Shanxi 61 25 Guangxi 25 
Yunnan 26 Tibet 26 Yunnan 26 Hainan 26 
Xinjiang 27 Guizhou 27 Tibet 27 Tibet 27 
Chongqing 28 Shanxi 61 28 Ningxia 28 Ningxia 28 
Shanxi 61 29 Ningxia 29 Guizhou 29 Gansu 29 
Hunan 30 Qinghai 30 Gansu 30 Guizhou 30 










Figure 2-1: Regional Institutional Improvement (2000-2005) 
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4.3 Summary statistics 
Table 2-5 presents the summary statistics including means and standard 
deviations of the included explanatory variables that we have investigated. Within the 
table, we report the mean and standard deviations of the region and firm 
characteristics, including regional institutional quality, foreign presence, average 
regional industrial wages, GDP per capita, firm labour productivity, firm export 
employment and firm export intensity, for each group of acquired and non-acquired 
domestic firms. In columns 3 and 4, we present an extension of this exercise to show 
the summary statistics for the partially acquired firms and the wholly acquired firms. 
Table 2-5 shows that there is a clear distinction among four different ownership types 
of firms. For example, we can see that acquired firms are more likely to be located in 
a province with better institutions. Better institutions encourage more partially foreign 
acquired firms. Furthermore, we observe that the average efficiency is the highest for 
the wholly acquired firms.        
Table 2-6 presents the coefficients of correlation between the explanatory 
variables. The coefficients of correlation between firm characteristics are relatively 
small. Institutional environment is positively correlated with foreign presence, 
regional industrial wages and regional GDP per capita. The correlation between the 
regional GDP per capita and institution is positive and rather high (0.80). It implies 
that more economic developed regions appear to have better institutional quality. 
Intuitively, the economic development benefits from an improvement in institution, 
and fast economic growth demands better institutional environment. Notably, the 
coefficient of correlation of industry capital intensity and firm export intensity is 
negative (-0.23). 
To investigate how much of the variation in the institutions is due to 
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cross-regional and over-time differences, we run a simple regression in which the 
institution variable is regressed on year dummies, region dummies, year and region 
dummies, and year-region dummies, respectively. Table 2-7 presents R-square which 
is a descriptive measure of how well the institution variables are explained by the year 
and region variations. We find that about 88% variation of institutional quality is 
explained by regional differences and 12% variation of institutional quality comes 
from changes over time.  
Table 2-5: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 














Institution 1.21 1.14 1.98 0.93 1.74 0.98 2.23 0.80 
         
Foreign 
presence -2.39 1.37 -1.72 1.08 -1.80 1.11 -1.65 1.06 
         
Regional 
industrial 
wages 2.27 0.49 2.52 0.47 2.46 0.50 2.57 0.43 
         
Regional 
GDP per 
capita 0.20 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.59 0.74 0.53 
         
Firm export 
Intensity 0.14 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.34 0.43 0.48 0.51 
         
Firm 
employment 4.87 1.15 5.09 1.14 5.12 1.10 5.05 1.17 
         
Firm labour 
productivity -0.55 1.08 -0.24 1.10 -0.18 1.06 -0.30 1.13 
         
Firm K/L 
ratio -0.77 1.25 -0.31 1.27 -0.31 1.21 -0.31 1.32 
         
Firm age 21.64 126.23 11.77 90.71 13.05 91.77 10.45 89.61 
         
Indu. 
K-intensity 
dummy 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.50 
         
Indu. R&D 
dummy 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Note. All variables are logged variables except firm export share and firm age, variance between 0 and 25 
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Institution 1           
Firm export 
Intensity 0.1445 1          
Firm 
employment  -0.079 0.1456 1         
Firm labour 
productivity 0.0583 -0.0205 -0.1611 1        
Firm K/L 
ratio 0.0351 0.0095 0.0005 0.3334 1       
Firm age -0.0469 -0.0173 0.0216 -0.0159 0.0047 1      
Indu. 
K-intensity 
dummy -0.14 -0.233 -0.0809 -0.0134 -0.0557 0.0212 1     
Indu. R&D 
dummy 0.0567 -0.0728 -0.03 -0.0018 -0.0155 -0.0037 0.1551 1    
Foreign 
Presence 0.2659 0.114 -0.029 0.0207 0.0509 -0.0199 -0.1 0.1286 1   
Region 
industry 
wage 0.4699 -0.0032 -0.0693 0.0804 0.0413 -0.0233 0.1631 0.2597 0.2325 1  
Region GDP 
per capita 0.8043 0.0878 -0.1185 0.0751 0.0504 -0.0406 -0.099 0.0992 0.3466 0.5487 1 








5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Determinants of acquisition: acquired firms versus domestic firms 
Table 2-8 presents results from the binary logit model. In non-linear models, we 
report the marginal effect so that each coefficient can be interpreted in terms of 
elasticity. Robust heteroscedasticity-corrected clustered standard errors are reported in 
SDUHQWKHVHV :H LQWHUSUHW WKH LPSDFW RI WKH KRVW FRXQWU\¶V UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV and 
effects of acquired firm characteristics on the prevalence of foreign acquisition in 
China as follows: 
 
5.1.1 Regional institutional impact on foreign acquisition 
Model (1) in Table 2-8 is the benchmark model with inclusion of time, industry 
and province controls. As it is shown in column (1), the co-efficient of institutional 
environment is positive and significant, indicating that improvements in regional 
institutions and higher regional foreign firms' activity, regional average wages and 
regional GDP, have a significant and positive impact on the prevalence of foreign 
acquisitions within China across industries. This finding is consistent with literature 
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that has pointed out bad institutions are identified as impediments that undermine FDI 
attractiveness23. For example, after looking at FDI scenario in Africa, Asiedu (2006) 
suggests that weak and inefficient institutions have a negative impact on the flow of 
FDI to Africa. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) also found robust results which show that 
the impact of an improvement in the quality of institutions may result in an increase 
of FDI inflows in a sample of 52 countries.  
Furthermore, we notice that the marginal effect of institutional quality on the 
probability of foreign acquisition is about 0.00637. An improvement in the 
institutional quality by one standard deviation (i.e. by 0.93) 24 raises the propensity to 
attract foreign acquisition by slightly less than 0.64 percentage point. Compared to 
other factors, it contributes about 36 percent to the overall probability of being 
acquired.25 In the context of China, we have above 470,000 observations over a 
period of five years.26 Therefore, it means that about 602 more domestic firms are 
likely to be acquired by foreign firms if the institutional quality improves by one 




                                                             
23
 There are potential endogeneity issue that is possible to cause reverse causality between acquisition FDI and 
institution. A better institutional quality attracts acquisition FDI, while acquisition FDI may have positive effects 
on institutions. To deal with this issue, we lagged institutional quality in our regressions to reduce the effect of 
reverse causality. Furthermore, we find that most variation of the institutional quality is from regional dimension 
rather than time dimension. Thus we believe that the reverse causality between acquisition and institution has 
limited effects on the interpretation of the results in general.    
24
 Please refer to Table 2-5. 
25
 We find the overall probability of being acquired is about 1.8 percentage points in Section 3.  
26
 The source data are available from the year 2000 to 2005. However, a change in ownership depends on lagged 
characteristics that lead to a loss of the first year a firm is observed in. Therefore we exclude the year 2000 from 
the regression analysis. 
27
 It is calculated as 470000/5*0.15%. 
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Table 2-8: Logit Model of Acquisition: Marginal Effects 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: For all Firms: Acquired firm=1&Domestic firm=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) ˄5˅ 
Regional 
Institutions 
0.00637*** 0.00713* 0.00631** 0.00715* 0.00695*** 
˄0.00054˅ (0.00205) (0.00178) (0.00205) ˄0.00054˅ 
Foreign Presence 0.00243*** 0.00244*** 0.00257*** 0.00257*** 0.00314*** 
˄0.00016˅ (0.00036) (0.00033) (0.00033) ˄0.00019˅ 
Average Wage 0.00341*** 0.00327***   0.00314*** 
˄0.00041˅ (0.00075)   ˄0.00041˅ 
Regional GDP per 
Capita 
-0.02770***  -0.02655**  -0.01325*** 
˄-0.00323˅  (0.00804)  ˄-0.00289˅ 
      
Firm Export Share 0.00796*** 0.00796** 0.00791** 0.00791** 0.00888*** 
˄0.00194) (0.00274) (0.00273) (0.00274) ˄0.00192˅ 
Firm Employment 0.00334*** 0.00335*** 0.00339*** 0.00339*** 0.00362*** 
(0.00021) (0.00053) (0.00051) (0.00052) (0.00024) 
Firm Labour 
productivity 
0.00176*** 0.00178** 0.00186** 0.00187** 0.00175*** 
(0.00014) (0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00014) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.00303*** 0.00301*** 0.00307*** 0.00305*** 0.00307*** 
(0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00011) 
Firm Age -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00063*** 
(-0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (-0.00002) 
      
Indu. K-intensity 
Dummy 
    0.00001 
    (-0.00051) 
Indu. R&D 
intensity dummy 
    0.00089** 
    (0.00032) 
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 474,482 474,482 474,482 474,482 474,482 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Independent variables are logged except export share and all dummies. 
 
Since the correlation matrix in Table 2-6 identifies that regional institutions, 
regional GDP per capita and regional average wage are highly correlated, it raises a 
concern about the potential bias of the co-linearity has on the estimated effect of the 
institutional quality. To check if this is the case, we exclude regional GDP per capita 
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in column (2), regional average wage in column (3), and both of them in column (4). 
With exclusion of the regional GDP per capita, the results show a increase in the 
size of the estimated effect of the institutional quality from 0.00637 to 0.00713 in 
column (2). So the GDP per capita is positively related to the institutions but 
negatively related to the probability of acquisition, which is consistent with findings 
in the correlation matrix and results in the column (1). Importantly, the effect of the 
institutional quality remains significantly different from zero. In column (3) with drop 
of the regional wage, we observe that the coefficient of regional institutional quality 
varies very little as compared to previous columns. In column (4), both regional GDP 
per capita and regional wage are excluded. The coefficient of the effect of institutional 
quality shows an increase in the size, but the effect still remains significantly from 
zero.      
Turning to other explanatory variables, we explore the effect of other regional 
variables on the attractiveness of foreign acquisition. We observe that the regional 
foreign presence, which is a proxy for the quality of the investment climate, is 
positively correlated with foreign acquisition. Domestic firms in those provinces, 
which have higher foreign firm activities, are more attractive to foreign investors due 
to agglomeration benefits. It may imply that the competition of foreign investors for 
resources or congestion externalities has not yet outweighed the benefits of being in a 
province with many other foreign firms present. The result is consistent with the 
argument put forward by Amiti and Javorcik (2006) in the case of China.28 They 
                                                             
28
 In their paper, the dependent variable is measured by number of foreign firms. 
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indicate the importance of 'scale effects' for the increase in FDI. As they point out, the 
greater the amount of investment, the greater the confidence of others to invest. Tseng 
and Zebregs (2002) also find robust evidence that suggests positive relationship 
EHWZHHQIRUHLJQILUPV¶SUHVHQFHDQGSUHYDOHQFHRIIRUHLJQHQWU\ in China.  
The coefficient of average industrial wages in a region is positive and 
statistically significant in all the specifications. It shows that higher average industrial 
wages in a region facilitate more foreign acquisition. The implication of this result is 
an assertion that, in recent years of fast economic development, China has not 
attracted foreign investment only through low labour costs. As reflected in the model 
of Branstetter and Feenstra (2002), multinational firms in China tend to pay a 
premium on wages to their workers. This may be because multinational firms desire 
to hire quality workers. The higher wages may well reflect higher labour productivity. 
Hence, it is conceivable that wages in those provinces that can attract relatively more 
FDI can be higher too. Apart from that, the Chinese hukou (household residence 
registration) system, which restricts the mobility of labour across provinces, was 
weakened during the 1990s, raising concern that provincial wages could potentially be 
endogenous. We address this issue by estimating the model with provincial fixed 
effects. However, we find neither change of sign, nor any changes of significance on 
the magnitude of the wage variable with this modification.  
Finally, regional GDP per capita also plays a role in the entry decision. 
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of regional GDP per capita is negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications that GDP per capita is included. In the past 
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empirical studies, market size was found to be a significant and positive determinant 
of FDI. It is pointed out that one of the motivations of FDI is to look for a new market. 
The larger the market size of a particular province, other things being constant, the 
more FDI the province should attract. Cheng and Kwan (2002), Tseng and Zebregs 
(2002) and Zhang (1999) indicate, in their research, that empirical studies have found 
a strong positive correlation between GDP and FDI inflows especially at the country 
level. However, we observe that the coefficient becomes negative and significant. 
Indeed, GDP per capita can be interpreted as economic development, which may be 
positively related to costs. For example, more developed regions are subject to higher 
land costs. Thus for foreign investors who are driven by a search for lower costs, the 
domestic firms in relatively less developed provinces may be more attractive due to 
lower acquisition costs.  
 
5.1.2 What impact does firm heterogeneity have on foreign acquisition? 
Continuing with the next regressors in Table 2-8, we examine whether 
pre-acquisition firm heterogeneity affects the likelihood of being acquired. At the first 
glance of Table 2-8, we find that more productive, export intensive, capital-intensive 
and younger domestic firms are more likely to be acquired by foreign firms. However, 
because acquisitions are rare events in total number of firms in China, the marginal 
effects are relatively small. 
Turning to firm labour productivity and firm size, we find that the acquired 
ILUP¶VSUH-acquisition labour productivity and the number of employees are positive 
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and significant in all specifications29. In column (1), an increase in productivity by 
one standard deviation raises the propensity to attract foreign acquisition by 0.18 
percentage points compared to the 1.8 percentage points overall. The result shows that 
acquired firms behave differently from those that remain domestically owned. The 
higher the pre-acquisition productivity and the size of the domestic firm, the more 
likely it is to be acquired. It reconciles well with previous studies such as McGuckin 
and Nguyen (1995) in which they argue that the buyer should 'cherry pick' their 
targets, and accordingly choose the firms with the highest productivity.  
The coefficients of export intensity in all specifications are positive and 
statistically significant. It suggests that Chinese domestic firms with higher exporting 
intensity are more likely to be foreign acquired. If the export share increases by one 
standard deviation, the probability of acquisition increases by 0.8 percentage points. 
The result accords with the theoretical prediction that one motive of FDI is to 
establish an export platform, as found by Ekholm et al. (2003), Grossman et al. (2004) 
and Yeaple (2003). Empirically, Girma et al. (2005) conclude that the U.K. firms with 
higher exporting intensity are more likely to be foreign takeover targets. 
In previous empirical investigations, firm capital intensity, which is measured by 
firm capital labour ratio, has also been found to have an important impact on the 
likelihood of foreign acquisition. Girma et al. (2008) find evidence of cherry picking 
which shows that acquired firms have a higher capital labour ratio. Karpaty (2005) 
                                                             
29
 The region dummies have been included in the baseline specification to control for regional specific effects. 
For example, firms located in the coastal regions in China are more productive and larger than firms located in the 
inland regions. Therefore, the introduction of regional dummy isolates the regional differences in size and 
productivity. 
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also confirms that the capital labour ratio is positively related to foreign entry. In our 
study, we find that the coefficient of capital intensity is positive and significant at the 
0.1% level in column (1) to (4). Although the marginal impact of firm capital intensity 
is small, as acquisition is a rare event, in the data set the magnitude is steady across all 
specifications. The result suggests that the more capital-intensive the domestic firm 
was prior to acquisition, the more likely it was to be acquired by foreign firms. 
Apparently, the more capital-intensive firms are more labour productive. So the result 
echoes the cherry picking hypothesis that acquirers choose their targets with the 
highest survivor possibility, and hence with the best firm performance.   
In Table 2-8, we also find that the age of the domestic firm is related to the 
probability of being acquired by foreign firms negatively and significantly. With 
regard to our results in column (1), the effect of age has different interpretations. On 
the one hand, a younger firm may be less rigid and resistant to acquisition by 
outsiders. On the other hand, according to the cherry picking hypothesis, an older firm 
has accumulated experience that is thought to give it an advantage over the younger 
ones. Our investigation on Chinese firms confirms the first explanation and rejects the 
cherry picking prediction on the part of the acquiring firms. Empirically, by analysing 
FDI in Sweden, Karpaty (2005) also finds that the younger firms, on the margins, are 
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5.1.3 Industry impact on foreign acquisition 
Now we discuss whether pre-acquisition industrial characteristics have an impact 
on the prevalence of foreign merger and acquisitions. In column (5), we exclude 
industry dummy to allow us to estimate industry impact on foreign acquisition. The 
conventional argument about the capital labour ratio is that multinationals based in 
rich countries might allocate their more labour-intensive production to their affiliates 
in less developed countries, while concentrating their more capital-intensive or 
skill-intensive operations at home (Lipsey, 2004). Furthermore, during the past 30 
years, China is widely referred to as a 'world factory' or 'labour-intensive 
manufacturing country'. The perceivable result is that more labour intensive industries 
in China attract more foreign investors. However, in Table 2-8, we notice that the 
industry capital intensity variable is insignificant, so we find no evidence to suggest 
that the industry capital intensity has an impact on the likelihood of being acquired. In 
fact, in the recent years of fast economic development, China has not attracted foreign 
investment only by providing unskilled or semi-skilled labour. 
Next, we investigate how industrial R&D intensity determines the likelihood of a 
domestic firm being acquired by a foreign firm. In Table 2-8, we observe that R&D 
intensity dummy is positive and statistically significant in column (2). The size of the 
effect is relatively small though. The result shows that domestic firms in more R&D 
intensive industries are more likely to be foreign acquired. It is consistent with the 
argument that multinationals possess technological advantages. In more R&D 
intensive industries, technological advantages are more obvious. Thus domestic firms 
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are more likely to sell equity to multinational firms to fill the technology gap.      
 
5.1.4 Regional institutional effect revisited in interaction terms  
Notably, another important empirical issue is that we find asymmetric 
institutional improvement across regions over time from Figure 2-1. Institutional 
qualities in the Coastal regions improve much faster than in the inland regions. 
Therefore, some region-time specific factors may cause bias in the estimation of the 
true causal effect. In this sub-section, we will overcome these empirical issues by 
adding industry-region-time level interaction terms of institution and industry 
variables with region-year level dummy to provide control for of our regression.  
As we have discussed above, with the use of year-region fixed effects, the 
variation in new measures allows us to isolate all region-year specific factors and 
estimate how institutional effects vary across industries. Furthermore, with the 
assumption that regional factors over time have no preference to attract certain 
industries, our modification better measures the true causal effect of how the 
institutional effect on the probability of being foreign acquired depends on industry 
characteristics. Furthermore, this modification not only helps us to tackle region-time 
specific factors, it also shows that the regional institutional impact varies across 
industries. Therefore, we carry out the same analysis as our baseline regression by 
adding interaction terms of industry level capital labour intensity and R&D intensity 
dummies with respective regional institution variables as we have described in 
Section 3. Results are shown in Table 2-9. 




In Table 2-9, columns (1) and (2) present the likely result of the introduction of 
Table 2-9: Logit Model of Acquisition with Interaction Terms between Institutional Quality 
and Industrial Capital Intensity and R&D Intensity: Marginal Effects 
 
 Dependent Variable: For all firms: Acquired firm=1&Domestic firm=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional 
Institutions 
0.00585***  0.00591***   




0.00111*** 0.00067***   0.00088** 
˄0.00032˅ (0.00028) 




  0.00105*** 0.00052* 
(0.00027) 
0.00026 
  ˄0.00025˅ (0.0003) 
Foreign Presence 0.00240*** 0.00242*** 0.00241*** 0.00243*** 
(0.00015) 
0.00241*** 
˄0.00016˅ (0.00017) ˄0.00016˅ (0.00016) 
Average Wage 0.00334*** 0.00305*** 0.00333*** 0.00324*** 
(0.00043) 
0.00302*** 
˄0.00041˅ (0.00044) ˄0.00042˅ (0.0004) 
Regional GDP per 
Capita 
-0.02735***  -0.02781***   
˄-0.00323˅  ˄-0.00319˅   
      
Firm Export Share 0.00795*** 0.00744*** 0.00793*** 0.00738*** 0.00745*** 
˄0.00193˅ (0.00189) ˄0.00193˅ (0.00192) (0.0019) 
Firm Employment 0.00334*** 0.00328*** 0.00334*** 0.00328*** 0.00328*** 
˄0.00021˅ (0.00020) ˄0.00021˅ (0.00021) (0.00021) 
Firm Labour 
productivity 
0.00176*** 0.00158*** 0.00177*** 0.00158*** 0.00158*** 
˄0.00014˅ (0.00013) ˄0.00014˅ (0.00012˅ (0.00013˅ 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.00302*** 0.00289*** 0.00303*** 0.00287*** 0.00289*** 
˄0.00011˅ (0.00009) ˄0.00011˅ ˄0.00010˅ ˄0.00011˅ 
Firm Age -0.00060*** -0.00058*** -0.00060*** -0.00058*** -0.00058*** 
˄-0.00002˅ (-0.00002) ˄-0.00002˅ ˄-0.00002˅ ˄-0.00002˅ 
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Region 
Dummy 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 474,469 474,469 474,469 474,469 473595 
Note.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Independent 
variables are logged except interaction terms, export share and all dummies. 
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the interaction terms of capital intensity and institutional environment into baseline 
regression. Time, region and industry fixed effects are controlled by dummies in 
column (1). In column (2), we apply region, year and region-year pair specific 
dummies along with the use of an industry fixed effect. It is a very demanding fixed 
effect control. It removes all factors that are common to firms within each region-time 
pair that affect the acquisition probability. Interestingly, in both column (1) and (2), 
we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. The result confirms that the improvement in regional institutions has a 
significant and positive effect on the prevalence of foreign acquisition within China.  
Furthermore, as implied by column (1), in high capital-intensive industries, the 
institutional impact on the probability of being acquired is a remarkable 20% higher 
than in low capital-intensive industries.30 The sensitivity test shows that the marginal 
institutional impact on the probability of being acquired has stronger positive effect in 
the more capital-intensive industries. In column (2), with control of all time-region 
fixed effects, we find that, an improvement in the institutional quality by one standard 
deviation raises the propensity to attract foreign acquisition by 0.07 percentage points 
more in highly capital-intensive industries than in low capital-intensive industries. It 
is a notable result given that the overall probability of being acquired is only 0.18 
percentage points. Intuitively, capital-intensive industries, such as manufacture of 
metals and chemical products involve a high level of fixed costs. So, the more 
capital-intensive the industry is, the greater the demand for legal protection from the 
                                                             
30
 It is calculated as 0.00111/0.00585*100%. 
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foreign investors. The improvement of institutional quality provides a better legal 
environment to protect property rights on assets. Thus, the likelihood of acquisition is 
more sensitive to the improvement in institutional environment in the case of 
capital-intensive industries, than in the case of labour-intensive industries.  
We further investigate how improvement in regional institutions has an impact 
on the probability of being acquired across different R&D intensive industries. We 
replicate our basic analysis by introducing the interaction of the high industry R&D 
intensity dummy with the regional institutions. In column (3), time, region and 
industry dummies control fixed effects. In column (4), we apply region, year and 
region-year dummies along with the use of an industry fixed effect. We find that the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant if we control for the regional 
specific fixed effect in columns (3) and (4). It confirms our results in Table 2-8 which 
show that the improvement in regional institutional environment encourages foreign 
acquisition.  
Column (3) of Table 2-9 tells us that the marginal institutional impact on the 
probability of being acquired has stronger positive effect in more R&D intensive 
industries. Actually, based on a calculation of the coefficients, the institutional impact 
in highly R&D intensive industries is about 18% higher than in low R&D intensive 
industries.31 In column (4), on controlling all time and region fixed effects, we find 
that, with an improvement in the institutional quality by one standard deviation, the 
propensity to attract foreign acquisition rises by 0.05 percentage points more in highly 
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 It is calculated as 0.00105/0.00591*100%. 
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R&D intensive industries as compared to low R&D intensive industries. Actually, the 
costs to enforce intellectual property rights protection in R&D intensive industry, such 
as manufacture of communications equipment, computers and pharmaceutical 
products, are higher if institutions are weaker. As a result, foreign investment in 
highly R&D intensive industries is more sensitive to the improvement in regional 
institutions. Furthermore, comparing the results of the first column and the third 
column, we find that the institutional impact due to being in a more capital-intensive 
industry is higher than its due to being in a more R&D-intensive industry. More 
precisely, this difference is further confirmed in column (5) where both the 
interactions are included and industrial R&D intensity seems to have no significant 
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5.2 Determinants of the mode of acquisition: wholly acquired versus partially 
acquired 
We repeat our investigation method to examine how the improvement of regional 
institutional quality and the acquired firm heterogeneity have an impact on the 
ownership form of acquisition. To interpret regression results of these logit models, 
we report the marginal effect corresponding to each coefficient so that our results can 
be interpreted in terms of elasticity. Robust heteroskedasticity-corrected clustered 
standard errors are reported within parentheses. 
 
5.2.1 Baseline result: regional institutional impact on the likelihood of being wholly 
acquired 
First of all, as Table 2-10 shows, the institutional environment plays a 
statistically significant and negative role for the domestic firms to be acquired as 
wholly owned foreign enterprises when all fixed effects are included in column (1). 
This is consistent with the previous empirical findings, such as those of Fan et al. 
(2009) and Aseidu and Esfahani (2001). They all find evidences that a better 
institutional environment induces partial ownership of the affiliate. In fact, the 
transaction cost model argues that, with the improvement of contract enforcement, 
coordination and transaction costs for sharing the ownership decline. Thus better 
institutional quality leads to a prevalence of joint ventures compared to wholly foreign 
owned firms. 
Since regional institutions, regional GDP per capita and regional average wage 
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are evidently co-linear right-hand side variables, we conduct the robustness analysis 
to check the sign and significance of the estimated coefficient on the regional 
institution variable to the exclusion of regional GDP per capita, regional average 
wage or both in column (2), column (3) and column (4) respectively. The results show 
a limited reduction in the size of the estimated effect of the institutional quality on 
WOEs, but the effect still remains significantly different from zero.    
We further introduce interaction terms between institution and industry specific 
characteristics into our analysis with year, region and region-year level dummies 
providing control for all time-variant regional differences. Intuitively, since this new 
interaction term varies at the year-region-industry level, we are able to identify 
institutional impact even while controlling for all region-year unobservable factors 
with year-region dummies. Results are reported in Table 2-11. 
Interestingly, we find that the coefficients of interaction terms in columns (1) and 
(2) are negative and statistically significant. Generally speaking, the propensity of a 
domestic firm to be wholly acquired is 4 percentage points lower in a highly 
capital-intensive industry than in a low capital-intensive industry, given a common 
improvement in the institutional quality by one standard deviation. Intuitively, joint 
ventures incur coordination costs if legal property rights protection is weak, while this 
cost is in absence in wholly foreign owned firms. In more capital-intensive industries, 
this transaction cost is higher. Thus, partially acquired firms will be more likely to 
appear respect to the improvement of institutional environment. It is worth 
mentioning that another strand of the literature underlines that acquiring firms gain 
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residual rights of control over the assets by providing control for full ownership. 
These control rights are assumed to help retain profits and reduce technological spill 
over. According to this argument, we should expect the institutional impact on full 
acquisition to be stronger in more R&D intensive industries. However, we do not find 
evidence to support this argument. One explanation is that a large number of foreign 
acquisitions in China are clustered in low R&D industries. The protection of 
technology may not be a primary concern for those foreign investors. As shown in 
column (5), the above conclusions continue to hold when we include both of the 
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Table 2-10: Logit Model of Mode of Acquisition: Marginal Effects 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: For all acquired firms: WOEs=1&JVs=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional 
Institutions 
-0.00352*** -0.00652*** -0.00452*** -0.00852*** -0.00352*** 
(0.00167) ˄0.00182˅ ˄0.00172˅ ˄0.00184˅ ˄0.00152˅ 
Foreign 
Presence 
-0.00543 -0.00568 -0.00637 -0.00635 0.00225 
(0.0061) (0.00507) (0.00607) (0.00607) ˄0.00577˅ 
Average Wages -0.03049 -0.02331   -0.03242 
(0.01844) (0.01854)   ˄0.01808˅ 
Regional GDP 
per Capita 
0.27714  0.25721  0.42115** 
(0.17261)  (0.17245)  ˄0.14384˅ 
      
Firm Export 
Share 
0.09350*** 0.09359*** 0.09412*** 0.09418*** 0.09839*** 
(0.01406) (0.01405) (0.01405) (0.01405) ˄0.01378˅ 
Firm 
Employment 
-0.01625** -0.01624*** -0.01636** -0.01636** -0.01512** 
(0.00546) (0.00546) (0.00546) (0.00546) ˄0.00527˅ 
Firm Labour 
productivity 
-0.02436*** -0.02463*** -0.02502*** -0.02506*** -0.02568*** 
(0.00565) (0.00564) (0.00564) (0.00564) ˄0.00556) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.01596*** 0.01614*** 0.01563*** 0.01588*** 0.01402** 
(0.00457) (0.00454) (0.00457) (0.00456) (0.0045) 
Firm Age -0.01660*** -0.01661*** -0.01662*** -0.01664*** -0.01670*** 
(0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00157) (0.00158) (0.00156) 




    -0.04759*** 




    0.03976** 
    (0.01322) 
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observation 10,822 10,829 10,825 10,825 10,825 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Independent 
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Table 2-11: Logit Model of Mode of Acquisition with Interaction Terms between Institutional 
Quality and Industrial Capital Intensity: Marginal Effects 
 
 Dependent Variable: For all Acquired Firms: WOEs=1&JVs=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional 
Institutions 
0.0137  -0.01078   




-0.03869** -0.04285**   -0.04708** 








  (0.01074) (0.01141) 
Foreign Presence -0.00394 -0.00541 -0.00541 -0.00665 
(-0.00626) 
-0.00587 
(-0.00611) (-0.00625) (-0.00612) (-0.00627) 
Average Wage -0.03862* -0.02822 -0.04321* -0.03839* 
(-0.01946) 
-0.02956 
(-0.01835) (-0.02002) (-0.01839) (-0.02004) 
Regional GDP 
per Capita 
0.26654  0.2624   
(0.17231)  (0.17193)   
      
Firm Export 
Share 
0.09374*** 0.09188*** 0.09307*** 0.09078*** 0.09173*** 
(0.01412) (0.01417) (0.01405) (0.01407) (0.01415) 
Firm 
Employment 
-0.01630** -0.01708** -0.01616** -0.01665** -0.01697** 
(-0.00546) (-0.00551) (-0.00546) (-0.00552) (-0.00551) 
Firm Labour 
productivity 
-0.02446*** -0.02468*** -0.02420*** -0.02446*** -0.02455*** 
(-0.00564) (-0.00579) (-0.00565) (-0.00579) (-0.0058) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.01607*** 0.01662*** 0.01632*** 0.01679*** 0.01669*** 
(0.00458˅ (0.00464) (0.00458) (0.00464) (0.00464) 
Firm Age -0.01654*** -0.01690*** -0.01658*** -0.01690*** -0.01689*** 
˄-0.00157˅ (-0.00158) (-0.00157) (-0.00158) (-0.00158) 
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Region 
Dummy 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
N 10,822 10,741 10,822 10,741 10,741 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Independent 
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5.2.2 Firm productivity impact on the likelihood of being wholly acquired  
Turning to the effects of firm-level characteristics on the mode of foreign 
acquisition in Table 2-10, we find that labour productivity has a statistically 
significant and negative impact on the probability of being wholly acquired by foreign 
firms in all specifications. The size of the estimate is relatively small and remains 
stable at about -0.025, even when all fixed effects of time, region, and industry are 
controlled for. It means that an increase in the firm labour productivity by one 
standard deviation raises the propensity to attract partial acquisition by around 2.5 
percentage points.32 It is a supplementary result to the existing literature, which 
focuses on the effects of the productivity of multinationals (parent firm) on ownership 
choices of FDI entry. (Hebous and Ruf, 2010, Raff et al., 2009, and Mugele and 
Schnitzer, 2008) They all find that more efficient parent firms prefer wholly owned 
affiliates to joint ventures, for efficiency gains consideration here. Our work looks at 
acquired firm productivity and provides results from an opposite angle. Thus, it offers 
a supplement to complete the story of acquisition. We explain our results from 
acquired firm's perspective: domestic firms are more willing to be partially acquired 
and retain gains if they are more productive. In contrast, domestic firms are more 
willing to cash out the whole amount of equity to foreign investors if they are less 
productive.  
Regarding other firm level explanatory variables in Table 2-10, we find that firm 
characteristics are significant determinants of the ownership mode of foreign 
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 Please refer to the standard deviations in Table 2-5. 
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acquisition. Interestingly, we find that younger, smaller (in terms of number of 
employees), less productive and more export-oriented firms, possessing higher fixed 
assets, are more likely to be fully acquired by foreign investors. The result is 
consistent with younger export-orientated firms are having less assets and being more 
likely to be subjected to financial restraints to finance their production potential. Thus, 
they are more likely to sell to foreign investors before they develop into an established 
firm. We find firm level results of explanatory variables also hold in Table 2-11.33  
 
6 Conclusions 
Literature has stressed the importance of the quality of institutions and firm 
characteristics for foreign acquisition activity. Motivated by some stylised facts in 
China, we have conducted an empirical investigation on the determinants of the 
prevalence of foreign acquisition and the ownership mode of the acquired firms, using 
a novel firm-level dataset on foreign ownership and region-time-level institutional 
data on China. Our empirical work is the first to use regional improvement in 
institutional environment over time for this purpose. Furthermore, we consider how 
GRPHVWLF ILUP¶V WKH DFTXLUHG VLGH¶V SUH-acquisition characteristics affect the 
acquisition, while the existing theory and empirical studies are predominantly focused 
on the firm heterogeneity of the multinationals (the acquiring side).  
Our results obtained from binary choice models have revealed interesting 
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 For all analysis, we conduct robustness checks by changing in equity share thresholds for the definition of 
ownership types with 50% equity threshold, replacing industry dummy variables with continuous variables, and 
altering binary logit model to OLS specification. Results are the same in the sign and significance. 
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findings regarding the determinants of foreign acquisition and the ownership mode of 
acquisition (wholly acquired vs. partially acquired) in China. Our results can be 
summarised as follows. First, we find that a better regional institutional environment 
has a significant and positive impact on the prevalence of foreign acquisition in China. 
Furthermore, this impact is stronger in capital-intensive and R&D intensive industries. 
Secondly, we find evidence of cherry picking in acquisition activity in China. More 
productive, capital-intensive and export intensive firms are more likely to be acquired 
by foreign investors. Thirdly, conditional on foreign acquisition norms, domestic 
firms are more likely to be wholly acquired as compared to being partially acquired, if 
they are smaller, younger,  more export intensive and more capital-intensive, even if 
less productive.  Finally, we find that in capital-intensive industries, better 
institutions increase the likelihood of the domestic firms being partially acquired. 
Providing evidence to understand the determinants that affect the acquisition is 
important for various reasons. First, without understanding how institutions affect 
foreign acquisition, any policy reform that aims at attracting foreign investment via 
the acquisition route may prove to be inefficient or misdirected. Secondly, 
understanding the pre-acquisition firm characteristics is an important factor in 
understanding whether China is benefitting from an increased inflow of investments, 
and whether the effects of FDI on the domestic firms are positive. Our next chapter 
will tackle this issue by matching and comparing post- and pre- acquisition firm 
characteristics. Last, but not the least, our discussion with ownership variation is an 
important step to understand the determinants of acquisition for the further research 
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on the full picture of the FDI in a host economy. The mode of FDI is a combination of 
two decisions: the ownership mode and the investment mode. The decision on the 
investment mode is the choice between establishing a new firm (greenfield investment) 
and acquiring an existing firm (acquisition). In our further research, we will add the 
investment mode into our analysis and find the determinants for the FDI mode of 
entry in the host country. 
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Since China began its programmes of opening-up and liberalisation, the flow of 
inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to China has increased dramatically, to the 
point that the country is now one of most attractive destinations for FDI. It is a widely 
shared view in literature that FDI promotes exports of host countries. Therefore, this 
paper empirically investigates whether or not foreign acquisition of Chinese 
indigenous enterprises increases export. If so, can China benefit from 
export-orientated acquisition FDI? The novelty of this research is that we assess the 
intra-firm consequences of FDI with use of a micro-level data.  
An empirical investigation of the consequences of FDI in the export performance 
of any host country is important, since export is recognised in classic economic theory 
as a part of the driving force of economic growth. Besides the intrinsic importance of 
the topic, it is of special interest in the case of China, which is famous for its 
export-led growth model and is widely considered the most attractive destination for 
export-oriented FDI, earning it the epithet of 'export processing zone of the world'. 
China's export boom, from $18 billion in 1980 to $593 billion in 2004, was 
accompanied by a substantial rise in FDI inflows from almost zero to $61 billion in 
the same period, with the accumulated FDI being as much as $560 billion by the end 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 3 
81 
 
of 2004. The exports generated by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) rose much 
faster than those by domestic firms, resulting in a share of 57% in China's total 
exports in 2004.1 
A wide range of literature has been published investigating export performance 
and other firm-level characteristics. For example, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) and 
Todo (2011) find that previous experience in exporting has a major effect on current 
exporting and can explain 90% of exporting behaviour. Therefore, it would seem 
obvious that export-orientated foreign acquirers will be more interested in existing 
exporting plants. Thus, our hypothesis is that foreign acquisition is more likely to 
promote export if the acquired firm is an exporter. However, more than 40% of 
foreign-acquired firms in China are non-exporters before acquisition. Taking into 
account the experience effect, it is not straightforward to identify the market 
orientation of a foreign acquirer in this scenario. In this study, therefore, we split our 
sample into acquired exporters and acquired non-exporters, in order to investigate 
whether acquisition FDI promotes exports in both scenarios. 
If FDI stimulates export performance, we are also motivated to examine what 
could generate this effect and whether China benefits from export-oriented FDI. Our 
study is based on the following two strands of literature. First, in theory, a firm starts 
to export when productivity reaches a certain threshold; and empirically, many studies 
using firm-level data find that firms' exporting decisions are affected by their 
productivity level (Bernard and Jensen, 1999 and 2004; Greenaway and Kneller, 2004; 
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etc.). Therefore, we aim to test whether foreign acquisition has an impact on 
productivity. In fact, it is a widely shared a view that FDI promotes the exports of host 
countries by a) helping the transfer of technology and new products for exports and/or 
b) providing training for the local workforce and upgrading technical and 
management skills. If this is the case, we can expect a significant improvement in 
productivity after foreign acquisition. The acquired firm therefore benefits from 
acquisition FDI. However, there is also a popular debate concerning the foreign 
acquisition of domestic firms: the negative aspects highlighted are that foreign 
acquisition may not help to develop the host country's dynamic comparative 
advantage if it is solely focused on local cheap labour and raw materials.2 If China 
fits with this scenario, we may find that foreign acquisition has no impact on the 
productivity of acquired firms. 
Secondly, we examine whether foreign acquisition results in a significant 
improvement in financial status. In theory, it is more difficult for credit-constrained 
firms to export, because exporting requires initial investment in marketing abroad or 
modification of products to suit the foreign market, etc. Some recent empirical studies, 
including Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007), Du and Girma (2007), Feenstra, 
Li, and Yu (2011) have examined whether the financial condition of firms affects 
exporting decisions. In our study, we also expect an improvement in financial 
condition by foreign capital given the considerable financial discrimination towards 
local private enterprises in China. Relating to the productivity issue, financial status 
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 World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness (UNCTAD, 2002). 
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also has some other implications: if financial status improves, but with no 
improvement in productivity, the result is coherent with the argument made by Huang 
(2003): 'more [FDI] is actually less'. China's success in attracting FDI arouses 
criticism because acquisition FDI in China is seen as reflecting weaknesses in the 
Chinese economy, such as financial discrimination faced by local private enterprises. 
If we do not observe any productivity or financial improvement, we may suggest that 
the foreign acquirer just cherry-picks a local firm and then starts to export or increases 
the export share of the acquired firm based on its current efficiency and financial 
status. Foreign acquirers simply facilitate exports using their existing access to foreign 
markets. 
There has been a growing literature on export and FDI in China (for example, 
Zhang and Song, 2001; Zhang and Felmingham, 2001; Zhang, 2005; Yao, 2006). 
However, most existing studies have examined the export effect of FDI depending on 
the use of aggregated national-, provincial- or industry-level data, assuming that 
foreign acquisition effects are equal across regions or industries. This methodology 
may produce results that dilute the true nature of the relationship and may lessen the 
probability of obtaining accurate empirical results. There are two reasons for this 
issue: first, the effects from FDI are diffused by problems of determining the direction 
of causality between inward FDI in an industry and firm dynamics. For example, does 
FDI stimulate exporting or are multinationals attracted to firms with high exporting 
intensity? It is difficult to answer this question with aggregate data. Second, there are 
time-invariant effects that are common to all firms, such as export-promoting policy, 
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that may cause over-estimation of the effect of foreign acquisition if cross-section 
data is applied. However, in our study, with available firm-level data, we are able to 
reveal the true export effect of the acquisition FDI on an acquired firm by comparing 
it to similar firms that have never been acquired. The firm-level data allows us to 
employ a difference-in-difference (DiD) propensity matching (PSM) estimator 
proposed by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998). From a large sample of 
domestically owned firms, we choose a control group in which firms have never been 
acquired and have similar observable characteristics to the treated group in the 
pre-acquisition period for the purpose of controlling causality issue. Given that the 
two groups of firms are similar, the DiD estimator ensures that unobserved time 
invariant effects that are correlated with the selection are removed. 
Research on the effect of foreign acquisition has been explored in recent years, 
but there are still aspects to consider. This study contributes to the existing empirical 
literature in at least three important aspects. First, many current studies focused on the 
intra-firm spillover of FDI, we investigate the intra-firm consequences of FDI with 
use of micro-level data. In addition, since the panel of Chinese firms used in this 
paper covers 6 years (2000-2005), we are able to explore the dynamic patterns of 
consequences of FDI. 
Second, besides looking at export performance, we investigate intra-firm 
productivity and financial status in the post-acquisition period. We also have a 
discussion on whether the FDI-induced export increase results in any productivity and 
financial status change. 
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Last but not the least, our results provide firm-level evidence as to whether 
acquisition FDI in China is a failed policy initiative. In fact, recently the utilisation 
strategy for foreign capital in China has been increasingly emphasizing the quality of 
the FDI rather than the quantity. The rationale behind this is to benefit knowledge 
transfer and minimise pollution and energy-consumption. Therefore, to understand the 
consequences of FDI is essential from a policy perspective.    
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we outline the 
literature that is related to our study. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. The 
data are discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the empirical findings. 
Section 6 draws conclusions and summarises the study.  
 
2 Literature review 
In this part, we start with the literature relating to acquisition FDI and its 
consequences, especially export performance. Then, for the purpose of identifying 
factors that boost export performance in China, we review the literature about the 
determinants of export. Finally, we have a discussion from policy perspective based 
on the current literature.  
There are many empirical investigations about the consequences of foreign 
acquisition with a focus on export performance. It is an empirical question of special 
interest in the case of China; given that 57% of China's total exports are from foreign 
affiliates in 2004. Applying panel data at the provincial level in the period of 1986 to 
1997, Zhang and Song (2001) show that higher FDI has a positive association with 
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the provincial manufacturing export performance without discussion on causal links. 
Based on the a monthly time series for the period 1986 to 1999 and error correction 
modelling techniques, Zhang and Felmingham (2001) find that bidirectional causality 
appears in both high FDI presence regions (coastal regions) and low FDI presence 
regions (western regions) in China, while exports attract FDI in median FDI presence 
regions (central regions). Zhang (2005) provides a cross-section analysis of the 
FDI-export linkage based on 186 industries in 1995. This paper confirms that FDI 
encourages exports in China. Furthermore, it shows that this effect is larger in 
labour-intensive sectors. More interestingly, with discussion of industry specific 
domestic capital stock, it also suggests that the export-boost effect from foreign 
capital is much greater than that of domestic investment. Using a large panel dataset 
containing 28 Chinese provinces over the year 1978 to 2000, Yao (2006) also 
identifies a strong and positive linkage between FDI stock and export promotion.  
In a broader empirical literature, this FDI-export linkage is also found in many 
other countries such as Athukorala and Menon (1995) based on FDI in Malaysia; 
Banga (2006) based on Japanese and U.S. FDI flows in India, and so on. However, 
one criticism of the current literature is that it mostly uses aggregate country-, 
province- or sector- level data by assuming that foreign acquisition effects are equal 
across countries, or province, or industries. These empirical approaches therefore face 
two issues that may dilute the true relationship between foreign acquisitions and 
exports. First, aggregate data makes it difficult to tackle the direction of causality 
between FDI and firm dynamics. For instance, it is not able to distinguish whether 
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high export-intensive local firms attract foreign investors or foreign investments 
stimulate exporting. Second, cross-section analysis in particular cannot isolate 
time-invariant effects that are common to all firms, such as export-promotion policy. 
Therefore, with the use of firm-level data, one primary contribution of this study is to 
control the causality issue by a propensity matching (PSM) estimator and remove 
time-invariant effects by a difference-in-difference (DiD) method.                  
In addition to answering what role foreign acquisition plays in export 
performance, we raise a question about what sources could generate this effect. In 
general qualitative discussions, it is believed that foreign acquisition stimulates host 
countries' exports by providing additional capital, technology, managerial know-how 
and access to global markets (UNCTAD, 2002). These merits brought by FDI have 
also complemented host countries' resources and capabilities. From a detailed 
discussion on the role of FDI, the World Investment Report 2012 also suggests that 
export-oriented foreign affiliates provide training for the local workforce and upgrade 
technical and managerial skills that benefit the host countries' exports. The effect is 
found to be even stronger if export-motivated investments have advanced technology 
capabilities. To better understand why FDI can stimulate export performance, we 
review the literature regarding the determinants of export at the firm-level.  
Theoretically, there has been a rapidly expanding literature on firm level 
exporting decisions and firm heterogeneity over the last decade. Our research about 
the issue is inspired by two streams of theory developments. First, Melitz (2003), 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Helpman, Yeaple and Melitz (2004), among others, 
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provide theoretic foundation on the participation in international markets and firm 
heterogeneity. In their theory, the source of firm heterogeneity is technology 
heterogeneity. Therefore, the productivity threshold is a key to determine whether to 
export. To complement theoretic approach from firm technology perspective, the 
availability of micro level dataset has facilitated firm level empirical analysis in many 
countries. Using firm-level data, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and 
Jensen (1999, 2004), and Greenaway and Kneller (2004) provide empirical evidence 
that exporting decisions are affected by, for example, firm size and productivity levels. 
Based on theoretical and empirical researches, most of the extensions to 
multinationals theory such as Markusen (2004) and Navaretti and Venables (2006) on 
FDI have also regarded technology as the defining attribute of multinational firms. 
With respect to China, Zhang and Song (2001) argue that FDI provides China with 
competitive assets for export-oriented production in technology intensive products. 
Such assets are often firm-specific, costly and difficult for the Chinese firms to 
acquire independently. Empirically, researches have shown that foreign acquisition 
leads to a productivity upgrading. Without discussion on export performance, Karpaty 
(2005) employs firm level data to investigate how foreign acquisition affects 
productivity in Swedish manufacturing firms. The study concludes that foreign 
acquisition increases productivity in Swedish firms and this difference does not occur 
immediately but starts three years post acquisition.    
Secondly, some studies are particularly interested in the interaction between 
economic openness and corporate finance from a governance perspective. 
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Considerable research has pursued the evidence that firms in countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems are constrained in a wide variety of activities, 
including exporting. Intuitively, a possible linkage between financial constraints and 
exporting is that since exporting requires initial investment, for example, marketing 
abroad and modification of products to satisfy foreign preferences, it is more difficult 
for credit-constrained firms to export. Theoretically, Chaney (2005) develops a 
heterogeneous firm model, in which firms with sufficient liquidity are able to export. 
In his model, firms may face liquidity constraints to finance entry cost. The liquidity 
constraints are generated by a random liquidity shock every period. Because of 
insufficient liquidity, there are firms that are prevented from exporting. Aghion et al. 
(2010) develop a static model with heterogeneous, financially-constrained firms and 
derives implications that financially developed countries are more likely to export and 
export more volume in sectors which require relatively more external finance. 
Empirically, as firm-level data have become available in recent years, Greenaway, 
Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007; Du and Girma, 2007; and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) 
have found that financial conditions of firms also affect exporting decisions. 
Literature on multinational firms and financial constraints is also considerable. Egger 
and Nelson (2011) find that debt-turnover ratio is an important factor whether foreign 
capital invests in domestic firms. 
According to two strands of approach, firms are more likely to export when they 
are more productive and less credit-constrained. Thus, in this paper, if foreign 
acquisition boosts export, we consider the source of effect from two possible aspects: 
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productivity and financial constraint. Within the existing literature, the reason why 
foreign acquisition could generate an export-promoting effect has not previously 
systematically exploited by the two strands of literature. Our research contributes to 
the literature by filling the gap with the first firm-level empirical investigation of its 
kind 
Our paper is also important from a policy perspective as the negative aspects of 
acquisition FDI in China have drawn an increasing concern from economists and 
policy-makers. First, UNCTAD (2002) and Caves (1996) suggest that FDI may not 
help developing the host countries' dynamic comparative advantages by focusing 
solely on local cheap labour and raw materials. It is a widely held view that exporting 
sectors in China are labour intensive industries. One distinctive motive behind 
export-oriented acquisition FDI is exploiting cheap labour and resources in China. 
Indeed, Zhang (2005) shows that FDI effect on export performance is larger in 
labour-intensive industries. Secondly, by emphasising distortions for the perfectly 
competition norm, there is also a worry is that export-oriented FDI in China is 
attracted by financial discrimination against domestic private enterprises. 
Provocatively, Huang (2003) claims that a large amount of FDI inflows are because of 
substantial weaknesses facing the Chinese economy. Especially, because of financial 
discrimination by the state-dominated banking system, private enterprises in China 
have been forced to sell their assets to foreign investors in order to realise their 
growth potential. He also points out that much FDI went into traditional 
labour-intensive industries in China, often crowding out private domestic 
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entrepreneurs. In an alternative approach to this issue, Egger and Nelson (2011) 
examine the effect of financial constraints on the willingness of Chinese firms to take 
foreign partners. They believe that multinational firms are large, possess internal 
finance, and have better access to the international capital market. Therefore, Chinese 
firm might finance their funding constraints by taking foreign investments. They 
employ firm level data (2001-2005) and find a significant impact of debt-to-turnover 
ratios in attracting foreign capital.   
Therefore, motivated by the literature, our research aims to reveal the role of 
export-oriented acquisition FDI in China's economy, focusing on both firm-level 
productivity and financial conditions. It is a more comprehensive investigation than 
existing research. In fact, if we find no productivity effect but a relaxed financial 
constraint, we may conclude that export-motivated FDI in China is a symptom of the 
economy's deficiencies rather than its strength. It takes advantage of the imperfect 
financial system in China and exploits cheap labour and resources. From a policy 
perspective, this implies that not only the size of the FDI stock, but also the motive 
and consequences of inward FDI, are important issues for the local economy. Our 
research is essential for China's FDI utilisation strategy and other economic reforming 
policies. It is also useful for other developing countries that are seeking to encourage 
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3 Empirical methodology 
To estimate the impact on export intensity of foreign acquisition of a domestic 
firm, we need information about the outcome in the domestic firm if it had never been 
acquired. Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) point out that there are different 
methods that take into account this missing data problem and the biases emanating 
from the missing data such as randomisation, instrumental variables, 
difference-in-difference and matching methods. All these methods rely on specific 
assumptions for the technique to be valid. 3  Relating to our study, the 
µGLIIHUHQFH-in-differencH¶ HVWLPDWLRQ WDNHV LQWR DFFRXQW QRW RQO\ WKH GLIIHUHQFH
between the acquired firms and the non-acquired firms, but also the difference within 
these two types of firms before and after the acquisition year. Furthermore, Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2000) suggest that a combination of matching and 
difference-in-difference analysis provides more accurate estimation for an evaluation 
study. Therefore, we first use a matching mechanism to construct two groups of 
similar firms and then apply the difference-in-difference method to estimate the 
export intensity effects of foreign acquisition in China.  
According to Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), the effect on export 
intensity due to an acquisition ܶܶ (treatment effect on the treated) can be described 
as: 
 
                                                             
3
 Randomisation can be used no matter what observables X are chosen. We rule it out since Xs are those that 
relevant to acquisition, i.e. selection is non-random in our analysis. 
Instrumental variable is appropriate if the conditional independence does not hold. We rule it out since foreign 
acquisition and change in export intensity need to be independent for firms with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics for our analysis.  
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ܶܶ = ܧሾሺ 1ܻ݅ െ ݋ܻ݅ ȁܺ,ܦ݅ = 1ሻሿ    (Eq.3-1) 
 
where 1ܻ݅ is post-acquisition export intensity of an acquired firm ݅ and ݋ܻ݅  is 
productivity in the same firm that had never been acquired. ܦ݅ = 1 if the outcome 1ܻ݅ 
(acquisition) is selected.  X is the vector of observed variables that determine the 
acquisition. The matching mechanism that identifies the treated group and the 
matched control group is based on the vectorX. How we implement the matching and 
difference-in-difference method in our analysis is presented in the following 
sub-sections.   
 
3.1 Propensity-score matching 
Although a general rule that acquired firms are more export-intensive 
pre-acquisition has been widely documented by trade economists, one empirical 
problem we face is that we cannot observe the counter-factual of acquisition and 
H[SRUW LQWHQVLW\ ZH FDQQRW REVHUYH WKH RXWFRPH RI EHLQJ µQRW DFTXLUHG¶  ݋ܻ݅ ) for 
those acquired firms. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) solve this type of empirical 
problem by using a propensity-matching mechanism. They show that the probability 
of an event (i.e. the acquisition in our analysis) conditioned on the observable factors 
can substitute for the unobservable missing data.    
So, according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we construct a sample of treated 
and control group firms with the propensity-score matching method. The idea behind 
the propensity-score matching method is to use the probability of receiving treatment 
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(foreign acquisition) as the basis for matching a treated firm to a control firm. The 
untreated group should consist of firms that are similar to acquired firms but have 
never been acquired. Then, with two groups of similar firms, we are able to discuss 
the effects of acquisition on an acquired firm's characteristics such as export intensity. 
For each firm and year, we identify the probability of receiving treatment (or 
propensity score) via the following probit model 
 
PሺTreatit = 1ሻ = FሺXitെ1, Ditሻ  (Eq.3-2) 
 
where D is the full set of industry and regional dummies, and vector X consists of a 
range of variables in the pre-treatment period t-1. These variables, thus, control 
aspects of firm performance pre-acquisition that are likely to make firms attractive 
targets for foreign investors. In the matching process, domestic and acquired firms 
only participate in the matching procedure once.4 
We believe that the proper way to match firms would be to take into account as 
much relevant information as possible in the data in order to track the causal 
influences pre-acquisition. The theoretical and empirical literature is vague in 
investigating relevant factors determining why a domestic firm is acquired by foreign 
investors. The covariates used in the probit estimation are: the firm leverage ratio, 
defined as the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets; the liquidity ratio, defined as 
the liquid assets relative to the total assets; productivity; capital-intensity; and the size 
                                                             
4
 Nearest neighbour matching without replacement: 'Smith and Todd 2005': trade-off between bias and variance 
will be significant if the propensity score distribution is very different in the treatment and control group. 
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and age of the firm. Industry and regional factors are also included, such as: industry 
capital intensity; R&D intensity; regional foreign presence; average wage; and 
institution quality. The details of how we construct these variables are described in the 
next section. 
How we identify determinants of acquisition is motivated by the existing 
literature. Girma and Görg (2003) use age and age squared, and size and size squared 
to test the hypothesis that these factors influence the probability of being acquired by 
a foreign owner. The age variable shows that on the one hand, a younger firm may 
more easily be integrated into the multinational enterprise than an older firm; on the 
other hand, an older firm will have accumulated experience thought to give it 
advantages over younger firms. In Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) and McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995), firm size is defined as log of employment and employment 
normalised by industry respectively. Both studies find that firm size has a positive 
influence on the likelihood of the acquisition. In terms of productivity, McGuckin and 
*JX\HQ  VKRZ WKDW µFKHUU\-SLFNHG¶, acquired firms are generally associated 
with above average productivity. Although Karpaty (2005) finds no evidence of 
µFKHUU\-SLFNLQJ¶ LQ IRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQV LQ6ZHGLVKPDQXIDFWXULQJEXWGHPonstrates 
evidence that more export-intensive, capital-intensive and R&D-intensive firms are 
more likely to be acquired by foreign investors. As mentioned above in Chapter 1, we 
find that foreign investors may 'cherry-pick' plants which are high productivity, more 
capital-intensive, export-oriented and larger. We also find that a better institutional 
environment has a positive impact on foreign acquisition in China. This impact is 
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stronger in capital-intensive and R&D-intensive industries. 
Based on the propensity score from the probit estimation, we use nearest 
neighbour matching with condition on a defined 'caliper'. Nearest neighbour matching 
is the most straightforward matching estimator, in which the matching partner for a 
treated observation is closest in terms of propensity score. However, it is argued that 
nearest neighbour matching may produce bad matches if the closest neighbour is far 
away. So we impose a 'caliper' as the maximum tolerance level on the 
propensity-score distance. In this study, the caliper is set at 0.05. We also impose a 
common support condition to drop observations in the treatment group whose 
propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum score among 
observations in the control group.   
In the case of this paper, the data set spans a six-year period and foreign 
acquisitions were taking place throughout the period. We match treatment 
observations with control observations in the same year, following Karpaty (2005)'s 
approach. 
After the matching, the treatment and the control group should have similar 
characteristics before the foreign acquisition. To check whether this is the case, we 
use a t test to examine whether the difference of the mean of the covariates between 
the treatment and the control group is reduced significantly after matching. In addition, 
we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and carry out a balancing test to investigate 
the standardised difference for all covariates. The lower the standardised difference, 
the more balanced the treatment and comparison groups will be in terms of covariates.  
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3.2 Difference-in-difference  
As discussed before, the major problem in calibrating the effect of acquisition is 
that the selection of treatment is most likely not random: certain types of firms are 
selected as targets based on their pre-treatment characteristics. Ruling out possible 
approaches such as instrumental variable and randomisation, as we need to avoid a 
potential bias due to a non-random selection decision, we apply a combination of 
matching and difference-in-difference analysis suggested by Meyer (1995). Thus, 
instead of using a straightforward propensity-score matching estimator we employ the 
more general difference-in-differences estimator on the sample of matched firms to 
ensure that unobserved time invariant effects that are correlated with the selection are 
controlled for. In fact, the estimator to measure the treatment impact in export 
intensity for the acquired firms (treatment group) is biased, since the impact is also 
likely to be affected by other factors which are contemporaneous with the acquisition. 
If these factors affect the treatment group of firms and the control group of firms in a 
similar fashion, the differences-in-differences estimator is able to eliminate these 
common effects that are contemporaneous with the acquisition. For example, 
economic policy change, market demand change or input cost change will affect both 
the acquired firm and the matched control firm in the same way. Working with a 
longitudinal data 5  set is another reason why we use difference-in-difference 
estimation, which can provide more robust estimates of the impact of treatment than 
the instrumental variables method. The specifications of the difference-in-difference 
                                                             
5
 Sample observations from a large population over a given period of time. 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 3 
98 
 
methodology within our context are presented below.   
DiD estimates the difference between pre- and post- the treatment (acquisition) 
for a group of firms that has received the treatment versus a group of similar firms 
that do not. Thus, the DiD estimator can be written as: 
 Ɂ෠DiD = ሺYഥ1T െ Yഥ0Tሻ െ (Yഥ1C െ Yഥ0C )  (Eq.3-3) 
 
where Ɂ෠DiD  is the DiD estimator that is measured as the average percentage point 
change in yearly levels of export intensity that can be attributed to acquisitions. 
Yഥ1T  and Yഥ1C  are the average outcomes for the treated T and controlled C groups, 
respectively. Sub-indices 0 and 1 denote before and after acquisition.  
Following Blundell and Dias (2000) and Sianesi (2001), the DiD estimator when 
we have longitudinal data can be redefined as: 
 Ɂ෠DiDmm = σ ൣ൫Yit1 െ Yit0൯ െ σ Wij (Yjt1 െ Yjt0 )jאC ൧iאT ɘi (Eq.3-4) 
 
where Ɂ෠DiDmm  is the difference-in-difference estimator by using method of 
propensity-score matching. Wij  is the weight on comparison between a treated firm j 
and a matched counterpart control firm i.  Wij  takes the value 1 if we match one 
'nearest neighbour' control firm to each treated firm. It is more than 1 if we want to 
match more control firms to each treated firm. ɘi is defined as the ratio between 1 
over the number of treated firms. It denotes the re-weighting that reconstructs the 
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outcome distribution for the treated sample. 0 and 1 denote before and after 
acquisition periods. t1 and t0 denote before and after acquisition time periods. 
To implement the above methodology within a regression framework, we can 
estimate the following equation using matched sample, according to Ilmakunnas and 
Maliranta (2004):   
 
Yit = Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1acqi + Ⱦ2pacqt + Ⱦ3acq כ pacqit + ɂit   (Eq.3-5) 
 
where Yit  is export intensity for a firm i at time t. acqi  is a group-specific dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is among firms in the treatment group and 0 
if the firm is a member of the control group. Therefore, Ⱦ1 captures the constant 
export intensity difference for a matched acquired firm during the sample period.  
pacqi  is the event of acquisition dummy for each pair of treated and matched control 
firms. pacqi  takes value 1 if time is in the pre-acquisition period and 0 if time is in 
the post-acquisition period. Thus, Ⱦ2  represents the export intensity variation 
between pre-and post- acquisition period. acq כ pacqit  is the difference-in-difference 
estimator which is defined as the interaction of being treated in the post-treatment 
period. Thus Ⱦ3 captures the impact of a foreign acquisition in export intensity after 
the acquisition. ɂit  is the error term. Table 3-1 shows how the 
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Table 3-1: The Explanation of the Difference-in-Difference Estimator 






Ⱦ0 Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ2 
Treated group 
(acqi=1) 
Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1 Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1 + Ⱦ2 + Ⱦ3 
Difference 
 
Yഥ1C െ Yഥ0C = Ⱦ1 Yഥ1T െ Yഥ0T = Ⱦ1 + Ⱦ3 
Difference-in-difference Ɂ෠DiD = ൫Yഥ1T െ Yഥ0T൯ െ ൫Yഥ1C െ Yഥ0C൯ = Ⱦ3 
 
 
4 Data  
4.1 Description of the data set 
To analyse the post-acquisition effect, we again use China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China. It covers all 
firms with an annual turnover of no less than 5 million Chinese Yuan for the period 
2000-2005. The data set has an average of about 190,000 firms per year, spanning 31 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. Importantly, it reports the amount 
of foreign share for each firm in each year so that we are able to track in the data if a 
foreign acquisition takes place. Furthermore, the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBS) provides every firm with a legal identification number and specifies its 
ownership type into the following six primary categories: state-owned enterprises, 
collective firms, private firms, mixed-ownership firms, foreign firms and Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan firms. It also provides information such as industry affiliation, 
year of establishment, employment, value added, exports and fixed assets. These 
sources are valuable for us to match a treated firm with its similar control counterparts 
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by applying the propensity matching mechanism.   
Foreign acquisition is defined as where the foreign share exceeds 25%. The 
choice of 25% as the threshold for defining acquisition is because the NBS defines 
foreign equity joint affiliates as firms in which 25% or more equity shares are held by 
foreign multinationals.  
Table 3-2 below summarises how we construct variables for our analysis by 
using information from the data set.  The outcome variable of interest for exporters 
prior to the acquisition is export intensity, which is measured as the share of exports to 
the total sales. The outcome variable of interest for non-exporters before foreign 
acquisition is the export dummy variable, which takes 1 if it exports and 0 if not. 
Dummy variable ܦܽܿݍ  takes the value 1 if a foreign acquisition takes place, while it 
takes the value 0 if foreign share remains below 25%. Firm size is measured by the 
logarithm of number of employees in the firm. Firm capital intensity is the logarithm 
of the total fixed assets scaled by the total number of employees. The operating age of 
the firm is defined as the difference between the year of observation and the year of 
WKH ILUP¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW )LUP ODERXU TXDOLW\ LV PHDVXUHG E\ WKH UDWLR RI WKH ILUP
wages to the number of employees. Finally, productivity is measured by total factor 
productivity (TFP). TFP is obtained from the method developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996), in which the labour and capital elasticity are estimated for each 2-digit 
industry.    
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Table 3-2: Definition of Variables  
Variable  Definition ܦܽܿݍ  
 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if foreign share reaches 25% 
and 0 if foreign share remains less than 25% 
 
Firm leverage ratio The total debt relative to the total assets 
Firm liquidity ratio The liquid assets relative to the total assets 
Firm productivity Total factor productivity (TFP) 
Firm export intensity Ratio of firm exports to total sales 
Firm employment Number of firm employees 
Firm K/L Ratio Ratio of firm fixed assets to number of employees 
Firm age Length of firm operating years 
Industry capital dummy Dummy takes 1 if industry capital intensity is higher than 
median and 0 otherwise 
 
Industry R&D dummy Dummy takes 1 if industry R&D intensity is higher than 
median and 0 otherwise 
  
Regional foreign presence Ratio of foreign sales to total sales of an industry in a 
region 
Regional average wage Ratio of industrial real wages in a region to the number of 
employees in the industry and region 
 
Regional Institution quality Regional intellectual property rights protection 
Year Yearly time dummy 
Industry 2-digit industry  
Province 31 provinces and regions within mainland China 
Source: China Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3-3 illustrates the number of foreign-acquired existing exporters and 
non-exporters from 2000 to 2005, using the whole sample. Our sample records 
736,834 firm-year observations during the six years. The number of observations is 
smaller than the total number of observations in the full data set for three reasons. 
First, our estimation requires lagged variables in the probit estimation. Then, we also 
exclude firms with less than three observations consecutively, given the need to have 
data during the pre- and post-ownership change period. Thus, our working sample 
consists of all firms with at least three time series observations and that either 
remained in domestic ownership between 2000 and 2005 or started as 
domestic-owned enterprises and ended up in the hands of foreign investors. Finally, 
we also exclude those firms with more than two ownership changes between domestic 
and foreign. 
 
Table 3-3: Frequency of Acquired Exporters v.s. Non-exporters  
Year Acquired exporters Acquired non-exporters Total Whole 
sample 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Frequency 
2001 854 58.57% 604 41.43% 1,458 134,799 
2002 1,069 58.64% 754 41.36% 1,823 156,227 
2003 815 54.12% 691 45.88% 1,506 170,617 
2004 1,713 51.55% 1,610 48.45% 3,323 141,814 
2005 1,131 62.52% 678 37.48% 1,809 133,377 
 5,582 56.28% 4,337 43.72% 9,919 736,834 
 
Table 3-3 shows that the sample contains a similar number of firms in each year 
in total which is about 13,000-15,000 firms except that there are more than 170,000 
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firms in 2003. The total number of foreign-acquired firms is 9,919. In most years, the 
number of foreign-acquired firms is less than 2,000; however, we observe a drastic 
increase in 2004, in which 3,323 domestic firms are acquired by foreign investors. 
Furthermore, we find that acquired exporters are more than acquired non-exporters, 
with a relatively small margin. Among those foreign-acquired firms, more than 40% 
are non-exporters, for each year except 2005 in which we find that 37.48% of 
foreign-acquired firms are non-exporters.   
Therefore, a fact that we can generate from Table 3-3 is that multinational firms 
may be more attracted by exporting indigenous enterprises in China. However, this 
trend is not overwhelming, a result which is contrary to our expectation. According to 
the discussions in the current literature, firm exporting experience has a major effect 
on exporting decisions. If foreign acquirers are export-oriented in China, as 
commonly supposed, we may expect the number of acquired exporters to be much 
higher than acquired non-exporters. Thus, in this study, one primary question is to 
investigate whether foreign acquisition promotes export in both scenarios.  
Before we start any regression analysis, we examine who those acquired 
exporters and non-exporters are. Are they different in respect to firm, industry and 
location characteristics? 
Table 3-4 provides the summary statistics of the key firm level variables. In 
JHQHUDO ZH ILQG HYLGHQFH RI µFKHUU\-SLFNLQJ¶ )RUHLJQ-acquired firms are better 
financed, more productive, larger, more capital-intensive and younger on average. 
Furthermore, acquired exporters are better firms compared to acquired non-exporters 
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in terms of financial status, productivity, size and age. Interestingly, we find that 
acquired non-exporters are 33% more capital-intensive than acquired exporters. As 
the mean is calculated from the whole sample, we do not know whether within- 
industry or across-industry heterogeneity generates this difference. If across- industry 
heterogeneity plays a role, the evidence implies that acquired exporters in China are 
clustered in labour-intensive industries; this is consistent with existing empirical 
findings, showing that China is an export hub of labour-intensive products.  
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Table 3-4: Summary Statistics of Firm Level Variables 
 
 
Variable Whole sample Total acquisition Acquired exporter Acquired non-exporter 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Leverage Ratio (t-1) 0.6096 (0.3396) 0.5412 (0.2774) 0.5386 (0.2745) 0.5447 (0.2812) 
         
TFP (t-1) 4.2384 (1.2052) 4.4564 (1.1465) 4.5449 (1.1164) 4.3362 (1.1757) 
         
Log Employment (t-1) 4.9864 (1.1527) 5.1862 (1.1114) 5.4437 (1.1053) 4.8543 (1.0283) 
         
Log K/L (t-1) -0.7279 (1.2583) -0.3342 (1.2295) -0.3896 (1.2071) -0.2629 (1.2543) 
         
Age 22.8125 (131.0175) 12.9977 (95.9869) 11.1435 (70.9732) 15.3841 (120.7515) 
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Table 3-5 (below) shows the number of foreign acquisitions by 2-digit industries. 
Although foreign acquisition occurs in almost all industries except tobacco, the 
frequency of foreign acquisitions varies significantly across industries. We find that 
export-led industries in China such as textiles, apparel, plastics and electrical 
machinery have more cases of foreign acquisition than other industries. In our sample, 
textiles, apparel, plastics and electrical machinery have more than 600 cases of 
foreign acquisition and over 2% industrial intensity of foreign acquisition.6 This may 
imply that many acquisitions and FDI in China may be export-motivated. Without 
conditioning on the proportion of exporters in industries, it is hard to quantify the 
tendency to acquire exporter or non-exporter firms. However, at least it shows that in 
export-led industries, more foreign-acquired firms are existing exporters rather than 
non-exporters; and it is consistent with the assumption that foreign acquisitions are 
export-orientated, because exporting experience has a huge impact on exporting 
decisions and there are more exporting firms than non-exporting firms in these 
industries. 
 
                                                             
6
 It is calculated as the proportion of foreign acquisitions to the total number of domestic firms in an industry. 



















Mining and quarrying  08 
-11 
62 26 36 0.27 
Processing of food 13 385 176 209 1.27 
Manufacture of food 14 280 103 177 2.21 
Manufacture of 
beverages 
15 168 33 135 1.73 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
16 0 0 0 0 
Manufacture of textiles 17 843 538 305 1.92 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel 
18 878 648 230 4.22 
Tanning & dressing of 
leather 
19 433 339 94 3.95 
Manufacture of wood  20 163 87 76 1.84 
Manufacture of furniture 21 168 122 46 3.57 
Manufacture of pulp 
paper 
22 246 78 168 1.38 
Publishing & printing 23 162 52 110 1.31 
Manufacture of sports 
goods, toy and stationery. 
24 284 231 53 4.81 
Manufacture of coke & 
refined petroleum 
25 40 10 30 0.93 
Manufacture of 
chemicals & products 
26 546 256 290 1.43 
Manufacture of 
pharmaceutical goods 
27 204 55 149 1.80 
Manufacture of 
man-made fibres 
28 57 24 33 1.94 
Manufacture of rubber 
products 
29 152 100 52 2.59 
Note. a Intensity of acquisition is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of domestic 
firms in an industry.  
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Manufacture of plastic 
products 
30 633 350 283 2.77 
Manufacture of other 
non-metallic minerals 
31 448 183 265 0.96 
Manufacture of basic 
metals 
32 86 29 57 0.68 
Manufacture of 
non-ferrous metals 
33 111 51 60 1.22 
Manufacture of other 
metals 
34 572 328 244 2.08 
Manufacture of general 
purpose machinery & 
equipment 
35 480 282 198 1.47 
Manufacture of special 
purpose machinery  
36 284 134 150 1.68 
Manufacture of 
transport equipment and 
products 
37 363 166 197 1.61 
Manufacture of 
electrical machinery 
39 607 365 242 2.19 
Manufacture of 
communications 
equipment & computers  
40 623 453 170 5.04 
Manufacture of medical 
& optical instruments  
41 185 121 64 3.23 
Manufacture of crafts 42 313 240 73 2.97 
Recycling  43 11 0 11 3.19 




132 2 130 0.48 
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A significant amount of foreign acquisition still takes place in less 
export-intensive industries (i.e. where export intensity is less than 15%), such as 
beverages, pharmaceutical goods, refined petroleum and electricity, gas and water. In 
these industries, we observe that more non-exporters are foreign-acquired than 
exporters. Without controlling for the proportion of exporters in these industries, it is 
hard to define the tendency to acquire exporters or non-exporters. In fact, if the 
difference reflects a tendency towards acquiring non-exporters in less export-intensive 
industries, the market orientation of the foreign acquisition could be domestic sales. 
However, if the difference is caused by the fact that there are fewer exporting firms 
than non-exporting firms in these industries, the above argument may be incorrect. 
Therefore, in Figure 3-1, we describe the tendency of foreign investors to acquire 
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Figure 3-1˖ The Tendency of Foreign Acquisition on Exporting Firms across Industries 
 
In Figure 3-1, the distribution of industries along the vertical axis shows that 
cross-industry differences exist for the proportion of exporters in industries. We 
observe that more than 50 percent of firms are exporters in the manufacture of sports 
goods, toys (24), wearing apparel (18), dressing of leather (19) and communication 
equipment and computers (40). Furthermore, we find fewer than 5 percent of 
exporters in industries such as mining and quarrying (8), and electricity, gas and water 
(44-46). Apart from these outliers, most industries have a proportion of exporters 
below 40% and above 10%.  
The horizontal axis in Figure 3-1 shows the distribution of acquired exporters 
among all acquired firms for each industry. Looking at the proportion of exporters in 
acquired firms only, the distribution also shows huge cross-industry differences. For 
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industry such as sports goods, toys (24), wearing apparel (18), dressing of leather (19) 
and crafts (42), we find more than 75 percent of acquired firms were exporters before 
acquisition. In contrast, in some industries such as recycling (43), electricity, gas and 
water (44-46), none of the acquired firms exported before acquisition. However, such 
cross-industry differences could be driven by the proportion of exporters in industries. 
For example, in an industry which has a high proportion of exporters to start with, 
acquired firms are naturally more likely to be existing exporters. We could examine 
this argument by looking at the relationship between the two distributions.  
In Figure 3-1, industries lie below the 45-degree diagonal, meaning that foreign 
firms have a tendency to acquire existing exporters across all industries, conditional 
on the proportion of exporters in an industry. The Figure 3-1 may imply that foreign 
acquisitions in China are export-orientated and may promote foreign sales after the 
take-over. There is no sign that, even in less export-intensive industries, foreign 
acquisition may be more likely to target non-exporting firms for promoting domestic 
sales in China. 
The further away from the 45-degree diagonal, the higher the tendency for 
foreign investors to acquire existing exporters, taking into account the likelihood of 
exporters in the industry. We find that in more export-intensive industries such as 
apparel (18), leather (19) and toy (24), the tendency is stronger than in less 
export-intensive industries such as refined petroleum (25), publishing, and printing 
(23). This may also demonstrate that foreign acquisition in China is export-orientated. 
As we know, the industry that is less export-intensive is probably because of higher 
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exporting barriers. Export-oriented multinationals are more willing to acquire existing 
exporting plants. Thus, we expect in these industries a higher tendency to acquire 
existing exporting plants on the part of export-orientated foreign investors.   
To summarize from Figure 3-1, acquisition FDI in China tends to acquire 
exporting firms across all industries. Furthermore, in less export-intensive sectors, this 
tendency is even stronger. Therefore, it is evident that foreign acquisition FDI is 
export-orientated from the industry dimension. We find no clear evidence showing 
that foreign acquisition may be motivated by access to domestic markets.   
Having described the motives of foreign acquisition in China with industry 
dimensions from the data, Table 3-6 (below) shows the number of foreign acquisitions 
by exporters or non-exporters by geographic area. It shows that foreign acquisition in 
China has a clear geographic variance. More than 85% of foreign acquisitions have 
taken place in coastal regions such as Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong. The 
regional intensity of acquisition is also high in these coastal regions; furthermore, we 
observe that more acquired firms are exporters than non-exporters. These coastal 
regions are also known as fertile grounds for exporting in China because of the easy 
access to international markets. As a result, exporting firms are more clustered in 
these provinces. Only less than 15% of foreign acquisitions happen in inland regions, 
and without easy access to exporting in hilly inland regions, there are also fewer 
exporting firms, so we find that more acquired firms are non-exporting firms. In 
general, the geographic difference may also imply that acquisition FDI in China is 
export-orientated. Thus, foreign acquisition promotes export.  
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Table 3-6: Foreign Acquisition by Location 








Coast Rg.      
Guangdong 44 2800 2,022 778 4.04 
Shanghai 31 2022 1,072 950 8.99 
Jiangsu 32 1147 620 527 1.69 
Fujian 35 731 422 309 2.69 
Zhejiang 33 647 453 194 0.92 
Shandong 37 604 299 305 1.49 
Liaoning 21 288 139 149 1.57 
Tianjin 12 262 142 120 2.24 
Guangxi 45 75 34 41 0.93 
Hainan 46 21 4 17 1.19 
      
Sub total  8597 5207 3390  
Inland Rg.      
Beijing 11 227 74 153 1.61 
Hubei 42 173 66 107 0.70 
Hebei 13 124 35 89 0.77 
Henan 41 122 37 85 0.44 
Sichuan 51 106 27 79 0.53 
Hunan 43 105 29 76 0.65 
Jiangxi 36 74 13 61 0.82 
Anhui 34 66 27 39 0.57 
Jilin 22 58 13 45 0.92 
Heilongjiang 23 43 4 39 0.66 
Chongqing 50 39 13 26 0.53 
Shaanxi 61 38 8 30 0.46 
Yunnan 53 37 5 32 0.56 
Shanxi 14 27 7 20 0.26 
Inner Mongolia 15 25 6 19 0.46 
Guizhou 52 18 1 17 0.32 
Xinjiang 65 14 4 10 0.34 
Gansu 62 10 0 10 0.17 
Ningxia 64 7 4 3 0.47 
Qinghai 63 5 1 4 0.41 
Tibet 54 4 1 3 0.50 
      
Sub total  1322 375 947  
Total  9,919 5,582 4,337 1.89 
Note. a Intensity of acquisition is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of domestic 
firms in a province. 
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Although we find more acquired exporters in coastal provinces and more 
acquired non-exporters in inland regions, we are not able to conclude that foreign 
multinationals tend to acquire exporters in coastal regions for the convenience to 
export without controlling for the proportion of exporters across regions. In Figure 
3-2, the vertical axis shows that cross province differences exist in the proportion of 
exporters. The further away from the horizontal axis implies that there is a higher 
percentage of exporting firms in the province relative to the total number of firms. In 
fact, we observe that more than a half of the firms in coastal regions such as 
Guangdong (44), Zhejiang (33) and Fujian (35) are exporters. Other coastal regions 
also have around 40 percent firms are exporting such as Shanghai (31), Jiangsu (32), 
and Shandong (37). Provinces in inland regions such as Tibet (54), Gansu (62) and 
Xinjiang (65) only have less than 10 percent exporting firms relative to total number 
of firms in the region. Most other inland provinces have less than 20 percent of 
exporting firms which is significantly less compared to coastal regions.  
The horizontal axis presents the proportion of exporters in the total number of 
foreign acquired domestic firms cross province. The further away from the vertical 
axis implies that a higher proportion of foreign acquired is exporters in each province. 
Figure 3-2 shows that the proportion of exporters in acquired firms is larger in coastal 
provinces than inland provinces in general. For example, we observe around 70 
percent foreign acquired firms in Guangdong (44) and Zhejiang (33). Proportions of 
foreign acquired exporters in inland provinces are below 20 percent in general.  
To investigate the relationship between the two distributions, we draw a 
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45-degree diagonal. In Figure 3-2, most provinces are positioned under the 45-degree 
diagonal, except Gansu (62) and Guizhou (52). The implication is that acquisition FDI 
in China tends to acquire existing exporters in almost provinces even in inland regions. 
Furthermore, giving barriers to export is higher in inland regions, we find that this 
tendency is stronger in inland regions. To conclude, Figure 3-2 provides another piece 
of evidence that foreign acquisition in China is export-orientated.        
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5 Empirical results 
5.1 Propensity-score matching 
5.1.1 The probit estimate with marginal effect 
Before using the propensity-score matching method, we split the sample into 
exporters and non-exporters. As previously stated, the acquired exporters were 
defined as foreign-acquired firms that were exporters one year before the acquisition. 
The acquired non-exporters were foreign-acquired firms that reported zero exports 
one year before the acquisition. Next, we run probit models to investigate how 
domestic exporting firms or non-exporting firms were chosen by foreign 
multinationals. In our analysis, the probabilities of receiving treatment of both 
samples were estimated by a probit model with marginal effects. We regress a 
zero/one acquisition dummy on a set of lagged firm-level, industry-level and 
regional-level foreign acquisition determinants. At the firm-level, finance constraints 
of Chinese companies were also included. Year, industry and province dummies have 
been used to control for time-, sector- and regional specific fixed effects. 
7KHOHYHUDJHUDWLRLVWKHWRWDOGHEWUHODWLYHWRWKHWRWDODVVHWVLW LQGLFDWHVILUPV¶
long-term ability to repay their debt. The liquidity ratio is the liquid assets relative to 
WKH WRWDO DVVHWV LW LQGLFDWHV ILUPV¶ short-term liquidity to finance their debt. In line 
with the literature, other firm variables are export intensity for the study of exporting 
firms, export dummy for the study of export likelihood, sales, size, TFP, capital labour 
ratio and firm operating age. Furthermore, industry-level variables include dummy 
variables which indicate whether the firm belongs to the categories of 
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capital-intensive industries and R&D-intensive industries. The regional-level 
variables are regional average wage, institution quality (property right measure), and 
the regional foreign presence measure included to control for the agglomeration effect 
of foreign firms. 
Results for the foreign acquisition determinants for exporting firms are reported 
in Table 3-7. As shown in the table, the results for the firm-level determinants can be 
interpreted as domestic firms that have lower leverage ratio, higher export intensity, 
capital-intensive and younger are more attractive to foreign investors. The short-term 
ability to repay debt, production scale, size and productivity all shown to have no 
impact on the probability of foreign acquisition.  
From Models 2 to 4, we added more dummies to provide controls for the time-, 
region-, and industry-specific effects. We found that significances of these variables 
remained across all these models. Notably, we noticed that the marginal effect of the 
firm leverage ratio on the probability of foreign acquisition on exporting firms was 
-0.202 in Model 4. This implies that a one standard deviation UHGXFWLRQLQWKHILUP¶V
leverage rate raises the propensity of attracting foreign acquisition by two percentage 
points. Compared to other firm level factors, it is the most influential factor that 
contributes to the overall probability of being foreign acquired.  
At the industry and region level, we concluded that firms which belong to the 
more capital-intensive industries, which locate in a region with higher foreign 
presence, and which have a higher average wage and better institutions are more 
likely to be foreign acquired. The coefficients for R&D were significant and negative 
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in the first three models, meaning that multinationals are more likely to acquire firms 
in the industries which require low R&D investment. However, it became 
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Table 3-7: Determinants of Foreign Acquisitions for Exporting Firms  
 Dependent Variable: Dacq  For all acquired exporters=1 & domestic = 0 
 Probit model with marginal effects (dprobit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm leverage ratio -0.261*** -0.257*** -0.199*** -0.202*** 
 (-8.49) (-8.37) (-6.52) (-6.61) 
Firm liquidity ratio 0.00000797 0.00000134 -0.00000838 -0.00000617 
 (0.10) (0.02) (-0.08) (-0.06) 
Firm export volume 0.0528*** 0.0511*** 0.0615*** 0.0587*** 
 (8.54) (8.16) (9.30) (8.80) 
Firm sales 0.0258** 0.0211 0.0114 0.0147 
 (2.03) (1.63) (0.86) (0.99) 
Firm employment 0.0202* 0.0231*** 0.00791 -0.0000766 
 (1.90) (2.15) (0.74) (-0.01) 
Firm TFP -0.0108 0.000167 -0.00438 0.000365 
 (-1.25) (0.02) (-0.49) (0.03) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.0719*** 0.0770*** 0.0724*** 0.0737*** 
 (9.26) (9.81) (9.29) (9.01) 
Firm age -0.0171*** -0.0168*** -0.0182*** -0.0178*** 
 (-15.66) (-15.55) (-16.52) (-15.93) 
Firm age2 0.00000835*** 0.00000822*** 0.00000895*** 0.00000875*** 
 (15.31) (15.21) (16.23) (15.65) 
     
Indu. K-intensity  0.0265 0.0271 0.0159 0.0535*** 
 (1.46) (1.48) (0.85) (2.60) 
Indu. R&D -0.0790*** -0.0868*** -0.0449*** -0.0135 
 (-4.68) (-5.08) (-2.53) (-0.29) 
Region. foreign 
presence 
0.146*** 0.155*** 0.0841*** 0.0680*** 
 (17.39) (18.14) (10.14) (7.86) 
Region. average wage 0.241*** 0.284*** 0.181*** 0.192*** 
 (8.58) (10.09) (6.40) (6.65) 
Region. institutions 0.0975*** 0.0978*** 0.320*** 0.316*** 
 (7.75) (7.29) (9.19) (9.05) 
     
Year dummy No Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No Yes 
_cons -2.625*** -2.644*** -2.599*** -7.396*** 
 (-30.07) (-29.95) (-19.40) (-12.26) 
N 100080 100080 99927 99889 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Independent 
variables are logged except export share and all dummies. All independent variables are lagged by 
one year.  




Results for the foreign acquisition determinants for non-exporters are reported in 
Table 3-8. We first found that the firm-level determinants had similar effects 
compared to those found for acquired exporting firms. Furthermore, we found that 
production scale and firm size also had positive and significant impacts on the 
likelihood that non-exporting firms would be acquired by foreign investors. The 
regional impact also turned out to be similar. However, the industry capital intensity 
and R&D impacts on the probability of foreign acquisition were different from the 
exporting firms: the results show that industry capital intensity had no significant 
impact on the likelihood of foreign acquisition. Moreover, by controlling for year, 
region and industry-specific factors that may affect foreign acquisition, such as 
preferential FDI policy which encourage foreign investment in certain industries, we 
found that industry R&D intensity had a positive impact on the probability that a 
non-exporting firm would be foreign acquired. Finally, we found that the marginal 
effect of firm leverage ratio was -0.156 in Model 4 which was smaller than -0.202 in 
Table 3-8. However, compared to other firm-level variables, it was still the most 
influential factor determining the probability that a domestic non-exporting firm 
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Table 3-8 Determinants of Foreign Acquisitions for Non-exporting Firms  
 Dependent Variable: Dacq  For all acquired non-exporters=1 & domestic 
= 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm leverage ratio -0.202*** -0.194*** -0.168*** -0.156*** 
 (-7.07) (-6.81) (-5.88) (-5.43) 
Firm liquidity ratio 0.0000314 0.0000326 0.0000258 0.0000221 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.46) (0.36) 
Firm sales 0.0935*** 0.0975*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 
 (8.44) (8.70) (9.33) (8.59) 
Firm employment 0.0658*** 0.0625*** 0.0583*** 0.0437*** 
 (6.29) (5.93) (5.50) (3.85) 
Firm TFP -0.00614 -0.00339 -0.0116 -0.00595 
 (-0.75) (-0.40) (-1.40) (-0.57) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (15.66) (15.66) (15.74) (14.73) 
Firm age -0.0197*** -0.0191*** -0.0195*** -0.0190*** 
 (-19.07) (-18.77) (-19.10) (-18.72) 
Firm age2 0.00000979*** 0.00000951*** 0.00000969*** 0.00000944*** 
 (19.04) (18.75) (19.06) (18.70) 
     
Indu. K-intensity  0.000230 -0.00454 -0.000525 0.0266 
 (0.01) (-0.28) (-0.03) (1.37) 
Indu. R&D -0.0562*** -0.0614*** -0.0293* 0.127** 
 (-3.65) (-3.96) (-1.82) (2.70) 
     
Region. foreign 
presence 
0.124*** 0.128*** 0.0870*** 0.0717*** 
 (17.21) (17.86) (11.89) (9.58) 
Region. average wage 0.169*** 0.197*** 0.0960*** 0.0855*** 
 (8.85) (10.66) (4.62) (4.02) 
Region. institutions 0.0764*** 0.0643*** 0.191*** 0.196*** 
 (8.10) (6.75) (6.67) (6.85) 
     
Year dummy No Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No No No Yes 
_cons -3.283*** -3.544*** -3.606*** -3.094*** 
 (-42.54) (-44.38) (-32.58) (-6.61) 
N 328233 328233 328233 328142 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Independent 
variables are logged except export share and all dummies. All independent variables are lagged by 
one year.  
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5.1.2 The result of propensity-score matching for acquired exporter firms and 
acquired non-exporter firms 
Using the propensity score obtained from the probit estimation, we matched 
foreign-acquired exporting/non-exporting firms with remaining exporting/ 
non-exporting firms within the same year. The results of the balancing tests were 
shown in Table 3-10.  
Taking into account all foreign acquisition determinants mentioned above, we 
then matched acquired firms with similar domestic firms by using the nearest 
neighbour propensity-score matching method with non-replacement by year for each 
sample. For each firm that had undergone ownership change, a domestic firm that was 
'closest' to it in terms of its propensity score was selected as a match using the 'caliper' 
matching method. Since lagged variables are included in the matching probit, 
matching was done for all years except the initial year 2000. 
Table 3-9 gives the frequency distribution of firms by year and treatment status 
for exporters. The first two columns give the frequency of acquired exporting firms 
and the number of domestic firms by year in the whole sample: there were 5,589 
foreign-acquired exporting firms in the sample, which was about 1% of the total 
number of firms. Furthermore, the frequency of the acquired exporters remained 
stable across years except for 2004 in which 1,781 exporting firms were 
foreign-acquired. The number of observations pertaining to firms that have never been 
acquired in the sample is 539,832. The last two columns in Table 3-9 present the 
number of acquired exporting firms and matched non-acquired domestic firms. Using 
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propensity-score matching by year, only 4,155 domestic firms were recognised as 
successful matches for those acquired firms; in other words, 4,155 domestic firms 
were found to have observable similar characteristics to those acquired firms.  
 
Table 3-9: Frequency of Acquired Exporters by Year: Whole sample vs. Matched Sample 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample 
Year Treated Control Treated Control 
2001 853 86,041 621 621 
2002 1,028 114,257 786 786 
2003 806 117,109 594 595 
2004 1,781 115,384 1,364 1,364 
2005 1,121 107,041 791 789 
Total 5,589 539,832 4,156 4,155 
 
In Table 3-10, we report the mean of firm-level determinants between the treated 
and non-treated groups one year before the acquisition and test the differences, for the 
sample where acquired firms are exporters. In the first two columns, we report the 
results for the unmatched sample. Notably, we found that acquired exporters were on 
average more export-intensive than domestic firms; they were also better financed, 
larger, more productive, more capital-intensive and younger. Most results were 
consistent with the probit estimation. The next two columns report the results of the 
matched sample. We found that the differences some important firm-level variables 
were substantially reduced by the matching procedure. By checking the balancing 
tests year by year, we successfully constructed a group of unmatched firms which 
could be further included in the control group. We carried out balancing tests for each 
year and we show our results for 2001 in the last two columns of Table 3-10. Note 
that the lower the standardised differences, the more balanced or similar the 
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treatments and comparison groups. In this paper, we follow the work of Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) which suggests that the value of 20 of the standardised differences 
(shown as % bias in Table 3-10) as the threshold for a significant difference. We also 
report the t-test between acquired and matched comparisons. Overall, we found that 
balancing conditions were satisfied for key variables.  
 
Table 3-10: Mean and Standard deviation for some Variables of Interest: Whole Sample vs. 
Matched Sample one year Pre-acquired Exporters 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample PS-test 2001 
Variables Control Acquired Control  Acquired %bias p>ȁtȁ 
Firm leverage ratio 0.6200 0.5379 0.5671 0.5377 20.0 0.111 
Firm exports  9.2393 9.7130 9.7277 9.8649 7.9 0.560 
Firm sales 9.8187 10.5776 10.6090 10.6205 13.9 0.307 
Firm employment 4.9727 5.4465 5.5582 5.4940 -0.3 0.983 
Firm TFP 4.1621 4.5409 4.5423 4.5365 13.6 0.325 
Firm K/L Ratio -0.7389 -0.3277 -0.4171 -0.3619 -8.1 0.564 




Table 3-11: Frequency of Acquired Non-exporters by Year: Whole Sample vs. Matched 
Sample 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample 
Year Treated Control Treated Control 
2001 601 86,041 423 423 
2002 752 114,257 562 562 
2003 693 117,109 502 502 
2004 1,600 115,384 1,308 1,308 
2005 678 107,041 478 477 
Total 4,324 539,832 3,272 3,273 
 
Table 3-11 shows the frequency distribution of firms by year and treatment status 
for acquired non-exporters and domestic firms. We found 4,324 acquired 
non-exporting firms. The last column shows that 3,273 domestic firms were found as 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 3 
126 
 
good matches for those acquired non-exporting firms. We report the mean of and 
differences in firm-level determinants between the treated and non-treated groups one 
year before the acquisition in Table 3-12. We found that results in the unmatched 
sample (first two columns) were also consistent with findings in the probit estimation: 
non-exporters that were targeted by foreign buyers had lower debt ratio, were more 
capital-intensive and were younger. The differences in size, productivity and 
production scale between the two types of firms were relatively small. The next two 
columns show the results from the matched sample: clearly, the differences in the firm 
level variables were significantly reduced as a result of the propensity-matching. 
Again, checking balancing tests year by year, we successfully expanded the matched 
sample. The balancing test for 2001 is shown in the last two columns.   
 
Table 3-12: Mean and Standard Deviation for some Variables of Interest: Whole Sample vs. 
Matched Sample one year Pre-acquired Non-exporters 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample PS-test 2001 
Variables Control Acquired Control  Acquired %bias p>ȁtȁ 
Firm leverage ratio 0.6200 0.5444 0.5690 0.5434 -4.9 0.796 
Firm sales 9.8187 10.2944 10.1401 10.3166 8.5 0.678 
Firm employment 4.9727 4.8605 4.8550 4.8619 18.4 0.371 
Firm TFP 4.1621 4.3052 4.2449 4.3067 3.1 0.883 
Firm K/L Ratio -0.7389 -0.2096 -0.3975 -0.2507 -29.0 0.155 
Firm age 23.8865 15.0202 16.4091 14.1274 6.5 0.765 
 
5.2 The effect of foreign acquisition on exporting in China 
We now turn to the results from the DiD estimates on the matched firms. 
Working with acquired exporters and non-exporters, we investigated how foreign 
acquisition had an effect on export likelihood and export intensity in China by 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 3 
127 
 
implementing propensity-score matching and difference-in-difference estimation. The 
propensity-score matching allows us to construct a group of firms that are similar to 
acquired firms but have never actually been acquired. Then we are able to reveal the 
effects of an acquisition on exporting by comparing two groups of otherwise very 
similar firms. The DiD estimator is able to eliminate common effects on both the 
treatment group of firms and the control group of firms that are contemporaneous 
with the acquisition. For example, economic policy change, market demand change or 
input cost change affect both the acquired firm and the otherwise similar non-acquired 
firm in a similar fashion. Thus, the combination of PSM-DiD estimates ensure 
explanatory variables used in the matching and aggregate shocks that might affect 
acquisition impacts on export likelihood or export intensity were not relevant in our 
estimation.  
Table 3-13 gives the OLS estimates from our DiD results for two acquisition 
scenarios. In the first scenario, we investigate the foreign acquisition effect on export 
likelihood of acquired non-exporting firms. In the second scenario, we examine the 
effect of foreign acquisition on export intensity of acquired exporting firms. Rather 
than showing the DiD results by year, we estimate the accumulated foreign 
acquisition impact on export likelihood and export intensity for different periods after 
foreign acquisition.  
In Table 3-12, we first investigated whether foreign-acquired non-exporters 
became more likely to export or not. The first outcome variable is the export dummy 
which indicates exporting status. The first set of results in the table proved that 
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foreign-acquired non-exporting firms are more likely to start exporting after the 
acquisition compared to those similar firms that remain domestic. Quantitatively, the 
size of the effect was significant and considerable. According to the PSM-DID 
estimation, foreign acquisition increased the accumulated impact on the probability of 
exporting in the year of acquisition by 14.1 percentage point, followed by 14.2 
percentage point in a two years period, 16.4 percentage point in a three years period 
and 17.5 percentage point in a four years period, compared to those similar firms that 
have never been acquired. In the previous descriptive analysis, although we find more 
than 40 percent of foreign acquired firms are non-exporters before acquisition, they 
are more likelihood to appear in exporting industries or coastal regions. Therefore, we 
raise a hypothesis that foreign acquisition in China has a positive effect on export 
decision if acquired firms were non-exporting before the acquisition. Our first set of 
results in Table 3-13 provides evidence to support our hypothesis that foreign 
acquisitions in China increased the export likelihood of acquired non-exporting firms.  
The results for the effects of foreign acquisition on exporting firms are shown in 
the lower rows of Table 3-13. The outcome variable of the second set is exporting 
intensity which is measured as the ratio of exports over sales. The results indicate that 
foreign-acquired exporting domestic firms will further enhance export intensity, and 
that this impact is positive right after the foreign acquisition. The effect is 
quantitatively large. As shown in Table 3-13, foreign acquisition promotes the 
accumulated export intensity by 5 percentage points in a three year period after 
acquisition. Overall, in a four year period after foreign acquisition, acquired firms are 
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5.5 percentages more export intensive than the controlled firms that have never been 
foreign acquired. These results accord with what the literature suggests as we 
discussed earlier: previous exporting experience has a major effect on current 
exporting and can explain 90 percent of exporting behaviour. Furthermore, we find 
foreign acquirers in China are more likely to be clustered in exporting industries and 
regions. Therefore, it is expected that they are more likely to be export-orientated. Our 
results strength the argument by providing evidence that acquisition FDI in China 
stimulates export intensity of the acquired exporting plant.  
To conclude from the two scenarios, acquisition FDI in China has a high 
tendency to engage in export. This is independent of the exporting status of the 
acquired firms prior to the acquisition. We find the export intensity increases if 
foreign acquisition FDI inflows invest in existing exporting firms. Even for those 
acquired firms that were non-exporters, we find a significant positive boost on the 
likelihood of exporting due to foreign acquisition. Our results are consistent with our 
descriptive analysis in which we find acquisition FDI is more likely to appear in 
exporting industries or regions. Our results are in line with the statement that that 
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Table 3-13: The Accumulated Effect of Foreign Acquisition: Export Perspective 











    
Export Dummy One year 0.1406*** 15.80 11036 
 Two years 0.1421*** 13.28 9696 
 Three years 0.1642*** 9.73 7061 
 Four years 0.1753*** 6.43 6233 
Sample of Exporters     
Export intensity One year 0.0234* 1.84 13983 
 Two years 0.0261* 1.85 11851 
 Three years 0.0490*** 3.27 9124 
 Four years 0.0552*** 2.10 8148 
Note: t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.3 Sources of effects of foreign acquisition on exporting 
The next question is why does foreign acquisition stimulate exports? Or in other 
words, which factors could explain the fact that foreign acquisitions cause changes 
that lead to an increase in exports by Chinese manufacturing firms? To answer this 
question, we first consider factors that may have an impact on exporting, i.e. the 
determinants of exporting. In the literature, firm performance and financial constraints 
are widely considered the most important factors in affecting exporting. 
 
5.3.1 Whether effects of foreign acquisition on export are caused by a productivity 
boost?  
Having discussed that firm's exporting decisions are affected by the productivity 
level in the literature, we then first discuss whether the increase in exports due to 
foreign acquisition is induced by the increase in productivity trigged by foreign 
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acquisition. In Table 3-14, we use PSM-DID estimates to investigate whether foreign 
acquisition has effects on productivity of acquired firms. The outcome variable in 
Table 3-14 is the productivity which is measured by total factor productivity (TFP). 
The first set of results indicate whether the productivity is changed in the foreign 
acquired non-exporting firms compared to the controlled non-exporting firms that 
remain domestic. Although, we found that the PSM-DID estimates were in general 
positive after foreign acquisition, we did not observe any significant accumulated 
productivity growth caused by foreign acquisition. In the second set of results, we 
show whether foreign acquisition affected productivity of exporting firms. Similar to 
the findings for the acquired non-exporting firms, we find evidence that foreign 
acquisition neither immediately boosted productivity nor had an accumulated impact 
on productivity in a medium term.     
To summarize from the two scenarios in Table 3-14, we find acquisition FDI in 
China had no significant impact on firm productivity, thus acquisition FDI may not 
focus on developing technology and skills of the host country. In other words, 
although export-motivated FDI inflows are widely considered as having the potential 
to stimulate the exports of host countries by transferring technology or upgrading 
technical and managerial skills, it is apparently not the case in the Chinese 
manufacturing sector during this period.  
As mentioned in the literature review, many studies investigate the inter-firm 
effects of foreign acquisition by looking at FDI from developed countries which 
invest in a developing economy. They are found to be highly productive, technology 
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advanced and efficiently managed. Thus, a positive productivity spillover is often 
found in the literature. Our approach is different in that our focus is on intra-firm 
consequences of FDI. There are two facts that imply no productivity increase due to 
foreign acquisition. 
There are two reasons that explain why we do not observe FDI-induced 
productivity gain. First, according to China Ministry of Commerce report (2003), FDI 
inflows in China during our sample period are mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
which account for 60 percent of cumulated FDI inflows in China. FDI projects from 
countries with significant superior technology than China such as U.S. and U.K. only 
account for 8.79 percent and 0.81 percent respectively. Second, most acquisition are 
clustered in labour-intensive industries as we described before. So to the extent that 
acquisition is all about finance the acquired firm, it is possible that acquisition FDI 
that exploits cheap labour does not help enhance productivity.        
Finally, since we do not observe any significant change in TFP due to foreign 
acquisition in Table 3-14, we can conclude that the effect of foreign acquisition on the 
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Table 3-14: The Accumulated Effect of Foreign Acquisition: Productivity Perspective 
Outcome Variable 
(Y) 











    
Log of TFP One year -.0121 -0.26 11036 
 Two years -.0783 -1.52 9696 
 Three years -.0381 -0.55 7061 
 Four years .0515 0.57 6233 
Sample of Exporters     
Log of TFP One year .0528 1.38 13983 
 Two years .0359 0.86 11851 
 Three years .0473 0.90 9124 
 Four years -.0125 -0.20 8148 
Note t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5.3.2 Whether effects of foreign acquisition on export are caused by healthier 
financial condition? 
In this part, we discuss whether increase in export likelihood or intensity due to 
foreign acquisition is possibly stimulated by the effect of foreign acquisition on the 
firm-level financial status. To answer this question, we first investigate whether 
foreign acquisition has an impact on the financial indicators of foreign acquired firms 
compared to similar domestic firms. In Table 3-15, we use PSM-DID estimates to 
investigate the accumulated impact of foreign acquisition on the long-term leverage 
ratio which is measured by the long term debt over the total assets and the short term 
liquidity ratio which is measured by the liquidity assets relative to the total assets. 
Two financial indicators are used as outcome variables in our investigation. The first 
outcome variable is the long term leverage ratio. The long term leverage ratio 
indicates firms' ability to raise long-term investment for production modification or 
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overseas marketing. The second outcome variable is the short-term liquidity ratio. We 
take it into account because Chaney (2005) shows that sufficient liquidity is required 
to finance the export entry cost if there is a random liquidity shock every period.   
The first set of results in Table 3-15 report the results from comparing acquired 
non-exporters with non-exporters which remains domestic. We do not find evidence 
that foreign acquisition immediately increases short-term financial liquidity. In 
addition, it shows that foreign acquisition does not have an effect on productivity in 
the medium term. However, we observed a significant accumulated improvement in 
the long-term leverage ratio after two years of foreign acquisition. After three years of 
accumulation, we observed that the leverage ratio was reduced by 4.2%; after four 
years of accumulation, we identified that the leverage ratio fall by about 4.7%.  
The lower rows of Table 3-15 show whether acquisition affects the financial 
indicators of exporting firms. Similar to the first scenario we have discussed, foreign 
acquisition does not have a significant effect on the short-term financial variable, i.e. 
the liquidity ratio. However, foreign acquisition has a statistically significant effect on 
the long-term leverage ratio two years after the acquisition. Quantitatively, relative to 
matched domestic firms, foreign acquisition reduces the long-term debt by 0.7% in 
the treatment year; then a bigger reduction of the long-term debt is found in two years, 
which is about 3%. The reduction accumulates to 3.7% in three years and 4.2% in 
four years.  
To summarise, in Table 3-15, we observe foreign acquisition results in a healthier 
long-term financial status. The result provides supporting evidence about an issue 
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related to export-oriented FDI in China claimed in some previous studies such as 
Huang (2003) and Egger and Nelson (2011). They believe that because of financial 
discrimination from the state-dominated banking system, private enterprises in China 
have been forced to sell off their assets to foreign investors who possess large internal 
finance and better access to international capital market in order to realise their 
production potential.  
The findings in Tables 3-14 and 3-15 combined are consistent with the argument 
on the negative aspects of foreign acquisition in China. First, we do not observe any 
significant increase in productivity in foreign acquired non-exporting firms. Thus, the 
result provides evidence for a popular debate concerning the argument that foreign 
acquisition may solely focus on local cheap labour and raw materials and therefore 
may not help to develop the host country's technology and skill level. Secondly, we 
find a significant and sizable reduction in the long-term debt ratio. Therefore, our 
results also imply that a rapid increase in foreign acquisitions in China may be 
attracted by China's deficient economy policy such as discriminative financial policy 
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Long term Leverage 
ratio 
One year -.0076 -0.63 11036 
 Two years .0150 1.18 9696 
 Three years -.0418*** -2.56 7061 
 Four years -.0468*** -2.81 6233 
     
Short term liquidity 
ratio 
One year -.0028 1.07 11036 
 Two years -.0013 0.49 9696 
 Three years .0050 0.02 7061 
 Four years -.0036 0.38 6233 
     
Sample of Exporters     
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
One year -.0077 -0.77 13983 
 Two years -.0297*** -2.58 11851 
 Three years -.0371* -1.64 9124 
 Four years -.0420*** -2.27 8148 
     
Short term liquidity 
ratio 
One year -.0004 0.07 13983 
 Two years -.0001 0.14 11851 
 Three years -.0003 0.20 9124 
 Four years .0002 1.02 8148 
Note t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Having found that only long-term leverage ratios have been reduced due to 
foreign acquisition, we turn to investigate we examine whether the long-term leverage 
ratio has impact on the increase in export due to foreign acquisition. We include the 
leverage ratio into the PSM-DID regression as a control variable. If coefficients of the 
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PSM-DID estimate has considerable changes in size or even in direction when a 
control variable is introduced, it then tells us that the control variable and PSM-DID 
estimate have an endogeneity issue. In other words, the omission of the variable 
would cause an over-estimated or under-estimated DID coefficient. If this turns out to 
be the case, we can conclude that the effects of foreign acquisition on export are 
caused by the healthier financial condition due to foreign acquisition.  
Based on the first part of Table 3-16, it was considered whether leverage ratio 
has an impact on the export likelihood after foreign acquisition by including 
long-term leverage ratio as a control variable into our PSM-DID analysis for the 
sample of acquired non-exporting firm and controlled firms that remain domestic. 
First, we observe that the PSM-DID estimates do no change compared to our 
benchmark results. The export likelihood increases due to foreign acquisition. 
Secondly, the direction of the change in export likelihood when leverage is introduced 
as a control variable is about the same in the period except the first year. In fact, in all 
four periods except the first, the coefficients of export likelihood estimates in Table 
3-16 is smaller than the benchmark results in Table 3-13. Thus, the omission of 
long-term leverage caused an overestimation of the PSM-DID coefficient in our 
benchmark results. In another word, a part of the export increase can be explained by 
the reduction in firm's long-term debt. So, the increase in export likelihood due to 
foreign acquisition may be affected by a healthier financial condition after acquisition. 
Finally, we find that the change in size on the export likelihood coefficient is 
relatively negligible quantitatively. By comparing Table 3-16 with Table 3-13 and 
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looking at two years after foreign acquisition, we find the likelihood to export 
decreases from 0.1421 to 0.1412 which is about a 0.6 percent decrease when 
long-term debt ratio is controlled for. After accumulating by a four year period, the 
difference between two results remains very small which is about 1 percent. As a 
result, the size of the effect of the leverage ratio on the export effect of foreign 
acquisition is very limited.    
In the second part of Table 3-16, the leverage ratio is included as a control 
variable into our PSM-DID analysis for the sample of acquired exporting firms. We 
also find that the coefficients of PSM-DID are smaller in almost all four periods than 
in the benchmark results, if the leverage ratio is added as a control variable. So again, 
the omitted variable causes an overestimation of the PSM-DID coefficient in the 
benchmark results in Table 3-13. It implies that the reduction in firm's long-term debt 
may explain a part of the export intensity increase due to foreign acquisition. 
However, the size of the impact is again negligible. By comparing the lower rows of 
Table 3-16 with Table 3-13, one year after foreign acquisition, we find the export 
intensity coefficient decreases from 0.0234 to 0.0228 (which is only about a 2.5 
percent difference when long-term debt ratio is controlled). After accumulating by a 
four years period, the difference is only about 5 percent. So the size of the effect of 
leverage ratio on the export effect of foreign acquisition is very small.    
In summary, we only identified positive effects of foreign acquisition on the 
likelihood of export and export intensity through the lowering of the long-term debts. 
Nevertheless, this effect is quantitatively small and negligible. Furthermore, because 
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we do not observe foreign acquisition to have any sizable and significant effect on 
productivity and the short-term liquidity ratio, we draw the conclusion that the 
increase in exports due to foreign acquisition is not related to productivity and 
short-term liquidity change. In other words, foreign acquisition are more likely to 
engage in export and are more export-intensive than remaining non-foreign-acquired 
firms, mostly due to unobservable factors which cannot be explained by productivity 
or financial conditions which are extensively discussed in the literature as 
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Table 3-16: The Accumulated Effect of Foreign Acquisition: Export Perspective Controlled 















    
Export dummy One year .1415*** 15.72 11036 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0176*** -2.78  
     
Export dummy Two years .1412*** 13.23 9696 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0097  -1.23  
     
Export dummy Three years .1550*** 9.69*** 7061 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0147*** -2.24  
     
Export dummy Four years .1735*** 6.40*** 6233 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0146*** -2.26  
     
Sample of Exporters     
Export intensity One year .0228* 1.79 13983 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0373*** -3.07  
     
Export intensity Two years .0244* 1.73 11851 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0418*** -3.46  
     
Export intensity Three years .0524*** 3.18 9124 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0365*** -3.02  
     
Export intensity Four years .0571** 1.96 8148 
Long term Leverage 
ratio 
 -.0554*** -3.25  
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5.3.3 Discussion of other possible firm-level effects of foreign acquisition on export 
increase. 
A systematic discussion of other potential factors in the literature is limited. One 
potential factor of such unobservable factors is the buyer-seller relationship in 
international trade brought in by acquiring foreign firms. Recent literature suggests 
that international trade has become increasingly dependent on the transmission of 
complex information as traded goods involve a high degree of differentiation (Rauch, 
1999) and production networks spread across the globe (Hummels et al., 2001). In 
fact, close communication between trade partners is more and more essential.7 As 
foreign acquirers possess a wider network and better communication stand than local 
Chinese firms, foreign investors facilitate information sharing which is necessary for 
product re-design and for better matching of international markets' expectations.8 As a 
result, foreign investors create business relationships in international markets after 
acquisition. Therefore, we observe foreign acquisition has a significant and positive 
impact on export intensity and the likelihood to export. Since we do not have data for 
measuring the export reliance on information possessed by foreign investors, we 
cannot provide empirical evidence to support the above hypothesis in this chapter.    
Furthermore, as it is discussed in literature of privatisation, another potential 
candidate of unobservable factors is changes in firms' attitude toward profits and risks, 
which is particularly relevant if foreign acquired firms are Chinese state-owned firms. 
                                                             
7
 In a recent global survey of 2300 Harvard Business Review subscribers, respondents said that face-to-face 
meetings are key to building long-term relationship (95%), negotiating contracts (89%), meeting new clients 
(79%). 
8
 IBM Global CEO Study (2006) reports survey evidence that business partners are the second most important  
source of innovation.  
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After foreign acquisition, former SOEs do not benefit from policy preference from the 
government anymore, so they may have to expand their business to survive. Given the 
convenience of exporting from the foreign acquirer, acquired SOEs are prompt to 
explore foreign markets. Also, foreign acquired SOEs become more risk-taking and 
may initiate exporting. Todo and Sato (2011) find that more risk-taking firms are more 
likely to export. Furthermore, risk preference's impact on exporting decisions is far 
more important than the productivity and firm size impact, evidenced by firm-level 
data for Japanese small and medium enterprises. Since we do not have data on firm's 
attitude toward profit and risks in China, we cannot test this hypothesis in this paper. 
However, these psychological factors need to be considered because it may also play 
an important role in the effect of foreign acquisition on exporting.  
 
5.3.4 Whether the effect of foreign acquisition on export in China is related to 
industry characteristics? 
As shown there is a clear industry dimension to exports in China, we investigate 
whether the effect of foreign acquisition on export increase in China is related to 
industry characteristics such as external financial dependence and R&D intensity. I 
construct the 2-digit industry-level financial dependence, R&D intensity, and export 
intensity dummies. The financial dependence is the 1986-1995 capital dependence in 
the U.S. at the 2-digit level. It is measured as the median external capital expenditure 
according to Rajan and Zingales (1998).9 The dummy of the financial dependence 
                                                             
9
 It is measured as (capital expenditure-cash flow)/capital expenditure. 
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equals 1 if the industry's financial dependence that the firm belongs to is higher than 
the median level of industry financial dependence. The financial dependence is 0 
otherwise. The R&D intensity is the U.S. 2 digit-level R&D intensity measured by 
Kroszner, Laever, and Klingebiel (2006). The R&D intensity dummy equals 1 if the 
industry's R&D intensity is higher than the median of industry R&D intensity. The 
R&D intensity is 0 otherwise. Finally, the industry export intensity dummy equals 1 if 
the industry's export intensity is higher than the median of industry level export 
intensity, and 0 otherwise.  
Having constructed the three dummies, the financial dependence dummy, R&D 
intensity dummy and export intensity dummy variables are interacted with the 
treatment dummy. If the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant, it 
shows that financial dependence, R&D intensity or export intensity has an impact on 
the export increase due to foreign acquisition. The specification of the regression is 
described as follows: 
 
Yit = Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1acqi + Ⱦ2pacqt + Ⱦ3acq כ pacqit + Ⱦ4acq כ pacqit כ Adumi +Ⱦ5Adumi + Ⱦ6acq כ Adumi + Ⱦ7pacqit כ Adumi + ɂit    (Eq.3-6) 
 
where Adum is the dummy variable representing financial dependence dummy, 
R&D intensity dummy or export intensity dummy   
Table 3-17 shows whether the acquisition effect on export is different in high 
financially-dependent industries and low financially-dependent industries. Ⱦ3 can be 
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interpreted as the coefficient of PSM-DiD estimate if the financial dependence is low. 
Consistent with our previous findings, we observe an increase in export likelihood 
and intensity in low financial dependent industries. Ⱦ4 can be interpreted as the 
difference of PSM-DiD estimate between high financial dependence industries and 
low financial dependence industries. We find Ⱦ4 is insignificant in all periods for 
both sample of foreign acquired exporter and foreign acquired non-exporters. Thus 
the financial dependence has no impact on the effect of foreign acquisition on export 
in China.  
Similarly, in Table 3-18, we find acquisition boosts exports in low R&D 
industries in general. However, we find it is not statistically different from the 
acquisition effect on export in high R&D industries. Therefore, we conclude that 
foreign acquisition has a positive effect on exports of acquired firms and this effect is 
not related to whether the acquired firm is highly externally financially-dependent or 
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Table 3-17: The Effect of Acquisition on Export According to Industries with different 
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Note t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
6 Conclusions 
Inward FDI has been viewed as an accelerator of host countries' economic 
growth. One of its major potential growth contributions is to promote host countries' 
exports. Our study empirically investigates this issue by using the Chinese data for all 
firms in the Chinese manufacturing industry with annual turnover of more than 5 
million Chinese Yuan for the period 2000-2005, a period during which inward flows 
of FDI played an important role in Chinese exporting market. Our paper contributes to 
the literature mainly from five aspects. First, although there has been a large numbers 
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of studies investigating FDI and export linkage, most of them are based on aggregate 
region- and sector- level data. We employ a firm-level dataset with propensity-score 
matching and difference-in-difference techniques that eliminates the causal inference 
on the direct impact of FDI and unobservable time invariant effects, which are 
correlated with the selection. Second, we split our sample into foreign acquired 
exporting firms and non-exporting firms prior to acquisition. Therefore, export 
performance in this paper takes changes of both export intensity and export likelihood 
into account thoroughly. Third, in addition to discussing the acquisition effect on 
export, the paper is the first to consider factors could generate this effect with a 
firm-level analysis. Fourth, we also had a firm-level examination on whether the 
acquisition effect on export is associated with some industry characteristics. Fifth, the 
investigation on acquisition FDI related export, productivity, and financial constraint 
allows us to understanding on the role of FDI in a host country comprehensively. It is 
important from a policy perspective, especially for emerging countries.   
By investigating acquired exporters and acquired non-exporters, we find that 
foreign acquisition increases the export intensity of the acquired existing exporter 
significantly. For example, in the second year after the acquisition, the export 
intensity of an acquired firm is about 5.5 percent higher than that of a similar firm that 
has never been acquired. We also find that the likelihood to export increased for 
acquired non-exporters, compared to similar firms remaining entirely in domestic 
control. We observe that this impact starts from the year that foreign acquisition takes 
place.  
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Regarding factors that may be related to this effect, we investigate whether the 
effect of foreign acquisition on exporting is driven by productivity upgrading or 
financial status improving. The DiD-PSM estimators indicate that productivity is not 
boosted by foreign investors to a statistically significant extent for either acquired 
exporters or acquired non-exporters. This is a striking result as many existing studies 
find positive productivity spillovers from FDI. However, it is not surprising, because 
existing studies focus on multinational firms from developed countries, while only a 
small proportion of FDI in China is sourced from developed countries. FDI from U.S., 
for instance, only account for 8.79 percent of cumulated FDI inflows in China by 
2002. We observe a significant improvement in firm long-term leverage ratio for both 
types of firms. We also identify effects of acquisition FDI on the likelihood of export 
and export intensity through lowering long-term debts. However, this effect is 
quantitatively small and negligible. Finally, we also examine whether the acquisition 
related export-boost differs according to industry characteristics. We do not observe 
the acquisition effect is statistically different in high external finance dependent 
industries and low external finance dependent industries.  It is also invariant across 
low R&D intensive industries and high R&D intensive industries.  
To summarize, our empirical results suggest that foreign acquisition results in an 
increase in the exports of acquired firms. We also find that the increase in exporting 
due to acquisition FDI is not channelled by acquisition related productivity upgrading. 
From the financial constraint perspective, this effect may be caused by a healthier 
financial condition. The evidence is quantitatively very small though. Furthermore, as 
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our results show that export-orientated foreign acquisition results in a reduction in 
debt but no productivity increase, it is consistent with the concern about the negative 
aspects of FDI inflows. Policy implications are drawn for the integration of policies 
on FDI and financial market reform, especially for developing countries which attract 
export-orientated FDI. One direction of future research would be to investigate the 
buyer-seller relationships in international trade brought in by acquiring firms by 
employing both firm-level census data and firm-level trade data.   
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CHAPTER 4: Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition: the 
Location of Foreign Manufacturers in China 
 
1 Introduction 
In the light of the dramatic increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activities 
globally and its important role in the rapid economic growth of emerging countries in 
recent decades, the literature on the location determinants of FDI is quite substantial. 
Motivated by Dunning (1979, 2002)'s OLI paradigm and Markusen (1984, 2004)'s 
knowledge-capital model, many studies such as Markusen and Venables (1998) have 
investigated the location determinants of FDI with recognition of ownership choices. 
However, multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertaking FDI face another strategic 
decision; a choice between setting up a new plant (greenfield) or taking over an 
existing firm (acquisition). There are fewer studies on the relationship between these 
two modes of investment and the intrinsic characteristics of the host location. In this 
paper, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence that location determinants 
of inward FDI have different effects in terms of attracting greenfield FDI versus 
acquisition FDI with the use of Chinese micro-level data.   
By definition, greenfield foreign investments are in the process of expanding 
operations overseas by building subsidiaries from ground-zero, while acquisition FDI 
is the purchase of already existing companies in a host location. As such, there are 
several reasons why location determinants are different depending on investment 
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modes. First, the key difference between the two modes of foreign investment relates 
to the origin of the resources to be employed in the foreign subsidiaries. Kogut and 
Singh (1988) suggest that greenfield FDI uses resources of the multinational investor 
itself, whereas acquisition FDI uses both the resources of the investor and the assets 
of the local firm. Indeed, greenfield projects start with no market share; it is financed 
externally by the investor; and it requires new employees. In contrast, acquisition FDI 
is able to use the existing resources of acquired firms such as customers, assets and 
employees. In the literature, empirical evidence has shown that host location's market 
size (Cleeve, 2008), financial sector development (Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010), 
and labour market conditions (Vijayakumar et al., 2010) are important determinants 
of the location choice of inward FDI in general. However, limited empirical studies 
have been down to assess whether the same variables would have different effects in 
attracting greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI.     
Another intrinsic difference between the two modes of FDI is that a high 
concentration of firms provides procurement opportunities which only apply to 
acquisition FDI. According to rather established literature on the agglomeration and 
FDI, the regional cluster of local firms plays an important role when MNEs make 
their investment location decision (Fujita et al., 2001). To localise where other firms 
present, FDI invested plants benefit from positive agglomeration economies in the 
form of a large pool of customers and suppliers, availability of intermediate goods and 
service, specialised manpower, knowledge spillover between close firms and so on. 
Foreign invested firms also face negative sides of agglomeration. A large number of 
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firms in a region also drive up costs because of the effect of competition on the 
product and labour market. Two sides of the effect of agglomeration can attract or 
deter FDI inflows depending on which force is the stronger. However, since a higher 
stock of local firms also implies more potential acquisition targets, Roberto (2004) 
suggests that agglomeration which is an important location determinant should have 
different effects on greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. Although a large amount of 
studies have focused on agglomeration and FDI in general, the empirical evidence on 
comparing greenfield and acquisition FDI with the use of economic geography 
theories is scarce. One study is Roberto (2004) which is based on FDI in Italy. It 
shows that agglomeration-related location externalities affect the two modes of FDI in 
different ways.  
Following two streams of literature above, we are motivated to evaluate whether 
location characteristics have difference effects in attracting the two foreign investment 
modes, with a focus on the effects of agglomeration, market size, financial market 
development and labour market. To fulfil the purpose of this study, we employ a 
negative binomial model based on a comprehensive firm-level dataset covering the 
six-year period from 2000 to 2005 and 31 regions in China. With the use of Chinese 
firm-level data, we provide the first empirical evidence of its kind based on FDI in 
China.  
There are several reasons why China is interesting for our investigation. First, 
&KLQDKDVEHFRPHWKHZRUOG¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWUHFLSLHQWRI)',VHFRQGRQO\WRWKH86
and the largest FDI recipient among developing countries since the early 1990s. After 
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China's accession to the WTO in 2001, there has been an even faster growth in FDI 
inflows. According to the database of UNCTAD's FDI/TNC, since 2000 China 
received larger FDI inflows than any other emerging economy. It reached a record 
US$ 108 billion in 2008 compared to US$ 70 billion in Russia and US$ 42 billion in 
India. It is a phenomenon in the world economy, which has attracted the attentions of 
numerous scholars. 
Second, economic development and FDI activities have significant regional 
differences in China. China has its explicit economic policy bias across regions such 
as special economic zones (SEZs). Eastern coastal provinces, especially Shanghai and 
Guangdong, host most foreign investment due to their proximity to major ports, 
strong industrial base and regulation provision. However, less-developed regions, 
namely in Central and West China, draw significantly fewer FDI investments. 
Moreover, both greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI in China are highly active. 
Greenfield FDI dominated FDI inflows until the late 1990s. With the availability of 
more favourable regulatory provisions and more potential targets since China's WTO 
accession, foreign acquisition has become a major part of FDI inflows. So, the uneven 
distribution of FDI across regions and the common existence of both modes of FDI 
inflow make China a valuable case to investigate location determinants of FDI. In 
literature, there are few papers investigating the location determinants of FDI inflows 
in China such as Cheng and Kwan (2000). However, there has yet not a China-based 
study on the location determinants with emphasis on a comparison on greenfield FDI 
versus acquisition FDI.  
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Third, to investigate the location attractiveness of the two investment modes in 
China is also important from a policy perspective since greenfield FDI and acquisition 
FDI are expected having different consequences on the location economy. Although 
there has been no systematic investigation into the different consequences of 
greenfield FDI and foreign acquisitions in terms of aggregate investment and growth, 
respectively, investigations on the determinants of FDI suggest that multinationals 
who possess high technology and productivity prefer greenfield investment (Görg, 
2000; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). Their results may imply that host economy benefits 
more from greenfield FDI. Furthermore, policymakers have an ongoing FDI policy 
adjustment which encourages foreign investors to build plants in China's interior 
regions. Greenfield investments are particularly important in western regions in China 
where are not industrial bases, and thus have less attractiveness for acquisition FDI 
(for example: procurement opportunities). To allocate their limited recourses to attract 
greenfield foreign investors effectively, it is important that policymakers understand 
the location determinants of FDI respect to two modes of FDI entries. Our study 
provides an investigation on the location attractiveness to foreign investors and sheds 
light on FDI policy adjustment in China.  
To summarise, our investigation contribute to the literature in three ways. First, 
we include greenfield and acquisition into the investigation on the location 
determinants of FDI inflows. Second, our research is the first of its kind based on 
inward FDI in China with use of a micro-level data. Third, we tackle the question by 
focusing on agglomeration economies along with other location determinants such as 
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financial market development.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature overview. 
Section 3 presents our empirical strategy including the explanation of variables and 
hypothesis. Our data are described in Section 4. In Section 5, we first test the effect of 
location determinants on greenfield FDI and foreign acquisition separately. Then we 
make a direct comparison on the effects of location determinants in these two modes 
of foreign investments. Finally, we conclude on the main results in Section 6. 
  
2 Literature review 
The rapid growth in FDI activities over recent decades has led to substantial 
research into the phenomenon of multinational firms. A long list of determinants that 
attract FDI in a particular host location has been investigated in the literature. Rather 
than treat FDI projects as being homogenous in their investment strategies, many 
recent studies include the ownership decision in their framework. However, many 
existing studies are missing another important variation in the modes of FDI inflows, 
which are the investment modes, namely, greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI. In this 
section, we provide a review of the theory and empirical literature that discusses the 
location determinants of FDI, followed by a review of related studies on comparing 
location determinants of greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. 
 
2.1 Theoretical approach to location determinants of FDI 
Theoretical approaches on foreign firms' location choice assume that 
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multinational investors seek a location which gives the highest expected returns. Each 
firm faces a maximising problem based on the profit function: Ɏi = Ɏi(Xi), where Xi 
is a vector of the characteristics of the region i. Over the past few decades, we have 
witnessed a growth of FDI theories that explain Xi  in different ways. The first 
explanations on the determinants of FDI were base on the neo-classical trade theories. 
In their framework, vector Xi  comprises measures of labour costs according to 
Ricardian theory and accessibility to production factors such as raw materials referred 
in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (1933) and the MacDougall-Kemp model (1964). They 
suggest that lower labour cost and cheaper raw materials in host countries motivate 
inward FDI.    
Since the neo-classical approach, there has been an expansion of theoretical 
approaches on FDI determinants in many aspects. For example, Hymer (1976)'s 
market imperfection suggests that the cost of acquiring local knowledge is an 
important factor for FDI decisions. Later, Dunning (1979, 2003) contributed to the 
literature by bringing together several complementary theories of FDI. He provides an 
integrated framework on the determinants of FDI, namely, the eclectic or OLI 
paradigm. It suggests that ownership (O), location (L) and internalisation (I) are 
simultaneously affecting multinationals' investing strategies. Location attractiveness 
in its framework is explained as preferential tax policy, lower transport costs and 
production costs, and larger market size. Dunning and Lundan (2008) further 
developed the vector Xi  in the OLI paradigm by introducing market risk as an 
important location determinant of foreign investments. The development of the new 
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trade theory (Krugman, 1980) provides a rigorous theory foundation to explain the 
relationship between the three elements of the OLI paradigm. The location 
determinants of FDI that are based on the new trade theory focus on market potential, 
transaction costs and factor endowments.  
New trade theory contributed to the rise of new economic geography in the early 
1990s.1 It emphasised the importance of branch plant location in economic growth. 
Base on a rather established literature, Fujita et al. (2001) suggests that industrial 
firms tend to localise where manufacturing plants are clustered because of 
agglomeration externalities such as easier access to intermediate goods, product 
services, skilled labour and knowledge spillover. New economic geography shed light 
on investigations on location determinants of FDI inflows from an agglomeration 
effects perspective. Several empirical studies have investigated this theory such as 
Roberto et al. (2004) and Hilber and Voicu (2010). Also, to extend the new economic 
geography approach with a general equilibrium heterogeneous firm mode based on 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), Falvey et al. (2007) shows that, given parent's firm's 
productivity, a foreign-owned firm will be less likely to survive if the market size is 
smaller.   
Finally, as we discussed in Chapter 2, institutional quality has been recognised as 
an important factor in FDI inflows. Weak institutions result in poor legal protection of 
assets making foreign investment less likely. Higher corruption may increase the cost 
of FDI projects. Furthermore, political instability increases the likelihood of failure of 
                                                             
1
 Please refer to Krugman (1991). 
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foreign investments.    
 
2.2 Empirical evidence on location determinants of FDI 
The development of theory on the FDI location decision has been accompanied 
by a fast growth of empirical studies. Based on the early literature and the OLI 
paradigm, production costs, infrastructure, economic development and preferential 
policy have been tested as location determinants of FDI inflows in many empirical 
investigations.  
By employing a multivariate regression on FDI inflows in 80 less-developed 
countries, Schneider and Frey (1985) show that foreign investors prefer countries with 
lower labour costs. Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) found that infrastructure 
quality is positively associated with FDI in MENA countries. They also revealed that 
financial sector development encourages FDI inflows. Preferential policy has also 
been shown to be an important factor of FDI growth. Intuitively, higher taxes push 
FDI away from the host location. By investigating 25 empirical studies on taxation 
and FDI, Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find that the median tax rate elasticity in the 
literature is -3.3, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the host location tax rate 
reduces FDI inflows by 3.3 percent. Based on the FDI in 29 Chinese provinces from 
1985 to 1995, Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that special economic zones (SEZs) 
attract more foreign investment, indicating preferential policy of the host location is 
important in attracting FDI inflows.       
Along with the rise of the new trade theory, many empirical studies have focused 
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on how market size and the openness of the host economy affect the growth of foreign 
investments. In many cross-country investigations such as Asiedu (2006) and 
Mhlanga et al. (2010), market size (GDP) has been found to have a positive effect on 
attracting FDI inflows. Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that provinces in China with 
larger per capita income are more favourable FDI destinations. Furthermore, Mhlanga 
et al. (2010) also show that market growth encourages foreign investments in 
developing countries in South Africa.  
The weight of trade in GDP is usually used as a proxy for the openness of an 
economy in many studies. As explained in Chapter 3, many foreign investments are 
export-oriented. Thus, higher openness of a host location attracts greater FDI inflows. 
Both Mhlanga et al. (2010) and Asiedu (2006) provided evidence to support this 
argument by investigating FDI in developing countries.  
There is also a less established empirical literature motivated by the new 
economics geography theory. Figueiredo et al. (2000) focus on the agglomeration 
effects on spatial choices of greenfield foreign plants in Portugal. In their study, 
agglomeration is measured by the size of the industry-specific employment. They 
conclude that the size of manufacturing employment is an import location determinant 
of greenfield FDI. Furthermore, they find that total employment in the service sectors 
such as business and financial sector plays a role in attracting manufacturing FDI. 
More recently, Hiber and Voicu (2010) find similar evidence in Romania with the 
same measurement of agglomeration. Other empirical studies such as Roberto et al. 
(2008) measure the agglomeration directly with the number of firms of a sector in a 
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region of E.U. countries. They find a positive and significant effect of the number of 
local firms on the number of foreign entries in 50 regions of 8 E.U. countries. They 
also show that FDI inflows are driven by the number of foreign establishments in the 
region.    
 
2.3 Location determinants of greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI 
Multinationals face two decisions when they undertake investment in foreign 
countries, namely, choice of ownership mode and of investment mode. The decision 
on ownership mode depends on the choice of a partially owned venture or a wholly 
owned affiliate, while the decision on investment mode depends on the choice of 
greenfield investment or acquisition investment. There are a fair number of studies on 
the location determinants of FDI inflows with consideration of ownership variation 
such as the OLI paradigm. However, fewer investigations have focused on how 
location characteristics have different effects on attracting greenfield FDI versus 
acquisition FDI. 
Based on the OLI paradigm and new trade theory approach, Neto et al. (2010a) 
investigate the determinants of greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI with an analysis of 
panel data of 53 countries over the period 1996 to 2006. They show that market size, 
openness of economy, institution quality, and human capital are common in attracting 
two different modes of foreign investments. Risk measurements such as property 
protection and cultural differences play an important role in the location decisions of 
greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. They explain that greenfield investments are 
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intrinsically more risky than acquisitions.  
In order to evaluate how difference in technologies, investment costs, market 
size and market competition affect FDI entries, Thomas Müller (2007) develops a 
multi-stage game by endogenizing the acquisition price and the profits. The sub-game 
perfect equilibrium solved by backwards induction shows that greenfield investment 
is the optimal choice when the markets are very competitive or very uncompetitive.    
From the preferential policy perspective, Hebous et al. (2010) examine how 
different taxation policies explain the location decision of two FDI investment modes 
by employing German outbound FDI data with logit estimates. They find that the 
location decision of greenfield investments is more sensitive to different tax rates than 
that of acquisition FDI. They explain that a higher tax rate can be capitalised by a 
lower acquisition price, while this effect is absent in the case of greenfield investment.  
According to established FDI literature based on the new economic geography 
theory, Roberto (2004) seeks to assess how agglomeration has different effects on the 
location decisions of foreign greenfield entries versus acquisition FDI inflows in 95 
Italian regions from 1986 to 1999. They found that the number of established firms 
encouraged acquisition FDI but had no significant effect on greenfield investment. 
They pointed out that agglomeration might have both positive externalities attracting 
FDI inflows and negative congestion-like competition effects diverting FDI inflows. 
However, higher numbers of firms also provide more potential acquisition targets. 
This positive procurement effect does not exist in the case of greenfield investment. 
Furthermore, it found that greenfield FDI is affected more by the number of foreign 
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incumbents. Recognising a cluster of foreign incumbents is a sign of a good 
investment environment for foreign investors; the result implies greenfield investment 
is more reliant on this signal. It is consistent with the result in Neto et al. (2010a), 
which suggests that greenfield investment is riskier than acquisitions.       
Overall, there is a large literature on the location determinants of FDI inflows. 
Some studies have addressed some determinants that have different effects on 
attracting greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. Inspired by this literature, our 
research is particularly focused on agglomeration effects, as well as some other 
regional effects on attracting the two modes of FDI across 30 regions in China. To the 
best of our knowledge, we provide the first empirical evidence of its kind for China.  
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
In this section, we present our empirical strategy and econometric specification. 
Following some existing empirical literature such as Roberto (2004), we employ a 
negative binomial model to estimate the impact of different location determinants on 
greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. Therefore, the dependent variable (FI) is the 
number of foreign acquired firms or newly established foreign firms at 
province-industry-time level. In the count model, the standard model is the Poisson 
regression model. However, the negative binomial model, which explicitly models 
over-dispersion, is a more flexible function form for over-dispersed count data. In our 
research, we implement a random-effect, negative binomial estimation for two 
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reasons. First, we find that the variance of the explanatory variable exceeds the mean. 
It implies that there is over-dispersion so that the Poisson model is not appropriate 
according to Winkelman (2008). Secondly, we have a large number of zero 
observations. In addition, following the suggestion in Winkelman (2008), the negative 
binomial model is better suited to accommodate excess zeros compared by the 
Poisson model.  
Independent variables are mainly six different location characteristics that may 
have different effects on the two modes of foreign investments. They are demand-side 
agglomeration (Agg_demand ), number of firms (Agg_firm ), stock of foreign firms 
(Agg_FDI ), wage variation (Wage_CV ), government efficiency (BU ) and financial 
development (FinD ). We also add an industry level control ( Hfd כFinD), which is 
the sector financial dependence dummy interacting with the regional financial 
development into our later discussion. In order to avoid simultaneity issues, we 
assume that the location decisions of FDI are based on provincial characteristics of 
previous year. So all explanatory variables are lagged for one year and expressed in 
logs. Combing in the main provincial variables with other control variables, our 
benchmark estimation equation is as follows: 
 
FIi,s,t =Ⱦ1Agg_demandi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ2Agg_firmi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ3Agg_FDIi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ4Wage_CVi,s,tെ1 +Ⱦ5BUi,tെ1 + Ⱦ6FinDi,tെ1 + Ⱦ7Hfd כ FinDi,s,tെ1 + ɔ+ɂi,s,t      (Eq.4-1) 
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where subscripts i, s and t stand for each province i, sector s and each period of time t. 
The dependent variable FIi,s,t  is count data that is assumed to be discrete and 
non-negative integer values.  ɔ represents year-, 2-digit sector or province dummies 
to control for time, industry and region fixed effects.  ɂi,s,t is the error term. In 
general, we expect greenfield FDI or acquisition FDI to be positively related to the 
demand-side agglomeration, the number of foreign incumbents and financial market 
development, but negatively dependent on wage variation and bureaucracy. Since the 
agglomeration effect from a cluster of firms of an industry in a province may have 
both positive externalities and negative competition congestions, we are interested in 
finding the direction of the effect for both investment modes.   
To extend our discussion, we compare whether location characteristics have 
different impacts on the two modes of foreign investments. We regress the ratio of the 
number of foreign greenfield plants over foreign acquisitions on location determinants. 




= Ⱦ1Agg_demandi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ2Agg_firmi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ3Agg_FDIi,s,tെ1 +Ⱦ4Wage_CVi,s,tെ1 + Ⱦ5BUi,tെ1 + Ⱦ6FinDi,tെ1 + ɔ+ɂi,s,t       (Eq.4-2) 
 
Furthermore, we have a check on our benchmark empirical strategy with 
consideration of location proximity to other provinces into agglomeration variables2. 
How we construct the explanatory variables and extend our hypotheses is specified in 
                                                             
2
 There are the demand-side agglomeration, the number of incumbents and the number of foreign incumbents.  
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the following sub-section.     
 
3.2 Determinants of location decisions: independent variables 
Explanatory variables that have impacts on location decisions of greenfield FDI 
versus acquisition FDI are derived from the existing literature discussed in the 
previous section. First, we mainly focus on the form of agglomeration economies that 
attract foreign investments towards concentrated economic centres and the 
agglomeration diseconomies that push some foreign investments away from groups of 
competitive firms. Second, we are interested in whether the condition of the labour 
market is relevant on attracting the two modes of foreign firms. Third, we introduce 
provincial bureaucracy to investigate whether better government efficiency is 
appealing to different foreign invested firms. Finally, from the external finance 
perspective, we examine how provincial financial market development has effects on 
attracting greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI.      
We measure agglomeration effects in three ways. First, we consider 
'demand-side' agglomeration rent, which refers to the advantage of being close to a 
large market. Krugman (1991) suggests that it is preferable to locate in a country or 
region, which has a large market. Therefore, we expect that demand-side 
agglomeration is positively correlated with FDI inflows. In our research, the 
benchmark specification of the demand-side agglomeration Agg_demandi,s,t  is 
measured by the Yi,s,t, which is the output level of an industry s within the province 
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i.3 In fact, the provincial demand-side agglomeration of an industry is much wider 
than the potential market of the province itself. Many theoretical works of economic 
geography, such as Fujita (1988), have applied space into agglomeration and focused 
on linkages of 'proximity markets', which stand for markets where the distances 
between buying and selling are short. Therefore, we extend our bench market 
specification with a more general consideration by taking account the spatial 
agglomeration.  
According to a precursor framework by Harris (1954) s' market-potential 
function, the market potential of a location equates the potential demand for goods 
and services produced in the same sector within a location and the location's 
proximity to all other consumer markets (locations). In other words, the market 
potential accounts for both the size of market itself and its position relative to other 
markets. Recent researches such as Roberto (2004) and Roberto et al. (2008) derive a 
gravity-adjusted specification based on Harris (1954). In this paper, we follow the 
specification applied in Roberto (2004). Unlike the squared distances used in Roberto 
(2004), we use unit distances between locations, which deflate fewer effects of 
proximate markets by distances. A reason for this change is that distances between 
capital cities of Chinese provinces are much bigger than in the case of Italy. Thus, the 
unit distance between capital cities in China is a sufficient deflator for the location's 
proximity to all other markets. Therefore, in order to calculate the general 
demand-side agglomeration rent of a sector s within a province i (Agg_demand2i,s,t), 
                                                             
3
 In China, provinces are 'land-locked' as the trade barriers between provinces are high. With assumption that most 
outputs are consumed within the province, we use industry production as a proxy to measure demand of a 
province. 
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we calculate the average, inversely distance-weighted province-sector-year level 
outputs in all China province from 2000 to 2005 based on our firm-level dataset. It is 
shown as the following equation: 
 
Agg_demand2i,s,t = Yi,s,t + σ Y j ,s ,tdist ijj്i   (Eq.4-3) 
 
where Yi,s,t is the output of an industry s within the province i,  Yj,s,t is the output of 
a sector s in each province j. It is weighted by distij , which is the distance between 
two capital cities of two provinces. Distances are measured by the number of 
kilometres and calculated from Google map. Generally, the expression shows that the 
larger a province's own output, the closer to other larger markets and the larger other 
provinces' output, the higher the province's market potential of an industry. 
In the second measure of agglomeration effect, we take the cluster of firms of the 
same sector in a province into account. In theory, manufacturing plants tend to locate 
where many other firms operate according to a typical cumulative causation approach, 
first envisaged by Myrdal (1957). As we discussed, a cluster of firms provide a large 
pool of stable suppliers and customers. It also increases the supply of skilled labour 
and generates more knowledge spillover between firms in the same industry. On the 
other hand, it also refers to the congestion-like competition effect from a high 
concentration of firms. Indeed, firms face both a highly competitive product market 
and labour market where a large number of similar firms operate on. Therefore, the 
competition effect acts as a centrifugal force that pushes foreign investors away from 
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the highly competitive market to less congested provinces. Although the two forces 
have effects on the two modes of FDI inflows, a large number of firms also supply 
higher procurement opportunities that may have a positive effect in the case of 
acquisition FDI. It is difficult to disentangle the effect of procurement opportunities 
from the effect of agglomeration externalities. However, we expect the number of 
local incumbents to have different effects in attracting greenfield FDI versus 
acquisition FDI if the procurement opportunity effect is large. To evaluate the 
agglomeration effect of a sector s within a province i (Agg_firmi,s,t) generated by 
number of existing firms, we consider the number of firms in the same industry per 





  (Eq.4-4) 
 
where Ni,s,t is the stock of firms in the industry s in the province i at a particular year 
t.  Ai  is the area of the province in squared kilometers. Agg_firmi,s,t indicates the 
concentration of relative firms in the province i.  
According to spatial agglomeration theory, the agglomeration effect may also 
come from its proximities to all other provinces. Therefore, we also extend our 
specification into a broader consideration as we have done for the variable of 
demand-side agglomeration. With consideration of province's relative position to all 
other provinces, we construct: 
 






+ σ N j,s ,tA j
dist ij
j്i   (Eq.4-5) 
 
The third measure of agglomeration is not the generic number of established 
domestic firms but only the number of foreign invested incumbents existing in the 
same industry within a province. The agglomeration economies of this form are 
connected to the disclosure of information and investment risk reduction. It is 
intuitive that foreign investors have limited knowledge about the host location's 
investment environment. It is costly for them to observe the advantages and 
drawbacks of location choices because of factors such as cultural and language 
differences. The difficulty of acquiring local knowledge can curb multinationals' 
investment into the location. However, a higher FDI stock can be treated as a signal of 
the location being 'foreign friendly'. Given that greenfield investments are generally a 
riskier mode of investment compared to the acquisitions as mentioned in the literature, 
we expect greenfield FDI is more dependent on the stock of foreign plants. The 
variables of the stock of FDI AGG_FDIi,s,t and AGG_FDI2i,s,t are constructed in the 
same way as we constructed the stock of firms of an industry in a province above. The 
only change is NFi,s,t is the number of foreign plants of the same industry within a 
province, as follows: 
 
Agg_FDIi,s,t =
NF i ,s ,t
A i
  (Eq.4-6) 
and  




NF i ,s ,t
A i
+ σ NF j,s ,tA j
dist ij
j്i   (Eq.4-7) 
 
Apart from agglomeration measurements, there are other provincial variables 
that we are interested in. First of all, we proximate the condition of the labour market 
Wage_CVi,s,t by using the coefficient of variation of wages of an industry within a 
province from 2000 to 2005. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation ɐ to 
the average wage Ɋ of the wage in each 2-digit level industry at each province. A 
lower coefficient of variation of wage in an industry means less variation relative to 
the average wage of an industry. It may imply a more competitive labour supply of an 
industry in a province. By assuming sufficient labour mobility, China with a 
population of 1.3 billion offers abundant labour supply across regions. Therefore, a 
more competitive labour supply implies a possible lower labour cost of the industry in 
a region, which encourages FDI inflows. However, one important drawback of this 
argument is that we do not have information about the quality of the labour. Therefore, 
the variation may not only come from the competitiveness of the labour market but 
also from different skills or education levels of the labour in an industry. 
 
Wage_CVi,s,t =
ɐwage ,i ,s ,tɊwage ,i ,s ,t   (Eq.4-8) 
 
Intuitively, it is believed that the competitiveness of the labour market has 
asymmetric effects on attracting the two modes of foreign investments. Greenfield 
FDI is probably more affected by the labour market because they create new jobs and 
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hire employees from labour market, while acquired firms may not be affected because 
they take over the assets of acquired firms as well as labour forces.  
Then, we use bureaucracy (BU ) to measure government efficiency. It is widely 
accepted in the recent literature such as Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) that the quality of 
domestic institutions is a key determinant of FDI inflows. We believe it is of special 
interest in the case of China. Although 'optimal size' of the government in a market 
economy, either at central or local level, may be controversial in theory, it is widely 
accepted that China has a massive and bureaucratic government. Registration 
regulations and approval procedures are complicated. Furthermore, communicating 
with government officials is a heavy burden even in daily operations for managers, 
especially foreign ones because of language and culture difference. We expect both 
greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI are negatively related to the provincial 
bureaucracy. Ideally, the most relevant bureaucracy data to reflect the difficulty of 
establishing a new foreign invested business are those that concern project permission, 
licensing procedure, corruption and so on. However, we do not have satisfactory 
information about these indicators. Our bureaucracy data is extracted from the NERI 
index of Marketisation, which is generated according to a large sample survey from 
business executives on 'how much time you have to allocate to deal with the 
government in order to keep your business going'. To our knowledge, it is believed to 
be a good indicator of the bureaucracy, which is available and consistent in 31 
provinces over our study period. The higher the index shows, the less bureaucratic 
and thus more efficient government.  
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Moreover, we introduce provincial financial development ( FinD ) into our 
regression. It is constructed from two sub-indexes in the NERI index of Marketisation. 
The first index is the ratio of deposits of non- state-owned financial institutes relative 
to the total deposits of all financial institutes. It shows the development of non- state 
banks and the reduction of the monopoly power of the four major state banks in China. 
The higher the index, the more competitive the financial market is. The second 
sub-index is the share of loans utilised by non- state-owned enterprises relative to the 
total loans. It is a meaningful indicator because an under-developed financial market 
tends to discriminate towards non- state-owned firms in China. So the higher the share, 
the more banks are commercial orientated rather than government policy guided. A 
more developed financial market provides a lower cost of finance such as borrowing. 
Thus, we expect an improvement in the financial market to have a positive effect on 
attracting foreign investment in general. Notably, in the case of acquisition FDI, an 
under-developed financial market may force private firms to sell their equities to 
finance their full production potential (Huang, 2003). Therefore, a better financial 
market may also have negative effect on the acquisition FDI if the procurement 
opportunity effect in China is large. Thus, we expect financial market development to 
have different effects on attracting greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. 
In addition to the external finance perspective, we consider if the effect of 
financial market development is different according to industries that are highly 
reliant on external financial or not. The measure is based on the seminal paper by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) in which they constructed an index of dependence on 
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external finance for industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector. The index is 
calculated as a fraction of external capital expenditure and the authors assumed that 
this measure should be a valid index for the same industries in other countries as well. 
In order to fulfil our object, we create an interaction term between industry financial 
dependence and provincial financial market development. It is constructed as follows: 
 
Hfd כ FinDi,s,t = Hfds × FinDi,t  (Eq.4-9) 
 
where Hfds  is the dummy that equals to one if the financial dependence of 2-digit 
industry s is higher than the industry median, and zero otherwise.  FinDi,t is the 
financial development of a province i at year t.  
There are other unobserved factors such as FDI favourable policies and more 
regulation provision in some special economic zones or for some industries, which are 
correlated with the number of foreign invested firms and independent variables. To 
deal with this problem, we also include year, industry and province dummies (ɔ) to 
control for some fixed effects.  ɂi,s,t  is the error term that is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed with a normal distribution and mean zero.     
 
4 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we describe in detail the data of both foreign greenfield 
investment and acquisition along with some variables of interests. Our research is 
mainly based on firm-level data extracted from the Annual Report of Industrial 
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Enterprises filed by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). It records 
detailed firm information based on the annual accounting reports of all enterprises in 
China which had no less than an annual turnover of 5 million Chinese Yuan spanning 
31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities for the period from 2000 to 2005. 
Since we are interested in the spatial distribution and location determinants of two 
foreign investment modes, we aggregate variables of interest in our firm-level data 
into provincial level data.  
In addition to the firm-level data, we employ some provincial-level variables 
from the NERI index of the Marketisation of China's Provinces (2009) which is 
collected and documented by National Economic Research Institution (NERI), China 
Reform Foundation. From different aspects, it conducts a comprehensive comparison 
on the process of reforming into market economies of 31 Chinese provinces for the 
period 2000-2007. It records 23 indicators of institutional arrangements and policies 
in five major areas, which are 1) the efficiency of government in the provincial 
economy; 2) economic structure, mainly evaluating the weight of private firms; 3) 
inter-provincial trade barriers; 4) factor-market development, such as financial market 
development; and 5) legal frameworks, including property rights enforcement. 
Considering the relevance and the consistency of the statistical method throughout the 
sample period in our main dataset, we extract two indicators from the data covering 
the period from 2000 to 2005. They are provincial bureaucracy and financial system 
development. 
In our research, we focus on firms that have foreign investments. To identify 
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foreign investment firms in China, we rely on information on the equity share held by 
foreign partners provided by firm-level data. According Chinese EJV law, a joint 
venture is a firm that the foreign partner's investment ratio is generally not less than 
25 percent of the registered total capital. Therefore, we define foreign greenfield or 
acquisition as follows:  
 
¾ Foreign greenfield investment happens if a new established firm starts4 with 
more than 25 percent foreign equity share. 
 
¾ Acquisition occurs if foreign equity share increases from less than 25 percent in 
one year to more than 25 percent in the next.     
 
4.1 Overall trend of foreign greenfield and acquisition investment in China from 
2000 to 2005 
According to the regional economic classification in China, the country is 
divided into eastern, central and western regions.5 In the eastern region, there are 
coastal provinces which have more developed economies. From the central region 
towards the western region, there are poorer provinces, which are further away from 
the ports and less developed. Figure 4-1 presents the overall trend of foreign 
greenfield and acquisition investment in China across coastal (eastern), central and 
                                                             
4
 Newly established firms are firms that have more than 25% foreign equity share at the time of the opening year. 
There is a possibility of measurement error if acquired-firm's name is changed after foreign acquisition. In this 
case, a foreign acquired firm is treated as a greenfield firms.  
5
 Classification is from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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western regions in 2001, 2003, and 2005. First, we observe an increase in both modes 
of foreign investments over time. From 2003 to 2005, we find a drastic increase in 
foreign greenfield and acquisition investments. Particularly in the case of foreign 
acquisition, acquisition FDI entries rose from about 1700 to over 4000. In fact, China 
has had an increase in FDI inflows since 1980s. However, because most firms in 
China are state-owned and not available for foreign acquisitions and there was no 
regulatory provision for foreign acquisition, 90 percent of it was greenfield 
investment in the 1980s and 1990s. Since privatisation in 1990s and the Chinese 
accession in WTO in December 2001, acquisition targets have become available, as 
major enterprises have been divested by the state and China's WTO commitments to a 
phased opening up. The boom in the domestic private sector since the late 1990s also 
contributes to an increase in acquisition targets. Therefore, the sharp increase of 
foreign capital inflow during the period can be explained by the higher stock of 
potential targets and regulation provision.   
Then we find that greenfield FDI entries are dominated by acquisition FDI 
entries in our sample period. As we explained above, since regulation restrictions 
were removed, the private sector has been growing and state-owned enterprises have 
been privatising; acquisition replaced greenfield FDI as the most popular investment 
form of FDI in China in the 2000s.   
Thirdly, we find there is a significant geographic dimension in foreign 
investment in China. Figure 4-1 shows over 80 percent of foreign investment, 
regardless of the investment mode, took place in coastal regions. Little FDI occurred 
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in western regions. Indeed, coastal regions, especially in Guangdong and Shanghai, 
were the location of China's first special economic zones (SEZs). Leaving aside their 
proximity to large ports, their attractiveness as FDI destinations was mainly due to 
preferential policy, relatively stronger economic development and lighter bureaucracy 
compared to other provinces. 
Furthermore, we observe a change in the composition of regional FDI inflows in 
our sample period. The increase in both greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI inflows is 
disproportionate toward eastern regions. The faster expansion of acquisition FDI 
inflows in eastern regions may imply that agglomeration economies in coastal regions 
have yet to reach their limit and agglomeration diseconomies have yet to emerge 
during our sample period. In theory, it is believed that firms will look for locations in 
contiguous regions where product and labour competition are lower once the 
competition effects surpass agglomeration economies in eastern regions. Figure 4-1 
may imply that this progressive process has yet to appear. It also shows that China's 
FDI policy adjustment to guide FDI into China's western interior regions has not been 
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Figure 4-1: Overall Trend of Greenfield and Acquisition FDI 6in China across three regions 
 
Table 4-1 shows the distribution of greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI at 
provincial level. We first observe there is also a clear skewed regional distribution in 
the data. Columns 2 and 4 show the total number of greenfield and acquisition FDI 
entries respectively. As shown in Table 4-1, although both greenfield and acquisition 
foreign investments appear to occur in almost all regions except Zero greenfield in 
Qinghai and Tibet, they are concentrated in more developed coastal provinces such as 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Shanghai.  
Furthermore, there are some differences between the two modes of foreign 
investment in terms of their distribution across provinces. For example, greenfield 
FDI numbers in Shanghai and Guangdong provinces account for 18% of the total 
                                                             
6
 Acquisition FDI is shown as Brown FDI in the figure. 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 4 
179 
 
greenfield investment. However, foreign acquisition FDI in these two provinces 
contributes up to about 50 percent of the total acquisition FDI cases. Two provinces 
that have mostly greenfield firms are Shandong and Zhejiang. They have about 30 
percent of the total greenfield FDI inflows in our sample period. So in general, 
greenfield FDI projects are more evenly distributed across provinces compared to 
acquisition.   
In column 3 and 5 of Table 4-1, we also consider whether these simply represent 
the geographical spread of industrial activity in China by presenting the number of 
foreign greenfield and acquired firms as a percentage of the number of firm-year 
observations in a region. We find that the average concentration of greenfield foreign 
firms across all provinces in 0.37 percent of the firm year observations. The greatest 
concentration of greenfield foreign firms is located in the Fujian province, which is 
about 1 percent, and the Shandong province, which is 0.9 percent. These two 
provinces are economically developed regions and have a high stock of firms. The 
difference of concentration rates across other provinces is less significant. There are 
about 15 out of 31 provinces with a concentration rate above average. Therefore, the 
distribution of the concentration rates is not extremely skewed. In contrast, the 
average concentration rate of foreign acquisition is 2.73 percent of the firm-year 
observations and there are only 4 out of 31 provinces with rates above average. 
Therefore, the distribution of foreign acquisition entries is highly skewed toward a 
few coastal provinces. Also different from greenfield FDI, the greatest cluster of 
foreign acquisitions is in Shanghai, which has a remarkable 13.5 percent and 
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Guangdong 6.22 percent. So far, two important messages have been found from Table 
4-1. Firstly, coastal regions are more attractive to foreign firms. Secondly, the benefit 
of being in coastal regions is affecting acquisition FDI more.  
To verify the second finding, we carry out our analysis into column 6 and 
column 7. Column 6 of Table 4-1 is the ratio between the number of greenfield FDI 
and acquisition FDI in a province. It implies how attractive a province is to foreign 
greenfield firms relative to foreign acquired firms in China. Ratios are sorted in 
descending order according to the ratio. Column 7 is the regional classification of 
provinces where 1 denotes the eastern coastal region, 2 denotes the central region and 
3 denotes the western mountainous region. Interestingly, we find that the many coastal 
provinces labelled region 1 are ranked in the bottom half of the table. Shanghai and 
Guangdong, which are arguably the most developed provinces and the most favoured 
FDI destinations in China, are placed at the bottom of the table. Their ratios are only 
higher than those in Tibet and Qinghai provinces, which have zero greenfield foreign 
firms established in our sample period.  
In general, the ranking confirm that the benefit of locating in coastal regions is 
affecting acquisition FDI more than greenfield FDI. In other words, the pattern may 
imply that the agglomeration has less of an effect on attracting greenfield FDI than 
acquisition FDI. In fact, although agglomeration rents attract both greenfield foreign 
firms and acquisition FDI to eastern provinces, the competition effect may push some 
greenfield investments away from highly congested coastal regions as greenfield FDI 
face more labour and market competition than acquisition projects. Also, acquisition 
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FDI benefits more from the procurement opportunity effect in developed coastal 
regions. Therefore, the net effect of agglomeration is smaller on foreign greenfield 
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Table 4-1: Foreign Greenfield v.s. Acquired Affiliates by Provinces  
Province Green Inten. Of Green7 Acq Inten. Of Acq8 Green/Acq Region9 
Jiangxi 56 0.65  83 0.97  0.67  2 
Guizhou 13 0.31  20 0.49  0.65  3 
Anhui 47 0.51  82 0.90  0.57  2 
Shandong 370 0.90  771 1.86  0.48  1 
Zhejiang 369 0.63  804 1.37  0.46  1 
Ningxia 3 0.27  7 0.61  0.43  3 
Hebei 73 0.44  176 1.05  0.41  2 
Liaoning 133 0.76  325 1.85  0.41  1 
Heilongjiang 24 0.40  59 0.98  0.41  2 
Shanxi 12 0.15  32 0.41  0.38  3 
Jilin 26 0.44  72 1.21  0.36  2 
Xinjiang 5 0.17  16 0.58  0.31  3 
Hunan 35 0.24  114 0.77  0.31  2 
Hebei 39 0.27  137 0.94  0.28  2 
Chongqing 11 0.23  39 0.83  0.28  3 
Fujian 184 1.10  783 4.63  0.23  1 
Guangxi 23 0.33  99 1.41  0.23  1 
Jiangsu 300 0.51  1337 2.28  0.22  1 
Hainan 5 0.50  24 2.42  0.21  1 
Beijing 47 0.41  227 2.13  0.21  1 
Tianjin 66 0.60  322 2.92  0.20  1 
Sichuan 20 0.17  109 0.91  0.18  3 
Inner Mongolia 5 0.14  28 0.80  
0.18  
3 
Shaanxi 7 0.14  40 0.80  0.18  3 
Gansu 2 0.03  14 0.26  0.14  3 
Yunnan 4 0.01  35 0.90  0.11  3 
Henan 13 0.06  142 0.68  0.09  2 
Guangdong 302 0.56  3323 6.22  0.09  1 
Shanghai 104 0.47  2965 13.50  0.04  1 
Tibet 0 0.00  5 0.79  0.00  3 
Qinghai 0 0.00  4 0.44  0.00  3 
       
Total 2293 0.37  12,204 2.73      
 
 
                                                             
7
 Intensity of Greenfields is the proportion of Greenfields with the total number of firms in a province. 
8
 Intensity of across is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of firms in a province. 
9
 Region difference where 1 refers provinces near to coast, 2 refers provinces in central region, 3 refers provinces in western 
mountainous regions. 
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In Table 4-2, we repeat the same exercise as we have done in Table 4-1 according 
to the broad 2-digit industry in which the greenfield foreign firms and foreign 
acquired firms operate. In general, Table 4-2 shows less industry heterogeneity 
between the two investment modes. Greenfield investment appears across all 2-digit 
industries, except in the manufacture of tobacco, and are evenly distributed 
industry-wise compared to the provincial dimension of the data. The top tow 
significant clusters are the industries of wearing apparel and communication 
equipment. They consist of 19 percent of all foreign greenfield investment. Foreign 
acquisition also takes place across all industry groups. Similar to greenfield FDI, the 
top two industries that have the highest number of foreign acquisitions are also 
industries of wearing apparel and communication equipment. They take up 17 percent 
of all foreign acquired firms in our sample period. We also observe that acquisition is 
distributed more smoothly across industries than regions. In fact, we find the 
distribution of foreign-acquired firms is highly correlated with the distribution of 
foreign greenfield firms across 2-digit industries. As a result, we may expect the 
industry effect on attracting foreign greenfield versus foreign acquisition is less 
significant than the effects of location determinants.      
The last column of Table 4-2 shows the ratio between the numbers of greenfield 
foreign firms in an industry relative to the number of foreign acquired firms in the 
data. It reveals information about the relative attractiveness of 2-digit industries to the 
two modes of FDI entries. Industries are sorted in descending order according to the 
ratio. The higher the ratio, the more attractive an industry is to greenfield FDI relative 
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to acquisition FDI compared to other industries. Generally, we find most industries 
have small difference in their relative attractiveness ratios. 21 out of 32 2-digit 
industries have their ratio in a range from 0.21 to 0.11. The top seven industries 
except electricity are not too different from most of other industries. Their ratio 
narrowly ranges from 0.26 to 0.29. Although, industries at the top seem to be more 
capital intensive industries such as electricity, transport equipments and petroleum, 
their differences are less significant compared to the regional dimension. As a result, 
it again suggests that there is not a clear pattern of the relative attractiveness in terms 
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Table 4-2: Foreign Greenfield v.s. Acquired Affiliates by Industry 
Industry Greenfield Inten. Of Greenfield10 Acq Inten. Of Acq11 Green/Acq 
Electricity, gas and water 46 0.35 126 1.33 0.37  
Process of food 130 0.49 445 1.67 0.29  
Manufacture of transport 
equipments and products 
131 0.72 449 2.45 0.29  
Manufacture of wood  58 0.63 201 2.19 0.29  
Manufacture of coke & refined 
petroleum 
9 0.28 32 1 0.28  
Manufacture of non-ferrous metals 36 0.46 128 1.65 0.28  
Manufacture of basic metals 21 0.2 81 0.78 0.26  
Manufacture of communications 
equipment, computer  
187 1.4 882 6.63 0.21  
Manufacture of wearing apparel 259 1.22 1242 5.9 0.21  
Manufacture of textiles 176 0.49 858 2.41 0.21  
Manufacture of food 64 0.62 318 3.09 0.20  
Manufacture of rubber products 32 0.69 160 3.43 0.20  
Manufacture of general purpose 
machinery & equipment 
115 0.39 605 2.03 0.19  
Manufacture of man-made fibres 14 0.61 74 3.23 0.19  
Manufacture of medical optical 
instruments  
43 0.8 234 4.36 0.18  
Manufacture of chemicals & 
products 
126 0.42 687 2.27 0.18  
Tanning & dressing of leather 94 0.94 513 5.15 0.18  
Manufacture of other non metallic 
mineral 





                                                             
10
 Intensity of Greenfields is the proportion of Greenfields with the total number of firms in an industry. 
11
 Intensity of across is the proportion of acquisitions with the total number of firms in an industry. 
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Manufacture of special purpose machinery  69 0.39 415 2.38 0.17  
Manufacture of furniture 34 0.71 212 4.44 0.16  
Manufacture of electrical machinery 124 0.53 786 3.36 0.16  
Manufacture of other metals 117 0.48 747 3.03 0.16  
Manufacture of pulp paper 37 0.3 240 1.98 0.15  
Manufacture of beverages 28 0.4 182 2.58 0.15  
Mining and Quarrying  10 0.05 70 0.34 0.14  
Manufacture of crafts 59 0.58 424 4.19 0.14  
Manufacture of pharmaceutical goods 30 0.39 231 3.03 0.13  
Manufacture of plastic products 98 0.51 763 3.96 0.13  
Manufacture of sports goods, musical 
instruments, game, toy and stat 
38 0.72 357 6.72 0.11  
Publishing &printing 11 0.13 184 2.25 0.06  
Manufacture of tobacco products 0 0 0 0 0 
Recycling  0 0 16 0.44 0 
      
Total 2,293 0.51 12,204 2.72  
 
4.2 Descriptive analysis of variables  
The description of the benchmark variables including expected sign, sources, 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4-3. The number of greenfield 
foreign firms and foreign acquired firms are dependent variables in our regression 
analysis. As we find that the standard deviations of two variables are much larger than 
their means, we believe that there is an over-dispersion in the count data. Therefore, a 
negative binomial model is preferred over the Poisson model in our count data 
analysis. The other variables are explanatory variables that are in logs and lagged by 
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one period. In our analysis, we also create an interaction term, which is the 
combination of the industry financial dependence dummies and the provincial 
financial development. Considering the potential endogeneity issue, for example 
possible reverse causality between foreign investment and financial market conditions, 
we lag independent variables one year to reduce the possible reverse causality. 
Furthermore, bureaucracy and financial market, particularly in China, are not likely to 
vary much across time. Most variations come from regional differences. Thus it is 
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Table 4-3 Definition of Variables 





 Number of foreign 
Greenfield firms 







 Number of foreign 
acquired firms 














Number of firms Agg_firmi,s,t 
+/- 
Log of the average 
number of firms per 
squared kilo meter 








Log of number of 
manufacturing foreign 
plants within the 
province 




Wage variation Wage_CVi,s,t 
- 
Log of coefficient of 
variation of wage 






Log of hours to deal with 
government officials 
index 








Log of non-state bank 
deposits and loans to the 
total index 






Hfd כ FinDi,s,tെ1 Log of High Dependence 
on external finance 
(Dummy)* Financial 
development index 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)& The NERI 
Index of Marketisation 
of China's Province 
  
      
 
In order to get a first glimpse of the relationship between the explanatory 
variables on the one side and two investment modes on the other side, we investigate 
the correlation matrix between the variables in which we are interested. Table 4-4 
shows the correlation between the two investment modes and independent variables at 
year-sector-province level. A higher market demand indeed positively correlates with 
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the number of greenfield foreign firms and foreign acquired plants. The stock of firms 
is also positively correlated with two modes of investment. It may indicate that 
agglomeration rent is positive, as the congestion-like competition effect has not 
passed agglomeration economies. We also find that the numbers of greenfield and 
acquisition FDI entries are highly positively related to the concentration of foreign 
incumbents, provincial bureaucracy and financial development as we expected. The 
size of correlation with the two modes of FDI is different, especially in the 
concentration of firms, the cluster of foreign firms and bureaucracy. The variation of 
wages of an industry in a province seems to have a very small effect on attracting both 
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Table 4-4: Correlation between Investment Modes in Each Sector, Region and Year and the 
Independent Variables.  
 Greenfields Acquisitions 
Greenfields 1  
Acquisitions  1 
Demand-side agglomeration 0.551 0.558 
Number of firms 0.426 0.528 
Stock of foreign plants 0.447 0.576 
Wage variation 0.086 0.027 
Bureaucracy 0.206 0.409 
Financial development 0.384 0.386 
 
In order to illustrate a graphical overview of the correlations, we plot correlations 
for some important variables with the two modes of foreign investments from Figure 
4-2 to Figure 4-5. In Figure 4-2, the vertical axis presents the number of firms and 
horizontal axis stands for the demand-side agglomeration which is measured by the 
log of output level. Each point illustrates the corresponding output level of the 
average number of newly established greenfield firms in a province over our sample 
period. We find the correlation is positive. Figure 4-3 also shows a positive 
relationship between number of acquisition FDI and provincial demand-side 
agglomeration. Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 demonstrate relationships between the two 
modes of foreign investment and the number of incumbents respectively. We also find 
a clear positive relationship in both figures. To quantify and compare these 
relationships, we carry out our econometric analysis on the location determinants of 
greenfield and acquisition foreign firms in the section of empirical results.  
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Figure 4-2: Correlation of the Demand-side Agglomeration with number of Greenfield. (Mean 2000 to 2005) 
 
Figure 4.3: Correlation of the Demand-side Agglomeration with Number of Acquisition FDI (Mean 2000 to 
2005) 
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Figure 4-4: Correlation of Number of Incumbents with Number of Greenfield FDI. (Mean 2000 to 2005) 
 
Figure 4-5: Correlation of number of Incumbents with number of Acquisition FDI. (Mean 2000 to 2005) 
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4.3 Overall trend of financial market development and bureaucracy 
Apart from the variables constructed from our firm-level dataset, the bureaucracy 
and financial market development index from the NERI index of Marketisation of 
China's province (2009) are also employed in our investigation. As we are particularly 
interested in the effect of financial market developments on the location attractiveness 
of foreign investment inflows, we present the overall trend of financial market 
development of all provinces in Figure 4-6.   
Figure 4-6 shows how much the financial market development varies between 
regions and across time. We have compared the variations between 2000 and 2005. 
First, how far the province is from the origin at x-axis and y-axis indicates how good 
the province financial market was in years 2000 and 2005 respectively. We find that 
coastal regions have more greenfield and acquisition FDI entries also have more 
developed financial markets such as Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang. Secondly, we 
find that more regions are above the 45-degree line, which indicates that 
discrimination faced by non-state-owned enterprises from local financial institutions 
became lower in most regions. Thirdly, the further away from the 45 degree line, the 
more it implies that there has been greater change in the financial market during five 
years. We observe that financial markets in the coastal regions such as Guangdong, 
Shanghai, and Zhejiang have made faster improvements than other regions. Therefore, 
although, the financial market is opening up in all provinces in China, coastal regions 
that start with better financial markets also have a faster development speed. 




Figure 4-6 Provincial Financial Market Development 
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5 Regression results 
In this section, firstly, we discuss how location determinants have had effects on 
attracting greenfield and acquisition FDI separately. Secondly, we investigate whether 
location characteristics have different effects on greenfield FDI versus acquisition 
FDI. Thirdly, we specifically discuss whether provincial financial development has 
different effects on greenfield FDI compared to acquisition FDI according to their 
different reliance on external finance. In addition to the benchmark regression 
specifications used in each of three subsections, we also check our benchmark results 
by assuming that agglomeration effects within a province do not only come from the 
province itself but also depend on its relative position to other provinces.  
 
5.1 Location determinants of greenfield FDI 
5.1.1 Benchmark empirical results 
Table 4-5 reports results showing how location determinants have effects on attracting 
greenfield FDI inflows. Firstly, in the Model (1), we tested effects of three 
location-sector level agglomeration determinants as well as wage variation, 
bureaucracy and financial development with a full set of year, industry and region 
dummies. We introduce year, industry, and province dummies to control for 
unobserved time-, industrial and provincial level specific factors such as FDI 
preferential policies that may affect both the number of greenfield foreign entries and 
correlate with the independent variables.  
The negative binomial random effect estimated coefficient of demand-side 
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agglomeration is positive and significant at the 99 percent level. It indicates that 
foreign greenfield firms are concentrated in provinces where the output of the 
respective industries is highest. Intuitively, foreign greenfield firms, similar to all 
firms, tend to select sites where they believe there is a potential to generate the 
greatest profits. According to Krugman (1991), higher expected profits are strongly 
associated with market access. Therefore, the positive and significant coefficient is 
consistent with our hypothesis. However, the size of the effect is negligible. The 
elasticity of the demand-side agglomeration (output) is at 0.0765 percent. It can be 
interpreted as a one percent extra increase in the output level of an industry within a 
province is related with a 0.0765 percent increase in the expected number of foreign 
greenfield firms. The average marginal effect (AME) equals Ⱦ෠yത, where yത  is the 
mean of the number of foreign greenfield firms in a sector within a province. So on 
average, one percent more output level of an industry within a province induces a 
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Table 4-5: Foreign Greenfield Investments' Location Determinants in China 
 Dependent variable: the number of greenfield FDI entries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Count model: Negative binomial 
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.0765*  0.0692*** 0.0728*** 0.0752*** 
(1.75)  (1.95) (2.08) (2.37) 
      
Number of firms -0.436*** -0.582***  -0.615*** -0.585*** 
(-2.79) (-3.43)  (-3.52) (-3.47) 
      
Stock of foreign 
Plants 
0.634*** 0.666*** 0.679***  0.658*** 
(28.73) (17.03) (19.22)  (17.28) 
      
Wage variation -0.0497*** -0.0751*** -0.0746*** -0.0334*** -0.0752*** 
(-2.65) (-2.18) (-4.99) (-4.96) (-4.35) 
      
Bureaucracy -0.117*** -0.199*** -0.270*** -0.231***  
(-3.00) (-5.97) (-8.71) (-7.79)  
      
Financial 
Development 
0.140 0.139* 0.1801 0.181  
(1.06) (1.81) (1.09) (1.44)  
      
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Cons 3.988 -8.110*** -5.728*** -5.481* -8.109*** 
 (0.50) (-12.36) (-5.66) (-1.98) (-13.28) 
ln_r      
Cons 9.805 2.748*** 3.974*** 5.535* 2.561*** 
 (1.24) (8.39) (5.41) (2.22) (9.55) 
ln_s      
Cons 2.414*** 0.463*** 0.868*** 1.390*** 0.461*** 
 (11.01) (3.56) (6.26) (7.42) (3.55) 
N 2590 2543 2543 2543 2590 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of greenfield plants invested by foreign investors in 
each province and in each sector at a certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial 
model with random effects. t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The 
ln_r and ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed 
to follow a Beta (r,s) distribution. 
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The second agglomeration measure is the number of firms in an industry within a 
province scaled by the area of the province. We find the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant. It illustrates that the higher the number of existing firms in the 
same industry within a province, the greater the reduction in greenfield FDI plants in 
the province. As we have already point out, from the agglomeration economies aspect, 
we should expect a positive sign for the coefficient as a cluster of firms generating 
economies of scale and network externalities. For example, a large number of firms in 
the same industry may reduce the costs of production because of greater specialisation 
and division of labour. Furthermore, according to cumulative causation theory, this 
cluster may also attract more suppliers and customers into the region. However, there 
is also an opposite force from a high concentration of firms. From the congestion-like 
competition point of view, the greater the number of firms of an industry located in a 
province, the higher the congestion-like competition exists in the product and labour 
market. It may divert greenfield FDI inflows in other locations. The coefficient is 
about -0.436 percent, indicating the one percent increase in the number of firms of an 
industry in a province results in 0.436 percent reduction in the expected number of 
greenfield foreign entries. The marginal effect can be explained as a one percent 
increase in the number of firms preventing 0.02151 firms to locate in the province. 
Consequently, it is evident that attraction forces are dominated by centrifugal forces 
due to the competition effect.  
The third independent variable is also an agglomeration measure. It is measured 
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by the stock of foreign plans. We observe that the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. It implies that the more foreign plans are operating in the 
province, the more attractive the location is to greenfield foreign entries. Our result is 
consistent with the 'follow-the-leader' pattern of foreign investment. As we have 
discussed, the existence of similar foreign firms in the host location provides pivotal 
signals to foreign investors who face difficulties in observing the benefits and costs of 
locating to the province. We also find the size of the effect is considerable. Greenfield 
foreign investments generally carry high uncertainty. Thus, they may rely highly on 
signals from foreign incumbents. The elasticity of the stock of foreign plants is about 
0.634 percent, indicating that one more percent increase of the foreign firms of the 
same industry in a province encourages an additional 0.03052 foreign greenfield 
plants in the province on average.  
Furthermore, in Model (1), the fourth explanatory variable is the sector-province 
level coefficient of variation of wage. Its coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, showing that the higher the variation of labour cost of an industry in a 
province, the less appealing the province is to greenfield foreign entry. The result is 
consistent with our expectation as we assume a higher wage variation of an industry 
indicates a less competitive and imperfect labour market of an industry within a 
region. By assuming China offers abundant labour supply, a less competitive labour 
supply leads to a possible higher labour cost of the industry in a host location, which 
discourages FDI entry. One important note we need to make here is that our 
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 It is calculated as 0.634%*4.81=0.030 
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province-sector level wage is aggregated from the firm level wage. We do not have 
any information about the skill or quality of the labour. Therefore, although the 
variation may indicate the competitiveness of labour supply to some extent, we cannot 
isolate variation of wage that is caused by the difference of labour skills in an 
industry.       
The next two independent variables in column (1) are year-province level 
government efficiency and financial development. the coefficient of bureaucracy is 
negative and significant as we expect. It implies less greenfield investment tends to 
locate in a province which is highly bureaucratic. The size of the effect of bureaucracy 
is small compared to agglomeration factors except demand-side agglomeration. The 
elasticity of bureaucracy is about -0.20 percent. 
It is worth noting that the coefficient on financial development is positive and 
insignificant. It is an interesting result because we expect a more developed financial 
market to be more appealing to all investments as well as foreign greenfield 
investments. One explanation of the insignificant relationship may be grounded on the 
nature of the greenfield firm. Rather than acquisition, greenfield FDI investment may 
rely less on external finance from the host location because the investment is directly 
financed by the capital from overseas' investing headquarters. 
From Model (3) to Model (5), we carry out robustness analysis to test the 
robustness of the sign and significant of the estimated coefficient on the key 
independent variables to the inclusion or exclusion of evidently, co-linear independent 
variables. Having found agglomeration connected variables, bureaucracy, and 
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financial development is evidently correlated with the number of greenfield foreign 
plants, we exclude demand-side agglomeration in column (2), number of firms in 
column (3), stock of foreign plants in column (4), and both bureaucracy and financial 
development in column (5).  
In Model (2), after the exclusion of the demand-side agglomeration, we observe 
that most coefficients vary little in size, sign and significance compared to the results 
in the baseline model. In Model (3) and (4), we drop number of firms and stock of 
foreign plants from our benchmark regression respectively. We find neither change the 
sign, or significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables compared to 
Model (1). The change of the magnitude of effects of location determinants is also 
very limited. Considering government efficiency and financial development is 
possibly correlated with three agglomeration variables, we exclude both variables in 
the Model (5). All coefficients of agglomeration variables remain statistically 
significant. The change in the size of the effect is relatively small.  
To summarize, Table 4-5 shows our benchmark analysis on the location 
determinants of greenfield investment. With inclusion of time-, industry-, and 
province-dummies, Model (1) presents the most general results based on our 
benchmark specification. In general, we find that a province with a larger market, less 
concentrated firms but more established foreign forerunners, and a less bureaucratic 
government is more attractive to foreign greenfield investments.     
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5.1.2 Empirical results with consideration of geographic proximity 
So far, our analysis has been based on the assumption that agglomeration effects 
only come from the province itself. However, as we have discussed, the 
agglomeration is much wider as it is also affected by linkages between other regions. 
Inspired by a precursor framework by Harris (1954)'s market-potential function, we 
add a gravity-adjusted specification into the agglomeration-connected variables, 
namely, demand-side agglomeration, number of firms and stock of foreign plants. 
Then we verify whether our results change under a more general assumption.  
Table 4-6 shows how location characteristics have affected the attraction of 
foreign greenfield firms with consideration of the province's relative position to other 
provinces. In model (1), we examine three agglomeration-connected variables along 
with other regional characteristics. Compared with the results in Table 4-5, we find all 
signs and significances remain the same except demand-side agglomeration. Results 
indicate that provinces that have fewer firms of an industry, more foreign incumbents 
and more efficient governments are more attractive in the eyes of the greenfield 
investors. The wage variation and financial development remain irrelevant to the 
number of greenfield foreign entries. The only difference comes from the coefficient 
of the demand-side agglomeration. Its effect becomes insignificant when geographic 
proximity is taken into account. This may be explained by markets in proximity 
attracting greenfield FDI. Nevertheless, the size of the demand-side agglomeration 
effect is tiny at 0.077 percent in our benchmark results. Therefore, in general, our 
result is robust even if we expand our agglomeration specifications by considering the 
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location's proximity to all other provinces.  
From model (2) to model (5), we include or exclude evidently, co-linear 
variables to test whether the sign and significance of the estimated coefficient on the 
agglomeration variables are robust. Compared with our benchmark results in model 
(1),  we do not observe any alter of the sign and significant levels on the key 
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Table 4-6: Foreign Greenfield Investments' Location Determinants in China with 
Consideration on Proximity 
 Dependent variable: the number of foreign greenfield entries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Count model: Negative binomial with proximity 
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.0389  0.0525 0.0578 0.0544 
(0.90)  (0.54) (0.13) (0.27) 
      
Number of firms -0.154** -0.385***  -0.408*** -0.345*** 
(1.96) (-6.62)  (-6.86) (-5.79) 
      
Stock of foreign Plants 0.809*** 0.554*** 0.602***  0.599*** 
(18.39) (12.56) (15.17)  (13.09) 
      
Wage variation 0.133 -0.0854 -0.295*** 0.0558 -0.173* 
(1.62) (-0.90) (-3.54) (0.64) (-1.81) 
      
Bureaucracy -0.107*** -0.132*** -0.230*** -0.182***  
(-2.45) (-3.52) (-6.85) (-5.67)  
      
Financial Development -0.0580 0.751*** 0.440*** 0.507***  
(-0.19) (9.28) (5.82) (6.40)  
      
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Cons 1.753 -5.737*** -4.805*** -5.223*** -6.278*** 
 (0.61) (-9.62) (-6.38) (-4.27) (-10.79) 
ln_r      
Cons 5.436** 2.068*** 3.260*** 4.105*** 1.818*** 
 (2.04) (8.16) (6.81) (4.37) (8.44) 
ln_s      
Cons 1.113*** -0.0525 0.445*** 0.820*** -0.120 
 (7.45) (-0.46) (3.87) (5.51) (-1.02) 
N 3398 3398 3398 3398 3398 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of greenfield foreign investors in each province and in each sector at a 
certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial model with random effects. t statistics are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ln_r and ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the 
dispersion is assumed to follow a Beta (r,s) distribution. 
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5.2 Location determinants of acquisition FDI 
5.2.1 Benchmark empirical results 
Similar to our analysis in the case of greenfield FDI, we regress the 
year-sector-province level variables that are connected with agglomeration and other 
regional characteristics in the Model (1). To control for unobserved time, industry and 
province variations that may affect the location attractiveness to acquisition FDI 
inflows, we include year, sector and province dummies. After presenting our 
benchmark analysis, then we exclude or include evidently, co-linear right-hand side 
variables to check the robustness of the sign and significance of the estimated 
coefficient on the agglomeration connected variables. According to the correlation 
matrix in Table 4-4, we exclude demand-side agglomeration in column (2), number of 
firms in column (3), stock of foreign plants in column (4), and bureaucracy and 
financial development in column (5). In general, the results show limited changes in 
the size, sign and significance of the estimated effect of the agglomeration connected 
variables.  
Our benchmark is presented in Table 4-7. In general, we find that signs and 
significant of most variables are consistent with our expectations. First of all, 
demand-side agglomeration has a positive and significant effect in attracting 
acquisition FDI inflows in all five models except model (2) in which demand-side 
agglomeration variable is excluded. However, we observe the size of the effect is 
relative small compared with the other two agglomeration variables.  
Then we find that coefficients of number of firms are positive and significant in 
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the benchmark analysis, indicating that the number of firms has a positive effect on 
attracting acquisition FDI when we control for all specific effects. Admittedly, firms 
operation in the market with a relative large number of incumbents face strong 
congestion-like competition in product and labour markets. However, the cluster of 
incumbents may also act in an attraction role to acquisition FDI inflows as it provides 
more suppliers and customers into the region. More importantly, in the case of foreign 
acquisition, the number of firms may be interpreted as proxying procurement 
opportunities. The greater the number of firms operating, the supply of potential 
acquisition targets is higher. Although it is hard to disentangle all these effects, the 
opposite effect may give us a clue as to which force is more important. A positive 
coefficient in the Model (1) shows the attraction force surpasses the centrifugal force. 
Compared with the negative result in the case of greenfield FDI, it implies the 
procurement opportunities play an important role in alluring more acquisition FDI 
into the region. Our result is consistent with that of Roberto (2004) and with many 
other studies which conclude the number of manufacturing incumbents has a positive 
influence on FDI inflows. It also explains why we observe a drastic increase in 
acquisition FDI as more targets are available after 2000.      
Thirdly, it shows that a positive and significant coefficient on foreign stock is 
robust across all models, indicating that more foreign incumbents of the same industry 
in a province could encourage more acquisition FDI entries into the province. It is in 
line with Roberto (2004) who describes the FDI stock as an important signal of how 
'friendly' to foreign investors a location is when have limited information about the 
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host location. In Model (1), the coefficient of the stock of foreign plants is high at 68 
percent even taking into account year, sector and province specific effects. The 
marginal effect implies that one percent of the number of foreign firms of an industry 
in the region stimulates additional 0.2953 foreign acquired plants in the province. We 
also find a consistent negative and significant coefficient of wage variation across five 
models, revealing that higher wage variation in the province may divert some 
acquisition FDI entries away to other locations. 
Fourthly, one striking result we find is that the coefficient of bureaucracy is 
negative and insignificant in all models54 . It implies that a more bureaucratic 
government will have no effect on attracting acquisition FDI. It is surprising that we 
do not find a significant negative relationship, but an insignificant relationship may 
reinforce one advantage of acquisition for foreign investors. Considering our 
bureaucratic data is generated from the hours that managers spend on keeping a 
relationship with government officials, managers of acquired establishment may have 
already built good communications with local government. Acquisition investment 
takes over assets as well as employees. Therefore, employees taken from acquired 
establishment help foreign investor in keeping a good relationship with local 
government. The bureaucracy becomes less important to acquisition investors.            
Finally, we find positive coefficients of financial development in all models. This 
provides robust evidence showing that financial development has a positive effect in 
attracting greater acquisition foreign investments. The results is consistent with the 
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 It is calculated as 0.68%*43=0.29 
54
 As we have discussed in the Chapter 2, literature has shown that an improvement in institution has positive an 
impact on foreign acquisition.  
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descriptive analysis that financial market are better and have improved faster in 
coaster regions in which experience more acquisition FDI entries. In addition, we 
have not yet considered industry characteristics with respect to financial market 
development. It is interesting to understand whether that foreign capital acts as a more 
important substitution role to replace local financial institutions in industries, which 
are highly dependent on external finance. We will tackle this argument in later 
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Table 4-7: Foreign Acquisitions' Location Determinants in China 
 Dependent variable: the number of foreign acquisition entries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Count model: Negative binomial 
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.0465***  0.0657*** 0.0762*** 0.0659*** 
(2.35)  (3.03) (3.41) (3.79) 
      
Number of firms 0.224*** 0.255***  0.345*** 0.264*** 
(9.72) (9.25)  (12.65) (9.51) 
      
Stock of foreign Plants 0.681*** 0.547*** 0.547***  0.578*** 
(40.61) (26.54) (27.23)  (28.82) 
      
Wage variation -0.150*** -0.676*** -0.703*** -0.400*** -0.714*** 
(-4.33) (-13.35) (-14.42) (-8.40) (-14.19) 
      
Bureaucracy -0.0148 -0.0108 0.0147 0.0113  
(-0.66) (-0.41) (-0.59) (-0.59)  
      
Financial Development 0.259*** 0.182*** 0.218*** 0.207***  
(2.09) (4.52) (5.53) (5.43)  
      
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Cons 1.511 -5.210*** -5.228*** -7.090*** -5.559*** 
 (1.22) (-12.52) (-9.03) (-11.77) (-15.19) 
ln_r      
Cons 6.005*** 3.130*** 3.720*** 4.074*** 2.905*** 
 (5.37) (10.66) (7.65) (8.80) (12.46) 
ln_s      
Cons 2.652*** 0.991*** 1.022*** 1.466*** 0.995*** 
 (23.92) (14.28) (15.31) (19.87) (14.25) 
N 2590 2543 2543 2543 2590 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of firms acquired by foreign investors in each 
province and in each sector at a certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial model 
with random effects. t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ln_r and 
ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed to follow 
a Beta (r,s) distribution. 
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5.2.2 Empirical results with consideration of geographic proximity 
As we have explained, agglomeration effects do not only come from the 
province itself, they are widely linked with its relative position to other regions. Then 
in Table 4-8, we regress gravity-adjusted agglomeration specifications to check 
whether our findings in the benchmark analysis held. Similar to previous discussions, 
we first add all agglomeration connected variables, wage variation, government 
bureaucracy and financial market development in the Model (1). With control for time, 
industry and regional fixed effects, Model (1) shows our benchmark results. Since 
agglomeration variables, bureaucracy and financial development are evidently 
co-related with foreign acquisition, we include or exclude co-linear right-hand side 
variables to check the robustness of the sign and significance of the estimated 
coefficient on agglomeration variables. We exclude demand-side agglomeration in the 
column (2), number of firms in column (3), stock of foreign plants in column (4) and 
finally bureaucracy and financial development in column (5). In general, we find sign 
and significance remains the same in our robustness checks. Our discussion below is 
based on the results of the benchmark model in column (1).  
In line with the benchmark results, we find that number of firms of an industry 
has a positive effect in attracting more acquisition FDI projects into the region, 
implying effects of procurement opportunities and agglomeration positive 
externalities surpass effects of congestion-like competition. We also confirm that 
foreign acquisitions tend to locate to where there are more foreign incumbents, giving 
a hint that predecessors are important to foreign acquirers who have limited 
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information about the host location. Furthermore, the insignificant effect of 
government efficiency and the positive effect of financial market development are 
also robust with new specifications. One important change compared to the 
benchmark result is that the effect of demand-side agglomeration becomes 
insignificant. However, the coefficient in our benchmark specification is significant 
but negligible in size anyway. Therefore, in general, we observe that our results on a 
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Table 4-8: Foreign Acquisitions' Location Determinants in China with Consideration of 
Geographic Proximity  
 Dependent variable: the number of foreign acquisition entries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Count model: Negative binomial 
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.0000371  0.0000343 0.0000362 0.0000368 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Number of firms 0.295*** 0.252***  0.202*** 0.213*** 
(11.10) (11.08)  (11.98) (13.58) 
      
Stock of foreign Plants 0.576*** 0.537*** 0.539***  0.584*** 
(30.28) (24.23) (24.30)  (25.00) 
      
Wage variation 0.00478 0.00283 0.00282 0.00416 0.00325 
(0.13) (0.61) (0.58) (0.81) (0.23) 
      
Bureaucracy 0.000883 0.0688** 0.0792*** 0.112***  
(0.03) (3.16) (3.56) (5.25)  
      
Financial Development 0.279** 0.533*** 0.512*** 0.477***  
(2.01) (13.31) (12.40) (11.38)  
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Cons -5.101*** -5.064*** -5.014*** -6.563*** -5.622*** 
 (-0.28) (-15.28) (-15.05) (-15.46) (-17.95) 
ln_r      
Cons 3.491*** 2.519*** 2.522*** 3.079*** 2.180*** 
 (31.80) (14.19) (14.24) (11.45) (15.78) 
ln_s      
Cons 2.368*** 0.839*** 0.844*** 1.058*** 0.755*** 
 (22.63) (12.36) (12.44) (14.65) (11.08) 
N 3398 3398 3398 3398 3465 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of firms acquired by foreign investors in each 
province and in each sector at a certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial model 
with random effects. t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ln_r and 
ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed to follow 
a Beta (r,s) distribution. 
 
 
Hao Wang PhD Thesis Chapter 4 
213 
 
5.3 Comparing effects of location determinants on greenfield FDI versus 
acquisition FDI 
Table 4-5 and Table 4-7 have already shown some obvious different effects of 
location determinants in attracting greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI. We find a 
significant negative coefficient in the number of firms in the case of greenfield foreign 
entries, while we find it has a significant positive effect in the case of acquisition 
foreign investment. The difference may be because of procurement opportunity effect. 
As we explained, apart from agglomeration economies and diseconomies that are 
common to all investments, a large number of incumbents also provide potential 
targets of acquisitions. In the case the procurement opportunities play an important 
role in attracting acquisition FDI, we find the effect of the concentration of firms is 
different in attracting the two modes of foreign investments.  
However, it is not straightforward when trying to demonstrate whether some 
other important agglomeration issue connected determinants have different effects on 
two FDI modes. For example, we find the demand-side agglomeration has a positive 
effect on attracting both greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI. In order to provide a 
direct comparison on how location determinants have different impacts on greenfield 
FDI versus acquisition FDI, we regress the ratio of number of greenfield firms over 
the number of foreign acquired firms of an industry in a province with all explanatory 
variables by using OLS specifications. Results are shown in Table 4-9. Model (1) is 
the baseline model with all right-hand side variables and dummies. From column (2) 
to column (5), we conduct the robustness analysis to check the sign and significance 
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of the estimated coefficient on the agglomeration connected variables to the inclusion 
and exclusion of co-linear right-hand side variables according to the correlation 
matrix in Table 4-4, as we have done in previous analysis. In general, we find almost 
all agglomeration connected variables are statistically significant in all specifications. 
It indicates that regional agglomeration characteristics indeed have different effects on 
attracting greenfield FDI inflows versus acquisition FDI inflows. Our discussions 
below concentrate on the benchmark specification in column (1).               
First, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the demand-side 
agglomeration in Model (1). It confirms that demand-side agglomeration encourages 
not only both modes of foreign investment, but also has a relative stronger impact on 
the location decision of greenfield foreign investment. In fact, one difference between 
greenfield and acquisition investment is that greenfield FDI entries need to earn a 
market share from zero but acquisition FDI has taken over the market share of 
acquired firm. A larger market potential may imply a greater opportunity to penetrate 
into the market for greenfield FDI. As a result, greenfield foreign investors may be 
more reliant on a larger market potential than acquirers.  
Then we find a negative and significant coefficient of the numbers of firms in all 
five models except model (3). It reinforces our results in previous discussions that the 
number of firms has an opposite effect on both greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI. 
As we have explained, greenfield foreign investors see a large number of firms in the 
same industry more like a sign of high-level of competition, while foreign acquirers 
believe that a group of clusters of similar firms provides more potential targets. In 
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addition, it is also relevant that greenfield foreign investors need to compete against 
all existing firms while acquisition can eliminate a competitor in the market. In fact, 
we have suggested that foreign acquisition in China is cherry-picking in the previous 
chapters. It implies foreign investors may acquire one of the biggest competitors in 
the market. Therefore, compared with greenfield investment, acquisition may be less 
affected by competition effects that drive investors away from the location.         
Furthermore, we find a consistent positive and significant coefficient of the stock 
of foreign plants in all models except model (4). It indicates that both modes of 
foreign investors rely on signals from prior foreign investments as they have limited 
knowledge about the cost and benefits of the location choice especially for foreign 
investors. Furthermore, as we expected, the significant positive coefficient indicates 
that greenfield FDI is more reliant on signals than acquisition FDI. The reason for this 
is that greenfield investments need to build a new plant from ground zero. Thus, they 
carry more risk and uncertainty than acquisition investments.  
Apart from three agglomeration-connected determinants, we do not observe any 
significance for the coefficients of wage variation, bureaucracy, and financial market 
development in the Model (1) of Table 4-9. This suggests that the differences in the 
effects of these variables between the two modes of investment are not statistically 
significant. To summarize, our results indicate that demand-side agglomeration, the 
number of firms and number of foreign incumbents play statistically significant 
different roles in the expansion of greenfield foreign investments versus foreign 
acquired plants. We also have a robustness check with consideration of the proximity 
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into agglomeration effects, results are qualitatively the same in Table 4-10.          
 
Table 4-9: The Relative Importance of Location Determinants with respect to Greenfield 
FDI over Acquisition FDI 
 Dependent variable: the ratio of number of greenfield/number of 
acquisition  




0.0122*  0.0211*** 0.0169* 0.0327*** 
(1.79)  (2.79) (1.76) (4.63) 
      
Number of firms -0.0499*** -0.0624***  -0.0579*** -0.0607*** 
(-2.54) (-4.49)  (-3.14) (-4.33) 
      
Stock of foreign Plants 0.0694*** 0.0388*** 0.0385***  0.0334*** 
(5.58) (4.07) (4.12)  (3.36) 
      
Wage variation -0.0353 -0.0624* -0.0434* -0.0248 -0.0567* 
(-1.45) (-2.54) (-1.84) (-0.96) (-2.36) 
      
Bureaucracy -0.00315 -0.0515 -0.0616 -0.0614  
(-0.12) (-0.08) (-0.64) (-0.66)  
      
Financial Development 0.0472 0.0111 -0.0150 -0.0148  
(0.63) (0.63) (-0.89) (-0.96)  
      
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
_cons -0.00551 -0.176* 0.154 0.254* -0.142 
 (-0.03) (-1.77) (1.45) (1.89) (-1.45) 
N 2067 2041 2041 2041 2067 
Note: The dependent variable is ratio of the number of greenfield firms over the number of firms 
acquired by foreign investors in each province and in each sector at a certain year. Model 
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Table 4-10: The Relative Importance of Location Determinants respect to Greenfield FDI 
over Acquisition FDI 
 Dependent variable: the ratio of number of greenfield/number of 
acquisition  




0.0214***  0.0213*** 0.0180*** 0.0115* 
(2.14)  (2.88) (2.34) (1.94) 
      
Number of firms -0.0236* -0.0358***  -0.0342*** -0.0342*** 
(-1.76) (-3.19)  (-2.90) (-3.04) 
      
Stock of foreign Plants 0.0281*** 0.0189* 0.0229***  0.0182* 
(2.97) (2.35) (2.91)  (2.22) 
      
Wage variation -0.0448 -0.0239 -0.0399* -0.0166 -0.0226 
(-1.63) (-1.04) (-1.82) (-0.72) (-1.02) 
      
Bureaucracy 0.00119 -0.0428 -0.0548 -0.0527  
(0.05) (-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.03)  
      
Financial Development 0.0754 0.0371 -0.00898 -0.00658  
(1.10) (0.80) (-0.68) (-0.46)  
      
      
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
_cons -0.318* 0.0637 -0.0704 0.000961 0.0860 
 (-2.01) (0.63) (-0.72) (0.01) (0.86) 
N 2114 2114 2114 2114 2140 
Note: The dependent variable is ratio of the number of greenfield firms over the number of firms 
acquired by foreign investors in each province and in each sector at a certain year. Model 
specification is OLS. t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.4 Whether the dependence on external finance is important for location choice?  
In this section, we examine how financial market development is important in 
the growth of the two modes of FDI in provinces of China. The conventional view is 
that a better financial market helps investments in the region. However, in the case of 
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foreign investment, foreign capital may act as a substitutive finance channel over 
local financial institutions. There has been a large literature focusing on the 
substitution relationship between local financial institutions and foreign capital. Some 
of them have pointed out that this relationship is significant if the local financial 
market is under-developed. In the case of China, for example, Huang (2003) claims 
that the high growth of FDI in China is a sign of the weakness of its financial system 
because local firms are not able to finance from local financial market. Embedding the 
substitution relationship into differences of two foreign investment modes, we expect 
that this relationship is not significant in greenfield FDI, but should have some effects 
on acquisition FDI. The reason is that greenfield projects are financed by foreign 
investors, whereas, acquisition projects take over assets of acquired firm which are 
related to local financial markets. In a previous discussion, we have found evidence in 
Table 4-5 and Table 4-7. However, our discussion has ignored industry characteristics. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how financial markets have effects on 
greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI with a focus on industry financial dependence. 
In our following investigations, we include an interaction term which is formed 
as industry financial dependence dummies multiplied by financial market 
development. Rajan and Zingales (1998) create the underlying 2-digit industry 
financial dependence data. It is measured by the fraction of capital expenditures that 
are not financed by cash flow from operations. The dummy equals 1 if the financial 
dependence of an industry is higher than the median and equals 0 otherwise. Results 
are shown in Table 4-11. Models (1) to (3) of our following discussion are based on 
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our benchmark specifications. Then, we include the relative position of the province 
to other regions into our analysis in models (4) to (6). The number of incumbents and 
the number of foreign firms are evidently co-linear right-hand side variables that 
raises a concern about the potential bias of the co-linearity has on the estimated effect 
of the financial development. Therefore, in each specification, we exclude the number 
of incumbents and the number of foreign firms which .  
Table 4-11 shows results for the case of greenfield foreign investments. 
Consistent with our results in Table 4-5, we do not observe any significant coefficient 
on the financial market development and the interaction term. This shows that 
financial market development does not have a significant impact on location decisions 
of foreign greenfield investors whether or not the new plant will be highly dependent 
on the external finance. Our results confirm that greenfield foreign plants are 
generally financed by capital provided by foreign investors. Location financial 
institutions play a limited role in the expansion of greenfield foreign investments. Our 
results are robust if spatial proximity is considered in models (4) to (6).     
Table 4-12 illustrates results for the determinants of acquisition FDI. We first 
focus on Model (1) that has the most control variables under our benchmark 
specification. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
financial development variable. It shows that as a more developed financial market 
attracts more acquisition FDI in less financial dependent industries. Moreover, a 
negative coefficient of the interaction term may suggest that acquisition FDI in more 
external finance dependent industries are less affected by the positive effect of the 
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financial market development. However, the coefficient in Model (1) on the 
interaction term is not significant.  
In Model (4) which is our most general model, we include geographic proximity 
and all dummy controls into our analysis. We not only find the coefficient of the 
financial market development is positive and significant, but also observe the 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. In addition, 
the sum of two coefficient is positive (0.540+ (-0.0481)). Therefore, it is evident that 
financial market development is positively related to the number of acquisition FDI in 
general, while this relationship is significantly weaker in industries that are more 
dependent on external finances.  
The result is consistent with the substitution role of acquisition FDI. Non- 
state-owned firms in China face discrimination from financial institutions in China. 
Those firms that are heavily dependent on external finance have to sell equity to 
foreign investors to increase their production capacity. Consequently, more available 
acquisition targets attract more acquisition FDI. This effect is opposite to the positive 
correlation between financial market development and number of acquisition foreign 
entries. Consequently, we find a negative coefficient on the interaction term. To 
summarize, our investigation implies that foreign capital is an important substitution 
source of finance for firms that rely on external finance in China, given that non- 
state-owned domestic firms have difficulties to raise finance from local financial 
institutions. 
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Table 4-11: Location Determinant of Greenfield FDI according to Different industrial 
financial dependency 
 Dependent variable: the number of greenfield FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Count model: Benchmark  Count model: Inclusion of 
proximity 
Financial development 0.105 0.161 * -0.0203 0.470*** 0.537*** -0.0119 
(1.40) (1.89) (-0.07) (6.09) (5.87) (-0.04) 
       
F-dependence* 
F-development 
-0.0500 -0.0312 -0.0392 -0.0627* -0.0505 -0.0428 
(-1.57) (-0.47) (-1.61) (-1.76) (-0.67) (-1.57) 
       
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.696*** 0.728*** 0.0849* 0.529*** 0.578*** 0.0462 
(19.99) (20.09) (1.94) (15.61) (16.14) (1.07) 
       
Number of firms -0.552***  -0.139** -0.376***  0.0553 
(-11.99)  (-2.86) (-7.30)  (0.97) 
       
Stock of foreign 
Plants 
0.682*** 0.633***  0.605*** 0.509***  
(19.32) (16.65)  (15.29) (10.64)  
       
Wage variation -0.741*** -0.336*** -0.0424 -0.291*** 0.0581 0.142* 
(-8.94) (-3.98) (-0.56) (-3.49) (0.67) (1.73) 
       
Bureaucracy -0.272*** -0.231*** -0.118*** -0.231*** -0.183*** -0.108* 
(-8.78) (-7.78) (-3.03) (-6.93) (-5.69) (-2.48) 
       
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -5.541*** -5.584* 4.100 -4.670*** -5.179*** 1.933 
 (-4.72) (-2.19) (0.44) (-5.71) (-4.13) (0.51) 
ln_r       
Cons 4.179*** 5.446* 10.06 3.423*** 4.141*** 5.756 
 (4.57) (2.40) (1.10) (6.08) (4.26) (1.60) 
ln_s       
Cons 0.850*** 1.395*** 2.442*** 0.426*** 0.818*** 1.115*** 
 (6.21) (7.43) (10.87) (3.80) (5.52) (7.51) 
N 2543 2543 2543 3398 3398 3398 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of greenfield plants invested by foreign investors in each province and 
in each sector at a certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial model with random effects. t statistics 
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ln_r and ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse 
of one plus the dispersion is assumed to follow a Beta (r,s) distribution. 
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Table 4-12: Location Determinant of Acquisition FDI according to Different Financial 
Dependency 
 Dependent variable: the number of foreign acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Count model: Benchmark  Count model: Inclusion of proximity 
Financial 
development 
0.237*** 0.135*** 0.271* 0.540*** 0.410*** 0.316*** 
(5.77) (3.00) (2.18) (12.47) (8.28) (2.27) 
       
F-dependence* 
F-development 
-0.0326 -0.117 -0.0169 -0.0481*** -0.112*** -0.0456*** 
(-1.63) (-1.01) (-1.43) (-2.12) (-2.49) (-3.13) 
       
Demand-side 
agglomeration 
0.659*** 0.762*** 0.0488* 0.502*** 0.628*** 0.00415 
(32.12) (37.37) (2.46) (24.34) (28.89) (0.20) 
       
Number of firms -0.274***  0.223*** -0.154***  0.295*** 
(-10.19)  (9.66) (-5.15)  (11.12) 
       
Stock of foreign 
Plants 
0.549*** 0.531***  0.540*** 0.492***  
(27.27) (25.65)  (24.38) (18.42)  
       
Wage variation -0.702*** -0.404*** -0.148*** -0.283*** -0.0425 0.00922 
(-14.42) (-8.48) (-4.29) (-5.60) (-0.82) (0.24) 
       
Bureaucracy 0.0743*** 0.114*** -0.0149 0.0791*** 0.112*** 0.000425 
(3.58) (5.64) (-0.67) (3.57) (5.28) (0.02) 
       
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -5.146*** -7.093*** 1.532 -5.023*** -6.576*** -0.165 
 (-8.26) (-11.58) (1.17) (-15.05) (-15.48) (-0.46) 
ln_r       
Cons 3.817*** 4.100*** 6.058*** 2.538*** 3.086*** 3.505*** 
 (7.12) (8.65) (5.12) (14.20) (11.50) (31.46) 
ln_s       
Cons 1.013*** 1.464*** 2.648*** 0.841*** 1.058*** 2.362*** 
 (15.30) (19.96) (23.92) (12.50) (14.76) (22.77) 
N 2543 2543 2543 3398 3398 3398 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of firms acquired by foreign investors in each province and in each 
sector at a certain year. Model specification is the negative binomial model with random effects. t statistics are in 
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ln_r and ln_r lines refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of 
one plus the dispersion is assumed to follow a Beta (r,s) distribution. 




There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the location determinants 
of FDI, which has accompanied the rapid growth of multinational activities in the last 
few decades. However, the majority of this literature has yet to recognise that the 
effects of location determinants are different for greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI. 
In this paper, we investigate location determinants on the two investment modes in 31 
Chinese provinces over the period from 2000 to 2005 using a negative binomial 
model. We contribute to the literature in a four other ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first of its kind comparing location determinants on 
greenfield FDI versus acquisition FDI in China, which is the second largest FDI 
recipient in the world (second only to the US). Second, unlike the use of macro-level 
data in previous studies, we employ a comprehensive firm-level dataset to identify the 
number of the two modes of FDI entries and construct dependent variables. Third, our 
empirical approach is interesting as we mainly focus on agglomeration effects which 
are motivated from the new economics geography theory. Furthermore, we also carry 
out an examination of how financial market developments have an effect on the two 
modes of FDI entries. Our findings are broadly consistent with expectations in the 
literature.  
From an agglomeration perspective, first, we find that the size of a region's 
potential market as approximated by province-industry output has a positive but small 
effect in attracting both modes of FDI inflows. This effect is marginally higher in 
greenfield FDI. It is explained that acquisition FDI takes over the existing market 
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share of the acquired firm which is not available to greenfield investment. Second, we 
find the number of incumbents of an industry acts as a centrifugal force that pushes 
greenfield FDI away, while it acts as an attraction force for foreign acquisition. Indeed, 
greenfield investments are probably more subject to competition effects and 
acquisition investments benefit from the procurement opportunities of a cluster of 
firms. The result implies that a rapid growth of acquisition FDI in recent years can be 
explained by strong procurement effect in China. Third, we also find a stock of FDI 
has a positive effect in attracting both FDI investment modes, and this effect is larger 
in the case of greenfield FDI. It is because greenfield foreign investments are 
intrinsically riskier than acquisition FDI projects. They are more reliant on signals 
that are explained by the number of existing foreign plants in the region.    
We also have investigated how financial market development affects the location 
decision of FDI in China. We do not find it has significant effect in attracting 
greenfield FDI. However, we show better financial market development encourages 
acquisition FDI. Furthermore, we observe that this effect is smaller in more financial 
dependent industries. The result is consistent with arguments in our previous chapter. 
Because of severe discrimination faced by non- state-owned firms from local financial 
institutions, more external-finance dependent firms have to sell their equities to 
foreign investor to finance their production potential. This substitution relationship 
offsets the positive effect of financial market development on growth of acquisition 
FDI in China. 
Our research provides an understanding of location characteristics that affect the 
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entry of greenfield FDI and acquisition FDI. It is an important step toward further 
investigations on the different consequences and implications of the two modes of 
FDI in the host location.    
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions 
 
1 Summary of findings 
Since acquisition FDI has dominated FDI inflows in China in recent years. This 
thesis starts with a study on foreign acquired firms in China. In Chapter 2, we explore 
the determinants of foreign acquisition and the ownership mode of acquisition in 
China, with a special focus on regional institution quality and pre-acquisition firm 
heterogeneity. The main dataset we employ is a very comprehensive Chinese 
firm-level data covering 31 Chinese provinces in the period of 2000 to 2005. The 
methodology we have applied is the binary choice logit model that estimates the 
likelihood of domestic firms being acquired by foreign investors. In our discussion, 
we explicitly distinguish fully foreign acquired and partially foreign acquired firms, 
providing the first evidence of its kind on China.   
Four interesting results stand out. First, we find that better institutional 
environment has a positive impact on the incidence of foreign acquisition in China. 
Furthermore, this impact is stronger in capital-intensive and R&D intensive industries. 
Our findings are consistent with current literature which is mainly based on aggregate 
cross-country investigations. Secondly, we find that in capital-intensive industries, 
better institution decrease the probability of domestic firms being wholly acquired. 
This finding is consistent with prediction of transaction cost theory. Thirdly, we 
confirm that acquisition FDI in China tends to take over domestic firms that are more 
productive and capital intensive. This is an evidence of 'cherry-picking' of acquisition 
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activity. We also find that more export intensive firms are significantly more likely to 
be acquired by multinationals, indicating a reflection of export-oriented acquisition 
FDI in China. Finally, conditional on foreign acquisition norms, domestic firms are 
more likely to be wholly acquired if they are smaller, younger, more capital-intensive, 
more export-intensive, and less productive. It is a supplementary result to the 
literature which suggests that more efficient parent firms prefer wholly owned 
affiliates. 
Although it is perceived that FDI in China are mainly export-oriented and we 
find evidence that more export intensive firms are more likely to be acquired by 
foreign investors, two questions remain: 1) whether acquisition FDI increases the 
export performance in the post-acquisition period, and 2) if so, whether the host 
country benefits from export-orientated FDI. We take up these research questions into 
Chapter 4, where we use propensity score and difference-in-difference methods to 
deal with causality issue and any time-invariant effects.  
A few important findings can be summarized. First, we find that acquisition FDI 
induces an increase of export intensity of the acquired exporter. We also show that 
acquisition FDI increases the likelihood of exporting by the acquired firm (which was 
a non-exporter before acquisition) compared to similar firms that have never been 
acquired. Our findings suggest that export-orientated acquisition FDI in China not 
only prefers exporting local firms but also enhance their export performance in the 
post acquisition period. Second, we do not observe any FDI-induced productivity 
upgrade in the acquired firm. This finding is a supplement to some existing literature 
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that finds positive inter-firm productivity spillover from foreign investment. One 
explanation could be that only a small share of FDI in China comes from developed 
countries. In fact, Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FDI takes a lion share of 60 
percent of the accumulated FDI inflows in 2002. FDI from the U.S. only takes less 
than 9 percent. Third, we find there is a significant improvement in the financial status 
of the acquired firm in the post-acquisition period, compared to similar firms 
remaining domestic. Our finding is consistent with the argument that acquisition FDI 
plays a substitution role if the financial market of the host location is 
under-developed.     
Having understood the determinants and impacts of acquisition FDI in China, we 
turn our focus on greenfield FDI which is also growing fast. In Chapter 4, we apply a 
negative binomial model to evaluate how regional characteristics determine the 
attractiveness on greenfield FDI compared with acquisition FDI. Inspired by the new 
economic geography theory, we focus on the effects of agglomeration on FDI activity 
in a region. Some most interesting results are summarized here. Firstly, we find that 
greenfield FDI is diverted away from clusters of establishments of an industry in the 
same region because the (congestion-like) competition effect dominates. However, 
acquisition FDI is encouraged by a higher concentration of firms of an industry in a 
region, indicating that the procurement opportunities have a strong effect on 
acquisition FDI in China. Second, we find that industry-region specific FDI stock has 
positive effect on attracting foreign investors, and this effect is stronger for greenfield 
investors. It implies greenfield FDI, which is a riskier investment strategy, is more 
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dependent on the signal reflecting investing environment of existing foreign 
investments. Last, but not the least, we find financial market development does not 
affect greenfield investment significantly, since greenfield project is directly financed 
by foreign investor. Furthermore, we find a better financial market encourages 
acquisition FDI, since to acquire a local asset involves local financial institutions. 
Interestingly, this effect is significantly lower in high external financial dependent 
industries. In fact, private firms that depend highly on external finance but face 
discrimination from local financial institutions have to seek capital from foreign 
investors by selling equity. This effect offsets the positive effect of financial market 
improvement on acquisition FDI.  
 
2 Future research 
There are still limitations facing this study in understanding inward FDI in a 
developing economy, which motivate future researches in mainly three aspects.  
First, a limited literature has evaluated whether greenfield FDI and acquisition 
FDI have different impacts on the host economy, especially based on micro-level 
analysis. In discussion on the determinants of greenfield FDI and acquisition 
FDI, Görg (2000) shows that more technologically advanced multinationals prefer 
greenfield investment due to the higher adaption costs they will incur in acquisition. 
Nocke and Yeaple (2008) shows that more productive firms tend to establish a new 
plant in a host location rather than acquire an existing one, using a binary model on 
U.S. multinationals. Therefore, it is interesting to assess whether these findings 
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predict a host economy benefits from productivity spill-over more from greenfield 
FDI than acquisition FDI?  
Second, although we have not identified the factor accounting for the 
FDI-induced export increase, there are other potential factors may attract attention if 
data is available. Rauch (1999) points out that international trade has been 
increasingly dependent on the transmission of complex information. Therefore, one 
would expect that foreign investors who possess a wide network in the global market 
can facilitate an increase in export performance in the post acquisition period. We 
could provide empirical evidence to support this hypothesis if we had data indicating 
export reliance on information provided by foreign investors.  
Third, like the most of current studies, we consider ownership modes and 
investment modes as discrete choices of multinationals. Empirical investigation on the 
determinants of modes of FDI with a joint consideration is scarce. A recent study by 
Raff et al. (2012) jointly estimates both ownership modes and investment modes of 
FDI entries with a nested logit model using Japanese firm-level data, in which a 
sequence of decisions is arbitrarily assigned. In fact, both ownership modes and 
investment modes are explained by similar firm-specific and host location-specific 
determinants in theory. It would possibly mean that these factors affect all modes of 
entries at the same time. Therefore, a multinational firm considers all entry 
alternatives in its profit optimisation problem. Following this direction, we would 
investigate how location characteristics have effects on all four modes of foreign entry 
in a host economy, namely greenfield joint venture, greenfield wholly foreign owned 
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firm, acquired joint venture, and acquired wholly foreign owned firm.        





Table A1. Number of Acquisitions 
 





       
2001 103,668 1,636 105,304 931 705 1,636 
2002 124,401 1,899 126,300 1,091 808 1,899 
2003 129,504 1,743 131,247 994 749 1,743 
2004 123,020 3,711 126,731 1,740 1,971 3,711 
2005 198,744 4,075 202,819 1,852 2,223 4,075 
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Table A2. Robustness Check: Logit Model of Acquisition: Continuous Industry Variables 
 Dependent Variable: For all Firms: Acquired firm=1&Domestic 
firm=0 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Regional Institutions 0.00148*** 0.00107** 0.00702*** 0.00644*** 
-0.00043 -0.0004 -0.00054 -0.00054 
Foreign Presence 0.00460*** 0.00442*** 0.00319*** 0.00248*** 
-0.00019 -0.00018 -0.00017 -0.00016 
Average Wages 0.00315***  0.00302***  
-0.00047  -0.00042  
Regional GDP per Capita 0.00897*** 0.01012***   
-0.0006 -0.00053   
     
Firm Export Share 0.00878*** 0.00830*** 0.00883*** 0.00813*** 
-0.00199 -0.00193 -0.00201 -0.00198 
Firm Employment 0.00432*** 0.00404*** 0.00362*** 0.00334*** 
-0.00025 -0.00024 -0.00024 -0.00022 
Firm Labour productivity 0.00240*** 0.00215*** 0.00176*** 0.00178*** 
-0.00015 -0.00015 -0.00014 -0.00014 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.00321*** 0.00308*** 0.00307*** 0.00308*** 
-0.00013 -0.00012 -0.00011 -0.00011 
Firm Age -0.00064*** -0.00065*** -0.00063*** -0.00060*** 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
     
Indu. K-intensity     0.00173*** 
   -0.00046 
Indu. R&D intensity    0.00039* 
   -0.00018 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes No 
N 474,482 474,482 474,482 474,482 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3. Robustness Check: Logit Model of Acquisition with Interaction Terms: 
Continuous Industry Variables 
 Dependent Variable: For all Firms: Acquired firm=1&Domestic 
firm=0 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Regional Institutions 0.00290**  0.00993***  
-0.00108  -0.00085  
(Indu. KL)*(Region 
Institution) 
0.00083*** 0.00077***   
-0.00023 -0.00023   
(Indu. R&D)*(Region 
Institution) 
  0.00031*** 0.00028*** 
-0.00006   -0.00006 
Foreign Presence 0.00239*** 0.00236*** 0.00240*** 0.00246*** 
-0.00016  -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00016 
Average Wages 0.00356*** 0.00346*** 0.00335*** 0.00235*** 
-0.00041  -0.00041 -0.00041 -0.00041 
Regional GDP per Capita -0.02606*** -0.02453*** -0.02679*** -0.02576*** 
-0.0032 -0.0032 -0.00318 -0.00318 
     
Firm Export Share 0.00812*** 0.00768*** 0.00809*** 0.00813*** 
-0.00197 -0.00197 -0.00197 -0.00197 
Firm Employment 0.00333*** 0.00343*** 0.00323*** 0.00336*** 
-0.00022 -0.00022 -0.00022 -0.00022 
Firm Labour productivity 0.00175*** 0.00174*** 0.00176*** 0.00177*** 
-0.00014 -0.00014 -0.00014 -0.00014 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.00305*** 0.00302*** 0.00305** 0.00306*** 
-0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00011 
Firm Age -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00060*** 
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Region Dummy No Yes No Yes 
N 474,469 474,469 474,469 474,469 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4. Robustness Check for Mode of Acquisition: Continuous Industry Variables 
 Dependent Variable: For all Acquired Firms: WOEs=1&JVs=0 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Regional Institutions 0.17044*** 0.16565*** -0.00416 -0.00706 
-0.01167 -0.01182 -0.02514 -0.02535 
Foreign Presence 0.00299 0.00282 0.0008 -0.0054 
-0.00539 -0.00543 -0.00578 -0.0061 
Average Wages 0.01001  -0.04511*  
-0.01691  -0.01835  
Regional GDP per Capita -0.04773* -0.02979   
-0.01879 -0.02043   
     
Firm Export Share 0.10995*** 0.11081*** 0.10733*** 0.09816*** 
-0.0129 -0.01295 -0.01392 -0.01411 
Firm Employment -0.00475 -0.00484 -0.01347* -0.01667** 
-0.00492 -0.00493 -0.0053 -0.00546 
Firm Labour productivity -0.02520*** -0.02579*** -0.02542*** -0.02417*** 
-0.0052 -0.00521 -0.00556 -0.00564 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.01108* 0.01073* 0.01360** 0.01657*** 
-0.00431 -0.00431 -0.00449 -0.00459 
Firm Age -0.01510*** -0.01529*** -0.01662*** -0.01651*** 
-0.00129 -0.00131 -0.00155 -0.00157 
     
Indu. K-intensity    -0.01807 
   -0.01361 
Indu. R&D intensity    -0.002 
   -0.00811 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes No 
N 10,829 10,829 10,825 10,822 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5. Robustness Check: Logit Model of Acquisition with Interaction Terms: Marginal 
Effects, Continuous Industry Variables 
 Dependent Variable: For all Acquired Firms: WOEs=1&JVs=0 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Regional Institutions 0.11498*  0.01265  
-0.04757  -0.03832  
(Indu. KL)*(Region 
Institution) 
-0.02913** -0.03326**   
-0.00964 -0.01033   
(Indu. R&D)*(Region 
Institution) 
  0.00155 0.00033 
-0.0025   -0.00246 
Foreign Presence -0.00342 -0.00449 -0.00645 -0.0066 
-0.00629  -0.00614 -0.0063 -0.00613 
Average Wages -0.04760* -0.04537* -0.03574 -0.05152** 
-0.01987  -0.01881 -0.01985 -0.01897 
Regional GDP per Capita 0.22712  0.23619  
-0.17095  -0.17031  
     
Firm Export Share 0.09849*** 0.09681*** 0.09755*** 0.09582*** 
-0.01418 -0.01422 -0.01409 -0.01412 
Firm Employment -0.01714** -0.01787** -0.01652** -0.01735** 
-0.00545 -0.0055 -0.00547 -0.00552 
Firm Labour productivity -0.02414*** -0.02455*** -0.02423*** -0.02429*** 
-0.00564 -0.00578 -0.00564 -0.00578 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.01672*** 0.01757*** 0.01635*** 0.01731*** 
-0.00459 -0.00466 -0.00458 -0.00465 
Firm Age -0.01643*** -0.01677*** -0.01650*** -0.01684*** 
-0.00157 -0.00157 -0.00157 -0.00157 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Region Dummy No Yes No Yes 
N 474,469 474,469 474,469 474,469 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Robustness Check for Mode of Acquisition: Different Equity Thresholds for 
Defining Foreign Enterprises: Marginal Effects 
 Dependent Variable: For all Acquired Firms: acquired 
firm=1&Domestic firm=0 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Foreign equity  ൒ 10% Foreign equity  ൒ 50% Foreign equity  ൒ 75% 
Regional Institutions 0.00144*** 0.00147*** 0.00166*** 
(0.98) (1.18) (1.00) 
Foreign Presence 0.00296*** 0.00233*** 0.00222*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Average Wages 0.0541*** 0.0901* 0.210*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Regional GDP per Capita -0.0991** -0.0588*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0073) (-0.0003) 
Firm Export Share 0.00848*** 0.00829*** 0.00892*** 
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0015) 
Firm Employment 0.00431*** 0.00404*** 0.00362*** 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Firm Labour productivity 0.00248*** 0.00223*** 0.00179*** 
(0.000) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.00309*** 0.00301*** 0.00318*** 
(0.000) (0.00012) (0.00011) 
Firm Age -0.00064*** -0.00065*** -0.00063*** 
(0.000) (-0.00002) (-0.00002) 
Indu. K/L Ratio 0.0007 0.0009 0.00001 
(-0.00046) (-0.00056) (-0.00051) 
Indu. R&D intensity dummy -0.00034 -0.00056 0.00065** 
(-0.00031) (-0.0003) (0.00032) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No 
Constant -1.440*** -1.339*** -0.0409 
 (-4.83) (-4.48) (-0.13) 
Observation 474,482 474,482 474,482 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 











Table A7. Robustness Check for Mode of Acquisition: Different Equity Thresholds for 
Defining Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises: Marginal effects 
 Dependent Variable: For all Acquired Firms: WOEs=1&JVs=0 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Foreign equity  ൒ 10% ൒ 50% Foreign equity  Foreign equity  ൒ 75% 
Regional Institutions -0.00252*** -0.00352*** -0.00402*** 
(0.00157) ˄0.00172˅ ˄0.00162˅ 
Foreign Presence -0.00443 -0.00558 -0.00647 
 (0.0060) (0.00508) (0.00602) 
Average Wages -0.02049 -0.03331 -0.04242 
 (0.01724) (0.01863) ˄0.01856˅ 
Regional GDP per Capita 0.26345 0.25541 0.34151 
 (0.17261) (0.17245) ˄0.19384˅ 
Firm Export Share 0.08350*** 0.10359*** 0.10412*** 
(0.01406) (0.01405) (0.01405) 
Firm Employment -0.01625** -0.01624*** -0.01636** 
(0.00546) (0.00546) (0.00546) 
Firm Labour productivity -0.02436*** -0.02463*** -0.02502*** 
(0.00565) (0.00564) (0.00564) 
Firm K/L Ratio 0.01565*** 0.01664*** 0.01514*** 
(0.00457) (0.00454) (0.00457) 
Firm Age -0.01660*** -0.01661*** -0.01662*** 
(0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00157) 
Indu. K/L Ratio -0.04756*** -0.04759*** -0.04734*** 
(0.01239) (0.01239) (0.01239) 
Indu. R&D intensity dummy 0.03923** 0.03976** 0.03945** 
(0.01322) (0.01322) (0.01322) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No 
Constant -1.440*** -1.339*** -0.0409 
 (-4.83) (-4.48) (-0.13) 
Observation 13,769 9567 7256 
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Independent variables are logged except export share and all dummies. 





The balancing test examines the standardised differences for the vector of 
covariates used in the propensity-score estimation. According to Smith and Todd 
(2005), the standardised bias is defined as the difference in means of a variable 
between the foreign-acquired firms and the successfully matched control firms, scaled 






σ ൣXi െσ g൫pi , pj൯XjjאC ൧iאTටVariאTሺXሻ + VarjאCሺXሻ
2
 
where Xi is the mean in the treatment group before matching and Xj  the analogue 
for the control group. VariאTሺXሻ is the variance in the treatment group before 
matching and VarjאC  is the variance for the control group. 
Note that the lower the standardised differences, the more balanced or similar the 
treatment and comparison groups will be in terms of the variable under consideration. 
Although there is no formal criterion about how large a standardised bias should be 
considered as serious, we are guided by the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) 
which suggests that a value of 20 is large. Furthermore, we report a t-test between 
acquired and matched comparison groups. In general, we find that balancing 
conditions are satisfied for key variables.   
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